1. Electronic Voting Ronald L. Rivest MIT CSAIL Norway June 14, 2004

2. Outline u PK Cryptography – very short history u Introduction to Voting u Voting using mix-nets u Randomized Partial Checking (Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest USENIX ‘02) u Pedagogic variant of Chaum’s proposal

3. PK Cryptography short history u 1976 – Diffie&Hellman New Directions in Cryptography: proposed DH key agreement and PKC u 1977 – RSA PK scheme proposed u 1980’s – Academic crypto blossoms; 1000’s of papers published (e.g. 1985 El Gamal PKC; 1985 Zero Knowledge GMR; …) u 1990’s World Wide Web (SSH; e-commerce begins); academic research continues to blossom (e.g. 1998 Cramer-Shoup PKC) u 2000’s – ?? Crypto applied to voting ??

4. Outline u PK Cryptography – very short history u Introduction to Voting u Voting using mix-nets u Randomized Partial Checking (Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest USENIX ‘02) u Pedagogic variant of Chaum’s proposal

5. Voting tech is in transition… u Voting tech follows technology: Stones  Paper  Levers  Punch cards  Op-scan  Computers(??) u Punch cards “out” after Nov. ’00 u DRE’s (touch-screen) require VVPAT (voter-verified paper audit trail) in Cal. u Is technology ready for electronic (paperless) voting?

8. Voting is a hard problem u Voter Registration - each eligible voter votes at most once u Voter Privacy – no one can tell how any voter voted, even if voter wants it; no “receipt” for voter u Integrity – votes can’t be changed, added, or deleted; tally is accurate. u Availability – voting system is available for use when needed u Ease of Use – esp. for disabled

9. Voting is important u Cornerstone of our (any!) democracy u Voting security is clearly an aspect of national security. u “Those who vote determine nothing; those who count the votes determine everything.” -- Joseph Stalin

10. Are DRE’s trustworthy? u Diebold fiascoes..?? u Intrinsic difficulty of designing and securing complex systems u Many units (100,000’s) in field, used occasionally, and managed by the semi-trained u Certification process is “riddled with problems” (NYT editorial 5/30/04)

11. Voter-Verified Paper Audit Trails? u Rebecca Mercuri: Voting machine should produce “paper audit trail” that voter can inspect and approve. u VVPAT is “official ballot” in case of dispute or recounts. u David Dill (Stanford CS Prof.) initiated on-line petition that ultimately resulted in California requiring VVPAT’s on many DRE’s.

12. VVPAT’s controversial… u Still need to guard printed ballots. u Two-step voting procedure may be awkward for some voters (e.g. disabled). u Doesn’t catch all problems (e.g. candidate missing from slate) u Malicious voters can cause DOS by casting suspicion on voting machine u Not “end-to-end” security: –Helps ensure votes “cast as intended” –Doesn’t help ensure votes “counted as cast”.

13. Outline u PK Cryptography – very short history u Introduction to Voting u Voting using mix-nets u Randomized Partial Checking (Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest USENIX ‘02) u Pedagogic variant of Chaum’s proposal

14. Can cryptography help? u Yes – using “mix-nets” (Chaum) and “voter-verified secret ballots” (Chaum; Neff) u Official ballot is electronic not paper. u Ballot is encrypted version of choices. u Ballots posted on public bulletin board. u Voter gets paper “receipt” so she can: –Ensure that her ballot is properly posted –Detect voting machine error or fraud

15. Voting using mix-nets u E: encrypt choices  ballot (done at each voting machine) u S 1 …S k : mix-servers provide anonymity (secretly permute and re-encrypt) u D: decrypt ballots (trustees threshold decrypt) ES2S2 DS1S1 SkSk Posted on bulletin board (Plaintext choices) Plaintext choices

16. Voter needs evidence u That her vote is “cast as intended”: u That her ballot is indeed encryption of her choices, and what her ballot is. This is extremely challenging, since She can’t compute much herself She can’t take away anything that would allow her to prove how she voted u So: she takes away evidence that allows her (as she exits polling site) to detect whether cheating occurred, and receipt to prove what her ballot is.

17. Everyone needs evidence u That votes are “counted as cast”: u That mix-servers (“mixes”) properly permute and re-encrypt ballots. This is challenging, since Mixes can not reveal the permutation they applied to ballots u That trustees properly decrypt the permuted ballots This is relatively straightforward, using known techniques.

18. Outline u PK Cryptography – very short history u Introduction to Voting u Voting using mix-nets u Randomized Partial Checking (Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest USENIX ‘02) u Pedagogic variant of Chaum’s proposal

19. Robust mixes u Provide proof (or at least strong evidence) of their correct operation. u Anyone can check proof. u Even if all mixes are corrupt and collude, it is infeasible for them to produce such proof (universally verifiable). u Proof does not reveal input / output correspondence! Proof or evidence

20. Practical Robust Mixes u Jakobsson “Flash Mix” (PODC ‘99) u Mitomo and Kurosawa (Asiacrypt ‘00) u Desmedt and Kurosawa (EC ‘00) u Neff (ACM CCS ‘01) u Furukawa-Sako (Crypto ‘01) u Golle (ACM CCS ‘02) u Golle, Zhong, Boneh, Jakobsson, Juels (Asiacrypt ‘02) u …

21. “Randomized Partial Checking Mix u Conceptually very simple u Very efficient u Works with any cryptosystem u Aimed at voting u Force each mix to reveal and prove half of its input-output correspondences u No complete path from input to output revealed; voter’s anonymity preserved within set of at least ½ the voters.

22. RPC illustrated u Mixes are paired (S 1,S 2 ), (S 3,S 4 ), etc. u For each ballot B between elements of a pair (e.g. (S 1,S 2 )), produce “challenge bit” b from hash of all bulletin board contents u If b = 0, first server must reveal where B came from and prove it by revealing keys/randomness. u If b = 1, second server must reveal where B goes and prove it by revealing keys/randomness. ES2S2 DS1S1 SkSk

23. Security theorem u An adversary who queries random oracle (  hash function) at most q times will have a chance of at most q 2 -t of producing a bulletin board transcript that passes public verification yet where the vote count has been altered by t votes.

24. Outline u PK Cryptography – very short history u Introduction to Voting u Voting using mix-nets u Randomized Partial Checking (Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest USENIX ‘02) u Pedagogic variant of Chaum’s proposal

25. A pedagogical variant of Chaum’s voting proposal u Used in my class this spring as introductory example, before going into details of Chaum’s and Neff’s schemes. u Captures many significant features, but not all; some problems/concerns not well handled. u Intended to be simpler to explain and understand than full versions. u Related to Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest RPC mix- net scheme. u Main ideas (e.g. cut and choose) already present in Chaum’s scheme.

26. Pedagogical variant (overview) u Voting machine produces ballot that is encryption of voter’s choices. u Ballot is posted on bulletin board as “official cast ballot” (electronic). u Voter given receipt copy of ballot. u Voter given evidence that ballot correctly encodes his intended choices. u Ciphertexts “mixed” for anonymity. u Ciphertexts decrypted and counted (threshold decryption by trustees).

27. Pedagogical variant (details) u Voter V i prepares choices B i u Machine prints and signs B i, C i, D i, r i, s i and gives them to voter. C i is encryption of B i (randomization r i ) D i is re-encryption of C i (randomization s i ) u If voter doesn’t like B i, she starts over. u Voter destroys either r i or s i, and keeps the other information as evidence (paper). u Voting machine signs and posts (V i, D i,”final”), and gives (paper) receipt copy to voter. u Final D i ’s mixed up (mixnet), decrypted, and counted.

28. Pedagogical variant (details) BiBi CiCi DiDi riri sisi u El-Gamal encryption and re-encryption: C i = (g r i, B i *y r i ), D i = (g r i +s i,B i *y r i +s i ) u Voter keeps only one link as evidence (similar to Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest, or Chaum) u Any attempt by voting machine to cheat will be detected with probability ½. u Voter can check evidence on exit. u Signed B i ’s are easy to get…

29. Pedagogical variant (details) BiBi CiCi DiDi riri u El-Gamal encryption and re-encryption: C i = (g r i, B i *y r i ), D i = (g r i +s i,B i *y r i +s i ) u Voter keeps only one link as evidence (similar to Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest, or Chaum) u Any attempt by voting machine to cheat will be detected with probability ½. u Voter can check evidence on exit. u Signed B i ’s are easy to get…

30. Pedagogical variant (details) BiBi CiCi DiDi sisi u El-Gamal encryption and re-encryption: C i = (g r i, B i *y r i ), D i = (g r i +s i,B i *y r i +s i ) u Voter keeps only one link as evidence (similar to Jakobsson/Juels/Rivest, or Chaum) u Any attempt by voting machine to cheat will be detected with probability ½. u Voter can check evidence on exit. u Signed B i ’s are easy to get…

31. Variant with “visual crypto” u Naor/Shamir: can do “xor” visually: += + + + = = = 0 + 0 = 0 0 + 1 = 1 1 + 0 = 1 1 + 1 = 0

32. Variant with visual crypto u Print B i ’ and B i ’’ on transparencies u Visually verify B i ’ + B i ’’ = B i u Keeps D’ i, D’’ i, and either (B’ i,r’ i ) or (B’’ i,r’’ i ) B’ i D’ i r’ i B’’ i D’’ i r’’ i BiBi +

33. Variant with visual crypto u Print B i ’ and B i ’’ on transparencies u Visually verify B i ’ + B i ’’ = B i u Keeps D’ i, D’’ i, and either (B’ i,r’ i ) or (B’’ i,r’’ i ) B’ i D’ i r’ i D’’ i

34. Variant with visual crypto u Print B i ’ and B i ’’ on transparencies u Visually verify B i ’ + B i ’’ = B i u Keeps D’ i, D’’ i, and either (B’ i,r’ i ) or (B’’ i,r’’ i ) D’ i B’’ i D’’ i r’’ i

35. Variant with visual crypto u Any attempt by voting machine to cheat will result in detection with probability ½.

36. Pedagogical variant (summary) u Schemes such as these (Chaum / Neff) provide an interesting degree of “end-to-end” security: from voter’s intentions to final tally. u Paper is used, but not to record official ballots or for recounts, but as commitments so fraud and error can be detected.

37. Conclusions u Voting technology is in a state of transition to electronics. u It seems possible to have electronic voting without: trusting machines for integrity using paper ballots for recounts revealing how any voter votes u How can we do all of this well?

38. (The End)