1. Lijphart C7: Exec-legislative relations C8: Electoral Systems

2. Presidential V. Parliamentary  Major Differences Separation and confidence Nature of election Collegial v. noncollegial  Other Differences Separation of powers means that executive officers cannot serve in the legislature (there are some exceptions in some parliamentary systems) Presidents cannot dissolve the legislature Head of State v. Head of Government

4. Simple Models: Parl v. Pres Source: http://dss.ucsd.edu/~mshugart/semi-presidentialism.pdfhttp://dss.ucsd.edu/~mshugart/semi-presidentialism.pdf

5. Veto Gates: UK v. US  UK: One veto gate: House of Commons (ignoring House of Lords, which is not powerless, but is definitely weaker than House of Commons)  US has three elected veto gates Presidency House of Representatives Senate

6. Veto Gates: UK v. US US: Separate origin and survival of each institution: --must transact Inter-branch transactions, even if the same party has presidency and congressional majorities

7. Parliamentary Systems with Minority or Coalitional Governments  Still hierarchical relationship of cabinet to parliament …cabinet survives only so long as it does not lose the “confidence” of the legislative majority  But absence of a majority means inter- party transactions (i.e., among multiple veto players)

8. Presidential Systems: US v. Brazil Compared to the US, Brazil’s presidency is “stronger”: Decree power And “weaker”: Veto can be overridden by 50%+1 (not two thirds) Note: Lula’s PT won 19.2% of the vote for Senate in 2006, electing 6 of the 27 senators up for election and 15% of the vote for deputies, winning 83 out of 513 seats

9. Hybrid/Semi-Presidential/Mixed Systems  President elected by the public  Appoints a PM and Cabinet Subject to Parliamentary Approval  “Cohabitation”  Examples: France, Russia (many others)

10. Semi-Presidential Systems

11. On Varieties of Semi-Presidentialism

12. France (a Premier-Presidential System)  France 1981: François Mitterrand, Socialist Party, elected President in May, 1981  But National Assembly (474 seats, five-year term), elected in 1978: Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists102 Communists 86 Opposition Gaullists178 UDF124

13. France 1981: President Mitterrand exercised his constitutional authority to dissolve parliament 19781981 (14 June) Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists102 268 Communists 86 43 Opposition Gaullists142 80 UDF124 59 …able to appoint a Socialist premier and cabinet (Pierre Mauroy)

14. 1986 National Assembly election Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists198 Communists 32 Opposition Gaullists146 UDF128

15. Cohabitation! Mitterrand had to appoint a premier from the Gaullist–UDF alliance (Jacques Chirac)

16. France 1988: Mitterrand reelected, dissolved parliament again 19861988 Mitterrand’s alliance: Socialists198260 Communists 32 24 Opposition Gaullists146123 UDF128130 …Mitterrand able to appoint a Socialist premier again (Michel Rocard)

17. France 1997  President is now Jacques Chirac, elected 1995  Chirac dissolved parliament in 1997

18. France 1997 19931997 Chirac’s alliance Gaullists243132 UDF209161 Left opposition Socialists 67244 Communists 24 35 …Chirac must appoint a Socialist premier (Lionel Jospin). Cohabitation again!

19. Semi-Presidentialism in Poland is Confusing  President Lech Kaczyński PM Jarosław Kaczyński 

23. Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR  Types of Plurality/Majority SMD/FPTP True majority systems  2-Round run-off systems often used in presidential races like in AL primaries  French System  Alternative Vote

24. Electoral Formula: Plurality/Majority Systems v. PR  PR Systems List PR  lists are closed (signif?)  differing PR formulae Mixed Member Proportional STV

25. Political Effect of Electoral Rules  Mechanical Effects: how do the rules impact the translation of votes into seats?  Psychological Effects: how do those impacts influence the choices of voters?

26. Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis  Duverger’s Law: “Plurality rule tends to reduce the number of parties to two, regardless of the number of issue dimensions” (Taageperga and Shugart 1989:65)  Duverger’s Hypothesis: “PR rules tend not to reduced the number of parties, if the number of issue dimensions favors the existence of many parties” (ibid., 65).

27. Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis (Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989:143)

28. Duverger’s Law & Hypothesis (Source: Taagepera and Shugart, 1989:144)

29. Source: Lijphart 1994:154-155

31. Ballot Example: Closed List-PR Source: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htmhttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htm

32. Ballot Example: Open List-PR Source: http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htmhttp://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/polit/damy/BeginnningReading/PRsystems.htm

33. STV Example: Ireland Source: Mair 1986: 292

34. Ireland and STV  See: http://electionsireland.org/counts.cfm?election =2002&cons=57&ref= http://electionsireland.org/counts.cfm?election =2002&cons=57&ref

35. Mixed Member Systems Source: http://www.gnb.ca/0100/Doc/fact7mixed-e.pdfhttp://www.gnb.ca/0100/Doc/fact7mixed-e.pdf

36. Mixed Member Systems  German elections: http://www.electionresources.org/de/ http://www.electionresources.org/de/

38. A MMP Sample Ballot

39. German Bundestag Ballot

41. Source: Lijphart, et al. 1986:160

46. Sources Note: material on veto gates and France via Matthew Shugart (personal correspondence)