1. Eliminative Materialism
The Case Against Folk Psychology

2. Intertheoretic Reduction
Certain (usually older) theories can be seen as special cases of other (usually newer) theories
We say the older theory reduces to, or is reduced by, the newer theory
Kepler’s planetary astronomy reduces to Newton’s Laws of Motion
Newton’s Laws of Motion reduce to Einstein’s General Relativity
Common sense theory of sound reduces to physical theory of compression waves in a plastic medium
Common sense theory of heat reduces to kinetic theory
A genuine reduction occurs when, in the newer theory, we can derive a set of claims about certain objects and their relations which are relevantly isomorphic to (sufficiently mirror) the claims of the old theory
Note that this is a matter of degree
Within Newton’s system, one can basically deduce Kepler’s system
Within General Relativity, Newton’s Laws turn out only to be very close approximations requiring the assumption of low masses, low velocities, and short distances
Not every aspect of common sense theory of sound/heat reduces to physical theory

3. Intertheoretic Reduction
When a Reduction occurs, the language of the old theory may be dispensed with, but (a significant amount of) the structure of the old theory lives on within the new theory
Thus reduced theories are NOT eliminated
They are, in a sense, given legitimacy
They are incorporated into a new and more encompassing theory
Identity Theorists think that FP will reduce to Neurology
Functionalists and Classical AI theorists think that FP will reduce to a more abstract theory of formally specified symbols and operations
Dennett Rejects the question of reduction as inappropriate, misunderstanding the function and success of FP

4. Theory Elimination
When the resources of a new theory outstrip that of an old theory, and there is no portion of the new theory which sufficiently mirrors the old, the old theory is said to be eliminated
The New replaces the Old
The Old loses its legitimacy
Little to no structure of the old is preserved
Copernican/Newtonian (heliocentric) view of the Solar system eliminates the Ptolemaic/Aristotelian (geocentric) view
Kinetic theory of heat eliminates the caloric theory
Oxidation theory of combustion eliminates the phlogiston theory
Neuro-psychological theories of mental illness eliminate theories of humors and daemonic possession
We find is that we were seriously wrong about what objects existed and how they interrelated to produce the phenomena we were theorizing about

5. Eliminative Materialism
Folk Psychology is a “radically false” and “radically misleading” conception of human cognition and the causes of human behavior
FP will be replaced by a “completed neuroscience”
“Our mutual understanding and even our introspection may then be reconstituted within the [more powerful] conceptual framework of completed neuroscience”

6. The Case Against FP
Serious Explanatory, Predictive, and Manipulative poverty
History of Stagnation and Retreat
Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical Theory
1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promise
A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater than that of reduction

7. 1. Explanatory, Predictive, and Manipulative Poverty
Normal mental processes poorly explained or not explained
Sleep, learning, memory, creativity, motor coordination, differences in intelligence
Abnormal mental processes poorly explained or not explained
Mental illness, effects of brain damage, intoxication, psychopharmacological effects
Special importance on explanation of learning

8. 1.c. Special importance on explanation of learning
No account of pre- and non-linguistic learning
No good account of learning a first language
No good account of the underlying dynamics and kinematics of learning in general
No good account of conceptual change in the individual

9. 2. History of Stagnation and Retreat
Virtually every other folk theory has been eliminated—motion, heaven, fire, life, etc.—unlikely we got this one right on the first try
Many domains of phenomena once explained via the intentional categories of FP, now explained in physical terms—behavior of seasons, weather, animals, geology—intentional categories of FP are in retreat
FP has not significantly advance in 3–4 millennia

10. 3. Little Hope of Integration into Overall Physical Theory
Biology, physiology, evolutionary theory, neurology—all show a high degree of integration into our basic physics
FP shows little or no hope of such integration
FP shows little or no hope of progressing Further to address its failings (stagnation again)

11. 4. Profile of of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promise
1.–3. combine for a story of failure, stagnation, retreat, lack of promise

12. A Priori Argument
A priori, the likelihood of elimination is greater than that of reduction
More ways for Neuroscience to be successful while eliminating FP, than way for Neuroscience to be successful while reducing FP
See pp of Matter and Consciousness
See Also p.45 for “The Vision”

13. Some Standard Objections to EM
FP is not an empirical falsifiable theory
Rather it is the abstract descriptive core required to understand any system as intelligent and rational (no matter the instantiation)
Traditional functionalism, classical AI, Dennett’s intentional stance
Rather, its central core concerning Propositional Attitudes is normative, characterizing the ideal reasoner
Being normative it cannot be falsified (?)
Dennett? Fodor?

14. Some Standard Objections to EM
I can Introspect Beliefs, Desires Qualia, How could I be wrong about what I most directly know?
Self-Effacing/Incoherent—see p. 48
Mountains out of Molehills

15. Clark’s Objections
Tension between the propositional modularity apparently required by our notion of mental causation and extreme holistic nature of neural nets
Could there be a deeper unity?
Deny that FP committed to inner propositions (Dennett, scattered causes)
Accept incompatibility and go eliminativist
(Not Noticed By Clark) Find a deeper unity, but of a structure which does not vindicate FP (Churchland, cf. p. 76 of Mindware)

16. Clark’s Objections Thought is systematic (Fodor and Pylyshyn)
So internal representations must be structured
Connectionist models lack structured internal representations
So connectionist models are not good models of human thought
Clark’s two suggested responses
Classical symbol systems not the only way of supporting structured representations (Churchland)
Human thought might gain what systematicity it displays from the structure of human language (Clark? Dennett)
Bag-of-tricks—no central code or processor, but a bunch of different (possibly multi-tasked and/or redundant) modules (somehow) working in concert (Dennett, Churchland)

17. Clark’s Objections Biological Reality Artificiality of tasks
Choice of problem structure
Abstraction and over-simplification
Dimensionality of input
Lack of exploitation of real-world structure for problem solving
One-network-one-task attitude
Over-simplification of the structure and function of neurons