1. Company LOGO WEB SYSTEM

2. Components of a Generic Web Application System

3. URL Mappings to the Web Application System

4. Web Application Architecture

5. Web Server vs Web Application  Web Server:  Serves client request and forward to proper application for further processing (e.g. IIS, Apache, thttpd and etc.)  Web Application:  Using programming language (e.g. ASP, PHP, Java,.Net, Perl or C) to  implement business logic and serve the client  Web Application does not run without Web Server  Web Server does run without Web Application (Serving static content)  Web Application should contain:  Web Server and underlying OS  Web Application Code  Backend Server

6. Web Server Vulnerability  Can be identified by:  Port scan for web related ports (TCP 80, 443 and etc)  Vulnerability scanner (Whisker.pl, N-Stealth, Nikto.pl and others)  Example:  IIS  File system traversal vulnerability  Unicode and superflous decode vulnerability  Various buffer overflow in ISAPI filters (.ida,.printer, WebDAV and etc)  Impact:  Usually the attacker can take over the system running the web server

7. Web Application Vulnerability  Vulnerability on web application itself  Can be identified by:  Source code review  Application testing  Automatic scanner  Manual testing  Example:  SQL or command Injection  E-Shop lifting  Passport reset password flaw  Impact:  Data confidentiality and integrity breached  System compromised

8. Flowchart for a One-Way Web Hack  We need two things to make an effective  attack:  Interactive terminal access  Ability to transfer files

9. Step 1: Finding the Entry Point  URL parsing vulnerability  n Unicode / Double decode attack  http://www1.example.com/scripts/..%c0%af../winnt/system32/cmd.Exe?/C+copy+c:\winnt\sys tem32\cmd.Exe+c:\inetpub \scripts  Parameter parsing vulnerability  Example: script uses open() insecurely  http://www2.example.com/cgi- bin/news.cgi?story=101003.txt|cp+/bin/sh+/usr/local/apache/cgi-bin/sh.cgi  SQL Injection  Etc…

10. Invoking the Command Interpreter

11. Invoking the Command Interpreter, con’t  Care must be taken to get cmd.exe to receive commands properly  Content-length must be right  Remember to run “exit” command  Make a script to automate POSTing  commands  This can be done for /bin/sh, too

12. Web Based Command Prompt  POSTing commands isn’t desirable  We want to run commands interactively  And we don’t want to trip an IDS or get blocked by a firewall  Solution: web based command prompt

13. Web Based Command Prompt (WCP)

14. Installing the Web Based Command Prompt  How do we get our script on the server?  Use our script for POSTing commands  Script files: write to a file one line at a time using “echo”  Script files usually don’t need extra permissions  Binary files: on certain shells you can echo  arbitrary characters to a file  echo -e "\x0B\xAD\xC0\xDE\x0B\xAD\xC0\xDE\x0B\xAD\x C0\xDE" > file

15. Uploading Files  We’d also like to upload files to the server  FTP, NFS, NetBIOs aren’t good to use for obvious reasons  Create a file uploader script in your favorite language  Get it on the server the same way as the web based command prompt

16. Now what?  Now we can do all sorts of fun stuff!!!  Find source code of web apps  Find server configuration files  Try to perform privilege elevation attacks that work locally  Screw with the database

17. Hacking IIS5(windows 2000 server) via unicode bug  Cari file html disimpan

18. Hacking IIS5(windows 2000 server) via unicode bug  Jalankan cmd.exe

19. Hacking IIS5(windows 2000 server) via unicode bug  Copy file cmd.exe

20. Hacking IIS5(windows 2000 server) via unicode bug  IT’S SHOW TIME..

21. Hacking IIS5(windows 2000 server) via unicode bug  Deface time

22. SQL Injection  Hackers typically test for SQL injection vulnerabilities by sending the application input that would cause the server to generate an invalid SQL query.  If the server then returns an error message to the client, the attacker will attempt to reverse-engineer portions of the original SQL query using information gained from these error messages.  The typical administrative safeguard is simply to prohibit the display of database server error messages. Regrettably, that’s not sufficient.  If your application does not return error messages, it may still be susceptible to “blind” SQL injection attacks.

23. Solution  To secure an application against SQL injection, developers must never allow client supplied data to modify the syntax of SQL statements.  In fact, the best protection is to isolate the web application from SQL altogether.  All SQL statements required by the application should be in stored procedures and kept on the database server.  The application should execute the stored procedures using a safe interface such as JDBC’s CallableStatement or ADO’s Command Object.  If arbitrary statements must be used, use PreparedStatements.  Both PreparedStatements and stored procedures compile the SQL statement before the user input is added, making it impossible for user input to modify the actual SQL statement.

24. Web Application Vulnerability  Application Design  Application Implementation  Application Deployment  Infrastructure Configuration

25. Application Design  Vulnerability in the stage of application design  Examples:  Weak password (policy)  No protection (Encryption) on confidential data  Bad choice on using cryptography  Weak authentication/authorization mechanism

26. Application Deployment  Transition of application state (e.g. from test to production)  Did not strip out information  Test/Guest accounts  Test information  Debug configuration  Account/Password information  No audit/test before deployment  Deployed bugged version  Expose test environment

27. Find Web Application Vulnerability  How Do You Find Web Application Vulnerability Today?  Raise Your Hand If You Use Automatic Tool!  Raise Your Hand If You Use Manual Test!  Raise Your Hand If You Don’t Use Any of Them!

28. Assesment Plan  Do You know what will be tested?  Do you have control to add or delete the test?  Who is making the plan?  What is the methodology?  What is the knowledge base?

29. Accuracy  How accurate is the result?  Can any tool identify “ANY” of the case study we are going to talk about?  Is it confused by your customized error page?  Can it login into your HTML Form-based authentication application?  Can it assess authorization or access control problem?

30. Accountability & Traceability  Can you verify or reproduce any single vulnerability found?  How easy/hard would that be?  Can you identify what is the risk brought to you by the vulnerability?  Can you change/define how the risk is calculated?