1. Ownership, Dialogue and Conditionality Richard Batley May 2006

2. Paris, 9 May 2006Ownership, dialogue, conditionality2 Aims  To indicate findings on interactions between ownership, accountability, dialogue and conditionality  To indicate recommendations and conclusions

3. Paris, 9 May 2006Ownership, dialogue, conditionality3 GBS and National Ownership  OECD guiding principles  Ownership/partnership v. imposed conditions  Step-change in dialogue and conditionality  Conditions are owned and agreed  Strengthening of national leadership, responsibility, accountability for reform  Whose ownership? Whose accountability?

4. Paris, 9 May 2006Ownership, dialogue, conditionality4 Broad Assessment PGBS has strengthened government ownership in four of seven countries. o attention to planning, budget and PFM Underlying factors:  Willing partner government  Basic trust in donor/government relationship  Significant consensus on development strategy  Ambition tailored to capacity

5. Paris, 9 May 2006Ownership, dialogue, conditionality5 Main Findings  Change in dialogue and conditionality - more in the eyes of donors?  Clearer joint alignment with national strategies - how well owned are national strategies?  Strengthened national systems, policy-making and budget control - but link of policy to expenditure planning….  Strengthened scope for domestic accountability  Accountability to donors and government  Mutual accountability

6. Paris, 9 May 2006Ownership, dialogue, conditionality6 Partnership and conditionality Management of tensions between partners:  Autonomy of governments v. poverty focus of donors  Donor perspectives on PGBS and conditionality  Governments are not homogeneous  Government v. country ownership

7. Paris, 9 May 2006Ownership, dialogue, conditionality7 What is to be done? PGBS offers compromise between ownership and conditionality - ownership with influence:  Dialogue about priorities, actions and indicators  Agreed performance targets Integrated with national PRS  Joint monitoring and accountability  Disbursement based on overall performance  Long term donor commitment plus More local office discretion Less turnover of donor staff Focused demands on government time