1. Prospects for Cross-Strait Relations Week 11

2. Week 11: Teaching Outline Economic and cultural ties Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? Preconditions for and Contents of Political Talks Prospects for China’s Peaceful Unification

3. 1. Economic and cultural ties Fewer agreements, more cooperation in implementing previous agreements – 21agreements (mostly related to economic issues) signed since 2008, particularly the first 2 years (4 meetings,12 agreements) Old issues left over by the previous administration because of tension between the two sides prior to 2008

4. 1. Economic and cultural ties Easier things first Impact of elections on cross-strait talks – One meeting session between ARATS and SEF in from 2011-2013 with 9 agreements singed

5. 1. Economic and cultural ties – Further institutionalizing cross-strait exchange New areas for cooperation and agreements in the coming years Possibilities of representative offices of ARATS and SEF on the other side of the Strait Meetings between Xi and Ma?

6. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? Priority in Ma’s comments (2012) on the Iron Triangle – cross-strait relations, foreign relations, national defense (as a peace maker) – No Surprise for Washington Institutionalizing cross-strait peace – Both sides of the strait belong to one China (creative ambiguity)

7. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? Distinction between sovereignty and governance Not mutual recognition on sovereignty, not mutual denial on governance Not mutual denial and mutual recognition One country, two areas (toward clarity) Comparing with one state on each side of the strait (clarity on the other end)

8. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? – More words for the first angle than the 2 nd and 3 rd one – Tension between M and D, art of balance Arms sales to Taiwan (From F-16 A/B to F-6C/D, even F-35?)

9. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? – The thorny issue of Taiwan’s international participation has been resolved case by case since 2008, without a package deal Taiwan’s diplomatic allies have surprisingly remained unchanged for 5 years （ Gambia); Taiwan’s participation in WHA Ma’s request in his inauguration speech: activities in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)

10. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? Necessity of peace talks as results of deepening economic, cultural, and social changes between the two sides – Political relations between the two prior to unification needs to be redefined in order to promote further exchanges in order to following a clear path rather than muddling through

11. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? However, peace talks and agreements not appear in Ma’s new speech – The idea of peace agreement withdrawn after it was confronted by the DPP during the elections, resulting in Ma’s three preconditions – Peace agreements was redefined to refer to the 16 agreements in Ma’s 2012 speech

12. 2. Continuing Conciliation Without Formal Political Agreement? – Is Ma eager to strike a package deal with the mainland on cross-strait peace? Earlier talks would be good for Taiwan, given the increasing gap between the two sides, Taiwan should be more eager than the mainland to strike a deal Stronger will, weaker capacity in Ma’s second term

13. 1. Precondition for political dialogue 92 consensus redefined Original meanings – both sides adhere to the one-China principle – both sides strive for China’s reunification – Different at the meaning of one China After 2008 – No dependence

14. 1. Precondition for political dialogue Unlike two parties in a real war who must first give up their territory claim over the other side in order to sign a peace treaty, the precondition for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait to reach a peace agreement is to insist on the overlapping national identity that both sides belong to one China and avoid legal halving of state sovereignty of China

15. 1. Precondition for political dialogue From 1993-2008, Taipei’s ambition to expand its international participation through aggressive pragmatic diplomacy and assertive pursuit of Taiwan’s de jure independence deteriorated cross-strait relations, resulting in four strait crises The Ma administration recognizes the 1992 consensus on the basis of “no unification, no independence and no war,” thus redefining the original consensus.

16. 1. Precondition for political dialogue For Beijing, the weak principle of one China can still service as a linkage between the two sides Taipei’s restraint from unilaterally declaring Taiwan independence means it has accepted the weak principle of one China The two sides therefore can find a common ground for building mutual trust This can also be applied to the DPP

17. 1. Precondition for political dialogue Beijing will not take Taipei’s acceptance of unification goal as the precondition for opening strait political dialogue and reach peace agreement between the two sides, even though some scholars in China still think it should

18. 2. Political Relations Redefined Not between the central government and local government Nor between the two sovereign states But between two political entities under the framework of constitutional one China. Although the two entities govern their domestic affairs respectively and oppose against each other politically, they are not split into two countries

19. 2. Political Relations Redefined Since the constitution of the PRC or ROC considers the territory currently controlled by the other side as the sphere of its own sovereignty and the international community respects the principle of one China—not diplomatically recognizing the two sides simultaneously nor allowing duel representation of the two sides in international organizations that require statehood for membership—the status quo of one China has not been changed

20. 2. Political Relations Redefined The two sides of the Taiwan Strait continue a symbolic “state of war” over the issue of constitution and international law regarding who should represent China, thus playing a political game within the one-China framework Culturally, the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait could be considered part of the Chinese nation

21. 2. Political Relations Redefined How to square the principle of one China with the reality of a non-yet-unified China? To separate the concept of foreign sovereignty form domestic sovereignty (Gabriel Almond) To make theoretic distinction among four dimensions of the concept of sovereignty (Stephen Krasner)

22. 2. Political Relations Redefined Domestic sovereignty – how public authority is organized within the state and how it might be effectively exercised within the state’s borders Westphalian sovereignty – “political organization based on the exclusion of external actors from authority structures within a given territory” and having the absolute right to rule within its domain

23. 2. Political Relations Redefined Interdependence sovereignty – referring to “the ability of public authorities to regulate the flow of information, ideas, goods, people, pollutants, or capital across the borders of their state;” International legal sovereignty – the status of those entities that possess formal juridical independence and thus a “ticket of general admission to the international arena.”

24. 2. Political Relations Redefined Peer-to-peer political entities Separated governance and shared sovereignty Any decision involving China’s sovereignty and territory integrity should be commonly made by the 1.3 billion Chinese people, including the 23 million Taiwanese people. – the decision is a product of unanimous agreement, rather than a majority rule.

25. 2. Political Relations Redefined while the state sovereignty, territory and people refer to the same sphere, government refers to only part of them This model of “shared sovereignty” is unique in the world and in the history of cross-strait relations. It is not only different from the zero- sum game of mutual denial and competing for international space, but also different from the seemingly win-win game of mutual recognition of each other’s sovereignty.

26. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework The two sides picked up many low-hanging fruits during the Ma’s first term, as 16 agreements (mostly related to economic issues) were signed between 2008 and 2011, particularly the first two years when 12 agreements were reached. Most of them were old issues left over by the previous administrations

27. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework This suggests that the two sides have resolved relatively easier problems between them and been muddling through the “deep water” for high-hanging fruits Economic and easy things first?

28. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework The core bargain of a peace agreement is that Taiwan would pledge not to seek de jure independence so long as the mainland did not use (or threaten to use) force (Phillip Saunders and Scott Kastner) The third “If” – if the danger of Taiwanese independence is growing, Beijing may be more inclined to consider the option of using force, thus blurring the subtle line between opposing independence and promoting unification

29. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework Hu Jintao indirectly responded to Ma’s appeal of “conciliation and truce” (hejie xiubing) by saying that the two sides should avoid waste of resource in the international arena (bimian bubiyao de neihao), resulting in both sides’ diplomatic allies remaining peculiarly stable and Taiwan international space being quietly expanded – WHA, ICAO, etc.

30. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework During 2013 APEC meetings, director of Beijing’s Taiwan Affairs Office of State Council and Taipei’s Mainland Affairs Council of Executive Yuan addresses each other’s official title Will such a precedent be applied to other ministerial exchanges between the two sides in the future, except for ministry for foreign affairs or national defense?

31. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework within the one-China framework, the two sides can treat each other as two equivalent political entities, public authorities and even governments, as long as both claim the same sovereignty (China) constitutionally and internationally

32. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework The two sides can even address each other as Chinese mainland government and Chinese Taiwan government when they engage in formal political dialogue or negotiation, acknowledging that the other side’s political and legal system is based on the commitment to one China, with the same territory and sovereign claim

33. 3. Building a Cross-Strait Peace Framework Should the two sides should recognize each other’s overlapping sovereignty (claiming the same one China) and separated governance? Is “brother states” workable? Should the peace agreement have a clear orientation to China’s final unification?

34. 3. Preconditions for and Contents of Political Talks Peace talks depend on the good will of BOTH sides – Taiwan cannot be forced to talk – Ma’s insistence on ROC’s sovereign and value system One country, two areas not a solid basis for political talks, even though…… Political relationship between the two needs to be redefined

35. 3. Preconditions for and Contents of Political Talks – DPP’s constraints on the Ma administration Su needs to distinguish himself from Tsai in order to…(Richard Bush) DPP’s representative office in the U.S., possibly in Japan as well Restore the China Affairs Department within the DPP Possibility of regression to former strait crises

36. Two Sides, Three Players IndependenceUnification Strategic ClarityStrategic AmbiguityStrategic Clarity One China, One Taiwan ROC on Taiwan Both sides belong to one China gezi biaoshu vs. gebu biaoshu One-China principle State-to- state relations One country, two governments One country, two areas National Unifications Guidelines ROC is Taiwan One country, two entities 1 ball, 2 surfaces One country, two areas One country, two systems

37. 3. Preconditions for and Contents of Political Talks The U.S. does not support political dialogues as much as it did in the late 1990s – Don’t put too much hope on Ma (Bush, Glaser) – Realistic expectation is good – Is peace agreement good for the U.S.? Tension between peace agreement and arms sales

38. 3. Preconditions for and Contents of Political Talks Core bargain in peace agreement – No war – Oriented to unification ？ – Bottom lines of peaceful unification or integration No regime changes Not a new aircraft carrier for the mainland

39. 4. Prospects for China’s Peaceful Unification Path – From economic and social integration to political integration – Striking a deal via political negotiation Formula: One country, two system – Hong Kong model – Macau model – Taiwan model – Linkage between reality and ideal

40. MAINLAND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS The world is now watching A global paradigm shift is happening A transition from the old order to the new With vibrations felt by many and not a few Taiwan too is watching A relationship change is in the offing US, being debt ridden, is no longer as effective China, becoming prosperous, is more attractive

41. MAINLAND CHINA-TAIWAN RELATIONS Taiwan is now rethinking A new scenario worth considering China as a superpower shall be phenomenal Taiwan as its partner may be treated special The world is now watching China-Taiwan relations warming Should China and Taiwan be joining hands What a mighty China will be emerging then. -- Frank Chin (Malaysia)