1. Getting to “Yes” Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot public perceptions, concerning a possible Solution to the Cyprus Problem. Presented by Alexandros Lordos and Muharrem Faiz

2. In last April’s referendums, the large gap between official negotiating positions and public perceptions, was made evident. Even though the primary Greek Cypriot negotiator over the previous years, Glafkos Clerides, was in favour of the Plan, 76% of Greek Cypriots voted “No”. Similarly, even though the main Turkish Cypriot negotiator, Rauf Denktash, was against the Plan, 65% of Turkish Cypriots voted “Yes”. One lesson from last April’s referendums, is therefore that public perceptions and preferences should be carefully examined from now on, since after all it is the wider public – and not the negotiators – who will be the final arbitrators of any Solution.

3. For the purposes of this presentation, two recent public opinion surveys will be utilised – one of the Greek Cypriots and the other of the Turkish Cypriots. The first Survey was conducted in September 2004, with a sample of 1000 Greek Cypriots who were interviewed over the telephone. The second survey was conducted in January 2005, with a sample of 700 Turkish Cypriots who were interviewed face-to-face. The surveys were not conducted in parallel with identical questionnaires. Rather, the Turkish Cypriot survey was designed in such a way as to build on the findings of the Greek Cypriot survey.

4. Sampling procedure: Multi-stage stratified random sampling

5. Underlying Attitudes

6. Greek Cypriot dominant narratives currently favour co-existence with the Turkish Cypriots.

7. The Turkish Cypriot community is currently polarized on the issue of co-existence with Greek Cypriots.

8. Both communities currently tend to mistrust the intentions of the other.

9. Greek Cypriots have strong reservations about the role of Turkey and of the Mainland Turks in the whole Cyprus affair.

10. Turkish Cypriots, in contrast, tend to believe that they need Turkey’s protection in order to be safe from “Greek Cypriot aggression”.

11. Majorities of both communities strongly oppose the use of violence.

12. Motivations

13. Turkish Cypriot motivations To become members of the European Union. To escape economic isolation. To become “the masters of their own house”. To overcome the risk of another war. To be re-united with the Greek Cypriots. (secondary motive) To be able to return to ancestral homes that are now in the south. (secondary motive)

14. Greek Cypriot motivations To escape the military stranglehold of Turkey. To re-establish the integrity and sovereignty of the Republic. To put an end to the “Turkification” of the northern half of Cyprus. To be able to return to ancestral homes that are now in the north. To be re-united with the Turkish Cypriots. (secondary motive) To attract foreign investment by resolving “the political irregularity” on the island. (secondary motive)

15. Majorities of both communities are willing to accept a Federal Solution.

16. Security

17. The two communities are sharply opposed on the issue of troop withdrawal.

18. The two communities are also opposed on the issue of demilitarization.

19. The creation of an integrated Security Force may be a mutually acceptable compromise.

20. Greek Cypriots demand the removal of intervention rights. The Turkish Cypriots would accept a moderation of intervention rights.

21. Replacing the Treaty of Guarantee with a European Security agreement, would be acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots.

22. Governance

23. The Turkish Cypriots have shaped the issue of governance in the negotiations, by insisting on privileges to protect them from majority rule.

24. Greek Cypriots are willing to tolerate the constitutional concessions which the Turkish Cypriots demand.

25. The Greek Cypriots are also willing to tolerate the derogations which the Turkish Cypriots demand in order to preserve bizonality and political equality.

26. The Turkish Cypriots are willing to tolerate “only Europeans as the three non-Cypriot judges on the Supreme Court”.

27. The Turkish Cypriots are also willing to tolerate a reduction in the number of issues for which Senate Special Majority is required.

28. The Turkish Cypriots would strongly support “direct election of the Presidential Council”

29. The Turkish Cypriots would also strongly support “provisions to encourage the development of bi-communal Political Parties”

30. Property

31. Greek Cypriots consider individual Property Rights to be more important than further territorial concessions.

32. The Turkish Cypriots are willing to accept a greater respect for Property Rights, and they would enthusiastically support “non- entitled refugees to have the right to a new home in the same village”

33. The Turkish Cypriots are also eager to put aside timetable restrictions to the application of residence rights.

34. Citizens from Turkey

35. Turkish Citizens who came in the 1970s 32,500 Turkish Citizens who came in the 1980s 13,500 Turkish Citizens who came in the 1990s 9,000 Turkish Citizens who came since yr 2000 4,000 More than half of the Turkish Citizens arrived in the 1970s

36. The Greek Cypriots strongly insist that more Turkish Citizens should depart from the island.

37. Greek Cypriot concerns about the Settlers. That many more would stay under the UN Plan, not just 45,000. That the Settlers would be entitled to stay in Greek Cypriot properties. That by allowing Settlers to stay, it will be like rewarding Turkey for her violation of International Law. That the Settlers would be an alien body to the culture of Cyprus, and would refuse to integrate. That through the vote of the Settlers, the influence of Turkey would remain strong in Cypriot politics.

38. Turkish Cypriots and Turkish Citizens do not vary much in their attitudes towards the Greek Cypriots.

39. However, the voting patterns of Turkish Citizens are sharply different to the voting patterns of the Turkish Cypriots.

40. Turkish Cypriots would strongly oppose a reduction in ”the list of 45.000 who may remain”

41. However, the Turkish Cypriots do in fact insist that those who are not entitled to stay should indeed leave the island.

42. Both communities tend to agree on the necessity to limit future immigration from Turkey.

43. The Economy

44. Both communities tend to agree that Federal oversight of the Economy is important.

45. Greek Cypriots would like to see a more rapid application of free market economics.

46. The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to tolerate such a reduction of economic restrictions, especially if Greek Cypriot investments are made through bi-communal business ventures.

47. Equitable distribution of costs is a demand of both communities.

48. Both communities would like to see Turkey more involved in the financing of the new state of affairs.

49. Education

50. The Greek Cypriots insist that the Federal State should be given more authority over educational matters.

51. The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to accept the creation of a “Federal Ministry of Education”, to oversee integrated schooling and cross-state schooling.

52. The Turkish Cypriots would strongly appreciate a European Development program for the instruction of other languages.

53. Legal Status

54. Greek Cypriots strongly insist on the legal continuity of the Republic of Cyprus.

55. The Turkish Cypriots would be willing to consider legal continuity, so long as a formula could be found so that they wouldn’t be forced to also recognize the “unilateral Greek Cypriot administration”

56. Implementation Guarantees

57. Both communities insist that strong and enforceable guarantees be offered for the implementation of the solution.

58. Greek Cypriot Implementation concerns That territorial adjustment will indeed happen as agreed. That Turkish troops will indeed withdraw as agreed. That current occupants will indeed vacate properties when the Property Board orders them to do so. That the Turkish Cypriots will not be able to secede from the Republic.

59. Turkish Cypriot Implementation concerns That the terms of the agreement (more particularly Bizonality and Political Equality) will not later be overruled through the application of European Law. That National Guard weapons kept in Greek Cypriot homes will indeed be relinquished as agreed. That alternative accommodation will indeed be found for those who would have to relocate. That the Greek Cypriots will not be able to dominate the Republic.

60. Shared Implementation concerns That Settlers will indeed depart the island as planned. That properties will indeed be compensated for as agreed. That international donors will indeed support the settlement as promised.

61. Getting to “Yes”: An overview of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot requirements.

64. Conclusions (I) Getting to a “double Yes” in a future referendum involves satisfying those segments of each community whose demands do not clash with the fundamental requirements of the other side. From the Greek Cypriot point of view, getting to “Yes” involves satisfying those Greek Cypriots whose main concern is Security, as well as those Greek Cypriots whose main concern is Return of Refugees. Those Greek Cypriots who would like to “bury the UN Plan”, “because it is not based on simple majority rule”, cannot be satisfied without alienating the majority of the Turkish Cypriots.

65. Conclusions (II) From the Turkish Cypriot point of view, renewing the “Yes” will involve satisfying those who would like to see a closer integration of the two communities, as well as those whose main concern is the raising of their standard of living through European Integration. Those Turkish Cypriots who would like to see a “Pure Turkish State”, cannot be satisfied without alienating the majority of the Greek Cypriots. The issue on which it will be most difficult to reach a mutually satisfactory compromise is Security – and here, it will be imperative for all concerned to be willing to consider creative solutions.

66. Conclusions (III) If Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot demands as described above are satisfied, then we can reasonably expect a “double Yes” at a future referendum, with approximate majorities of 65-70% on each side. Given the underlying public perceptions of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, this is the maximum level of support that any proposal for a Federal Solution could currently achieve.