1. Describing change in labour market policy. A conditionality approach Jochen Clasen University of Edinburgh RECWOWE/ESPAnet summer school 2007

2. Structure 1. Definition and boundaries of LMP 2. Indicators of change 3. Levels and levers of conditionality 4. Applying the framework 5. Some concluding remarks

3. 1. Definitions of LMP Labour demand and labour supply Active programmes – e.g. training, work experience, job search support (focus: job entry, employability) Passive benefits – e.g. unbemployment benefits, early retirement, lone parent benefit (focus: temporary job exit)

4. 1. Active or passive? wage subsidies (tax credits) vs. partial UB? – e.g. combination (wage and UB) – tax credits not in ALMP budget short-term working, bad weather payments leave schemes (education, child care) regular UB payments? – conditional – better job matching – Industrial restructuring >> the active (productive) role of passive benefits Some training/work experience programmes

5. 2. Describing change – indicators? 1. Social Expenditure – LMP expenditure 2. Institutional parameters 3. Social rights indicators

6. 2. Describing change – indicators? 1. Social Expenditure – LMP expenditure - net social expenditure - adjusted expenditure (e.g. by number of unemployed) - participants in ALMP - problem of displacement (working-age benefits)

7. 2. Describing change – indicators? 2. Institutional parameters - funding mode (tax, contributions) - responsibilities, management - benefit type (flat-rate; earnings-related) - benefit access (insurance, means-tested)

8. 2. Describing change – indicators? 3. Social rights indicators a. replacement rates - net or gross? - UB or unemployment compensation package? - relative to which wage level? b. coverage - or recipiency rates? c. composite indicators (de-commodification) >>but what about social obligations?

9. 3. Levers of conditionality Conditionality as cornerstone and basis for risk management in welfare states Three levels of conditionality: 1. Conditions of circumstance 2. Conditions of category 3. Conditions of conduct

11. 3. Applying the framework unemployment protection long time periods four countries legislation – (not administration/implementation) stylised accounts

12. Conditionality Shifts in Unemployment Benefit Reforms in the UK I, II, III: levels of conditionality - = tighter conditionality; + = looser conditionality; / = no significant change

13. Conditionality Shifts in Unemployment Benefit Reforms in Germany I, II, III: levels of conditionality - = tighter conditionality; + = looser conditionality; / = no significant change

14. Conditionality Shifts in Unemployment Benefit Reforms in France I, II, III: levels of conditionality - = tighter conditionality; + = looser conditionality; / = no significant change

15. Conditionality Shifts in Unemployment Benefit Reforms in Denmark I, II, III: levels of conditionality - = tighter conditionality; + = looser conditionality; / = no significant change

16. 1980-851986-901991-951996-20002000-05 UK I--/++ II---// III/---- Germany I////+ II-(- ; +)(/; -) - III-//-- France I----/ II(-;+)/-+(-;/) III/(-; /)//- Denmark I-(-, +)-++ II-+-// III/----

17. Main results all 4 countries altered all 3 levers of conditionality (category; eligibility; behaviour) clearest chronological pattern in the UK Danish pattern similar to British (at level I and III) German and French reforms distinctive – 2nd level privileged policy lever – differential effects (deeper dualism) – late turn away from labour market exit strategies and towards activation policy

18. Some concluding remarks what is the point? comparative (empirical) investigation of often touted ‘new model’ (paradigm) in the management of social risks systematic identification of patterns - new questions for causal & theoretical analyses conditionality understood as merely one, albeit crucual, indicator