1. The cooperative mind and its proximate mechanisms Team Leader: Cristiano Castelfranchi cristiano.castelfranchi@istc.cnr.it Team Members: Rosaria Conte Elisabetta Visalberghi Ugo Pagano Gabriele Schino Francesco Natale Elsa Addessi Gennaro Di Tosto Luca Tummolini ISTC-CNR - Italy

2. General Objectives Proximate explanations of reciprocity between non- human primates –Focus on ‘affective’ marking Proximate explanations of reciprocity between humans –Focus on the affective and cognitive basis of Institutions and Norms

3. Reciprocity in non-human primates

4. Reciprocity in non-humans primates Assumptions of traditional models: –interactions are always dyadic (isolated dyads) –altruistic behaviours always imply a significant cost for the actor, beside a benefit for the receiver The real world: –individuals live in groups (many potential dyads) –several “altruistic” behaviours imply little or no cost for the actor, beside a benefit for the receiver (social services)

5. Reciprocity in non-humans primates Specific questions: –What are the factors that affect partner choice? –What is the time-frame of reciprocation? –Can we demonstrate contingency?

6. Reciprocity in non-humans primates Methods: –Experiments Partner choice experiments characterized by: –Experimental manipulation of received benefits –Analysis of the factors influencing partner choice –Analysis of the time-frame of partner choice Partner 2Partner 1 Subject

7. Reciprocity in non-humans primates Methods: –Naturalistic observations Naturalistic observations characterized by: –Analysis of the distribution of different altruistic behaviours – Analysis of the factors influencing partner choice – Analysis of the time-frame of partner choice

8. Reciprocity in humans

9. Only humans are capable of large scale cooperation among non-relatives -Cooperation in large groups (public good games) -Cooperation in one-shot encounters (non iterated PD) What is a plausible evolutionary explanation? –Gene-culture co-evolution produces strong reciprocity –Strong Reciprocity is a behavioral pattern: We are willing to bestow benefits on those who have bestowed benefits (we are conditional cooperators) We are willing to sacrifice resources to punish those who are not bestowing benefits in accordance with a social norm (we are altruistic punishers)

10. Reciprocity in humans Our interpretation of SR: –a behavioral regularity produced by diffuse compliance with a norm of conditional cooperation and punishment -“You ought to cooperate with cooperators” -“You ought to punish cheaters” Objective: investigate the unique human mechanisms behind SR: i) How do humans construct their institutions? ii) How does the psychology of norm obedience work? iii) What is the role of punishment in norm obedience? What do we need (mentally) to punish?

11. (i) Institutions Institutions are niches but: –Institutions depend on some cognitive capacity –Institutions have cognitive consequences –Institutions regulate specific activities (i.e. ‘food sharing’ or ‘house building’) –Not all institutions are for cooperation (i.e. ‘shamanism’ ) Specific questions: –What are the primitive social skills needed for constructing institutions? –Are conformist dispositions enough? Is an imitative capacity enough? –How can we categorize other agents, actions or state of affairs as tokens of institutional types (i.e. seeing a line of stone as a “border”)? –Where do these concepts come from? –When and how do we reason with institutional concepts? Approach: theoretical modeling & agent-based simulations

12. (ii) Norm Obedience From specific institutions for cooperation to the abstract norm of strong reciprocity –Norms as prescriptions (i.e. ‘the will of an authority’) –Norm of strong reciprocity as regulating abstract activities (‘how to behave in cooperating tasks’) Norm obedience: -What are obligations? How can they motivate action? -What is respect for an authority? How do we acknowledge an authority? -What kind of reasoning underlies explicit obedience (vs mere ‘following’ a norm)? -How can we design a norm-obedient agent? Approach: theoretical modeling & agent-based simulations

13. (iii) Norm violation How do we recognize “norm violators”? What is the role of punishment in shaping norm obedience? Blaming as punishment -Blaming and the role of (self)image; moral punishment; enforcement of moral values -Direct blaming: damage to self-image -Indirect blaming: damage to reputation Approach: theoretical modeling & agent-based simulations