1. AUTOMATION SCENARIO May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections

2. Background The Commission on Elections started its efforts at modernizing or automating the electoral process way back in 1992 with Operation MODEX (Modernization and Excellence), immediately after the first Synchronized National and Local Elections (NLE). 1. The first try of an automated election system using the Optical Mark Reader (OMR) technology in the 1996 Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) Elections 2. The partial implementation in the ARMM provinces of the same automated system in the 1998 National and Local Elections 3. The halted nationwide implementation of a centralized automated counting system in 2004 4. The fully automated election system in the 2008 ARMM Elections COMELEC continues to fulfil its mandate of conducting election – be it manual or automated. Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

3. Background For the coming 2010 elections, the COMELEC is set to conduct the country’s first nationwide fully automated elections – from counting of votes to transmission and canvassing of election results.nationwide Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

4. Kinds of Technologies Considered The following shows the kinds of technologies considered by the Philippine inspection team during the 15-day inspection trip to the US in October 1993: 1. Mechanical Leverage Machine - a voting machine, wherein a voter would face or enter a cabinet-type booth to cast his vote. All the names are already presented to the voter in the booth, and the voter would just have to push a button corresponding to the name of a candidate of his choice, and pull a mechanical lever afterwards. His vote automatically gets counted. 2. Punch Card System - a voting device, wherein a voter is given a ballot, with hole slots corresponding to the candidates' names, and a puncher (similar to that used by our provincial bus conductors in ticketing their passengers). To cast his vote, the voter has to punch a hole corresponding to the name of the candidate of his choice. A separate reader machine does the counting afterwards. Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

5. Kinds of Technologies Considered 3. Optical Mark Reader (OMR) - a ballot counting machine: wherein a voter is given a ballot, with pre-printed candidates' names, with corresponding ovals to shade or broken arrows to connect. The votes in the shaded ballots would be scanned using an OMR. 4. Direct Recording Electronic (DRE) Machine - a voting machine wherein a voter is presented with a screen showing all the names of the candidates, much like the locator screens in the Glorietta Shopping Malls. To cast his vote, the voter has to touch the name of the candidate of his choice on the screen, and his vote automatically gets counted. Source: www.comelec.gov.ph

6. Electronic Voting Machines Used in other Countries

7. Australia (eVACS) Type: Bar code reader authenticates ballots, which are completed with a keypad. Usage: Eight of 80 polling places voted with the Electronic Voting and Counting System, or eVACS, in the Australia Capital Territory. Addressing distrust: The government specified that the program's code be open source. Addressing multiple votes: Voters sign in and receive a bar- coded ballot that gives them one vote. Still at issue: On intellectual- property grounds, the company that created eVACS, Software Improvements, wants to restrict the source code. Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

8. India (EVM) Type: Battery-powered electronic device has buttons next to choices. Usage: The Electronic Voting Machines, or EVMs, were used countrywide in May for the parliamentary elections by about 390 million people. Addressing distrust: The simple-to-use machines are built to address illiteracy and be tamperproof. Vote data is stored in nonremovable memory. Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink. Still at issue: Questions remain about the security of the devices and the tabulator that collects votes from the devices. Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

9. Venezuela (Smartmatic) Type: The integrated voting device has a small touch screen and a receipt printer. Usage: Almost the entire country voted on the device for an Aug. 15 referendum on the ouster of President Chavez. Addressing distrust: Paper receipts were kept by polling stations for random audits. Addressing multiple votes: A voter's fingerprint is transmitted to a national database, ensuring that each person votes only once. Still at issue: The voting process still lacks adequate checks on system integrity. Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

10. United States (Diebold, among others) Type: System has a touch screen and, in some cases, a receipt printer. Usage: An estimated 31 percent of voters in the United States will use the system in the November presidential election. Addressing distrust: Easy-to- use terminals include accessibility features for the handicapped. Addressing multiple votes: A chip card given to the voter contains a key to allow only one vote. Still at issue: Many questions remain about device security and the secrecy surrounding machine development and certification. Source: http://news.cnet.com/Global-lessons-in-e-voting/2009-1008_3-5387540.html

11. Philippines (Smartmatic) Type: Bar code reader, scans ballots, with built-in printer Addressing distrust: Examination and Testing of Equipment or Device of the AES and Opening of the Source Code for Review Addressing multiple votes: Each voter's finger is marked with indelible ink.

12. Project Specifications Component 1: PAPER-BASED AUTOMATED ELECTION SYSTEM (AES) Component 1-A : Election Management System (EMS) Component 1-B : Precinct-Count Optical Scan (PCOS) Component 1-C : Counting/Consolidation System (CCS) Component 2: PROVISION FOR ELECTRONIC TRANSMISSION USING PUBLIC TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS Component 3: OVERALL PROJECT MANAGEMENT

13. STATISTICS Estimated 47,000,000 registered voters 44,009,069 registered voters - as of April 20, 2009 ERB Hearing 58,327 registration records cancelled by reason of death 1,246,272 registration records deactivated Last ERB Hearing on November 16, 2009 80 Provinces 1,631 cities and municipalities 320,415 Established Precincts (estimate) 80,136 Clustered Precincts (estimate) 37,884 Polling Centers (estimate) 82,200 PCOS Machines 80,136 PCOS Machines for distribution to clustered precincts

14. Board of Election Inspectors One (1) BEI for every clustered precinct Three regular members – Chairman – Delivers ballot to voter – Poll Clerk – Third Member Support Staff – Depends on number of precincts clustered – To assist Poll Clerk and Third Member in managing – List of Voters with Voting Records – Book of Voters

15. Board of Election Inspectors No. of Precincts Clustered No. of Support Staff Total no. of personnel (BEI + Support Staff) 1none3 2 3 314 425 536

16. Establishing Identity of Voter LIST OF VOTERS WITH VOTING RECORDS  Photograph

17. Establishing Identity of Voter

18. If identity cannot be established through photograph  Compare signatures  Use Book of Voters Contains applications for registration Includes specimen signature of voter  Other methods to challenge identity

19. Official Ballots Pre-printed names of candidates 300 candidates can be accommodated  150 names per side of ballot

20. Official Ballots Ovals opposite names of candidate Shade oval opposite name of chosen candidate

21. PCOS Precinct Count Optical Scan One unit per clustered precinct Voter personally feeds ballot into machine Ballot can be fed at any orientation Ballot scanned both sides simultaneously

23. TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES At least three days before election day  Public shall accomplish test ballots  Ballots shall be manually counted and election returns accomplished  Same set of ballots that was manually counted shall be fed into the counting machine  Manual count shall be compared with the print-out of the election returns  If public is satisfied that the manual count is the same as the automated count, the print-out and manually prepared election returns shall be signed-off by the witnesses

24. TESTING & SEALING PROCEDURES At least three days before election day  Machines shall be sealed without any connection to transmission links  Public shall be allowed to secure the polling places where the counting machines are installed  The only time that the counting machines shall be opened is on election day in the presence of watchers

25. Voting Voting period  7:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.  Unless there are voters waiting for their turn to vote Poll Clerk lists down names voters queuing Poll Clerk calls voter to cast ballot Voter who fails to appear after being called twice shall not longer be allowed to vote  Precinct set up  At least 10 voters can cast ballot at any one time

26. Voting Before voting starts  Show that ballot box is empty  Transparent plastic  Turn on and initialize PCOS  Print “Zero Report”  To show that there is no entry/vote in machine’s memory

27. Counting At close of polls – Perform close function To prevent additional ballots from being inserted – After close function, PCOS automatically Starts counting process Prints election returns after completion of automated count – Eight (8) copies

28. Counting Insert transmission cable  After printing first eight (8) copies of ER  To eliminate doubts that the PCOS can be manipulated remotely Perform electronic transmission function Print additional twenty-two (22) copies of ER  Automatically performed by PCOS after completion of transmission

29. Canvassing/Consolidation Electronically transmitted results – Used as basis for canvassing/consolidation and proclamation of winning candidates for City/municipal officials Provincial officials Members, House of Representatives Senators and Party-list – Congress will also receive electronically transmitted results Constitution authorized the Congress to promulgate rules for canvassing of results for President and Vice- President

30. Municipal/City Board of Canvassers Provincial Board of Canvassers National Board of Canvassers Congress COMELEC Precinct Election Returns Mun./City COC SOVP Mun./City COC SOVP Prov. COC SOVM/C Prov. COC SOVM/C Physical transport Manual System of Canvassing

31. Municipal/City Board of Canvassers Provincial Board of Canvassers National Board of Canvassers Congress COMELEC Precinct Physical transport Electronic Transmission Comelec Central Back-up Server Advance Results/ Monitoring Comelec Central Back-up Server Advance Results/ Monitoring Server for Dominant Majority/ Minority Parties, Citizens Arm, KBP Advance Results Server for Dominant Majority/ Minority Parties, Citizens Arm, KBP Advance Results Secured Public Website Election Returns Mun./City COC SOVP Mun./City COC SOVP Prov. COC SOVM/C Prov. COC SOVM/C

32. SECURITY Security measures under a manual election system still applicable Strengthen security through automation  Password  PIN  Digital signatures  Encryption

33. SECURITY 128-bit encryption  2  2 = 4  2 = 8  2 = 16  2 = 32  2 = 64  2 = 128  2 = 256 128 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 2 = 512 2 = 1024 2 = 2048 2 = 4096 2 = 8192 2 = 16,384 2 = 32,768 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 2 = 65,536 2 = 131,072 2 = 262,144 2 = 524,288 2 = 1,048,576 2 = 2,097,152 2 = 4,194,304 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

34. SECURITY 128-bit encryption 2 = 8,388,608 2 = 16,777,216 2 = 33,554,432 2 = 67,108,864 2 = 134,217,728 2 = 268,435,456 2 = 536,870,912 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 2 = 1,073,741,824 2 = 2,147,483,648 2 = 4,294,967,296 2 = 8,569,934,592 2 = 17,179,869,184 2 = 34,359,738,368 2 = 68,719,476,736 30 31 32 33 34 35 36

35. SECURITY 128-bit encryption 2 = 137,438,953,472 2 = 274,877,906,944 2 = 549,755,813,888 2 = over One Trillion combinations 37 38 39 40

36. SECURITY 128-bit encryption  Same security system used by banks Random Encryption  Temperature of machine  Voltage  Unique machine identity  User identity No single/master decryption code

37. SECURITY Time needed to decrypt one precinct result will be same amount of time needed to decrypt next precinct result Transmission takes at most 2 minutes Copies for distribution – 30 copies of election returns at the precinct level – 30 copies of certificate of canvass at municipal level – 14 copies of certificate of canvass at provincial level

38. SECURITY Audit Log  Activities  Time  Date

39. SECURITY Paper Ballot Ballot digital image Data storage device Transmitted results Hard copies of election results

40. FIELD TEST/S 8 areas  2 for NCR  2 each (1 urban/1 rural)  Luzon  Visayas  Mindanao To test system and transmission in the same environment/conditions as on election day

41. CONTINUITY PLAN Types of Systems Breakdown  Fails to scan  Able to scan but fails to print ER  Able to print ER but fails to transmit  Able to transmit but fails to consolidate

42. CONTINUITY PLAN Fails to scan  Use spare PCOS  Use PCOS of another precinct  Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct  Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct  Scan ballots  If all PCOS fails  Manual counting

43. CONTINUITY PLAN Able to scan but fails to print ER – Use spare PCOS – Use PCOS of another precinct Wait for other PCOS to complete process in its precinct Get PCOS and reconfigure for next precinct Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let replacement PCOS print ER – If all PCOS fails Manual counting

44. CONTINUITY PLAN Able to print ER but fails to transmit – Go to nearest precinct or polling center which has a functioning transmission facility – Use removable storage device of defective PCOS and let the functioning facility transmit precinct results – If all transmission facilities bog down Physically transport removable storage device to canvassing site – In the presence of watchers and security escorts

45. CONTINUITY PLAN Able to transmit but fails to consolidate  Use consolidation/canvassing system (CCS) of another municipality/province  Use the removable storage device and let functioning CCS consolidate the results  Provide back-up canvassing through the Central Server Print results and send the same to affected board of canvassers Print results and constitute special board of canvassers to take the place of the affected board

46. Basic Elements of Elections People – Vote-buying – Coercion – Intimidation – Terrorism Systems & Procedures – Misreading of ballots – Unreadable handwriting – Error Honest Deliberate – Fraud – Manufactured election returns – Tampering of election results

47. Successful Implementation Vigilance of citizenry Cooperation Coordination Support

48. THANK YOU!