1. Microprocessor-Based Relays: Implementation, Conflicts, and Corrective Actions Steven V. Deases AEP – Station Engineer

2. Intro: Discussion Focus Level: High-Level Topic Discussion Scope: Station Protection Questions: Reserve Questions until the Conclusion Time Limitation: Approximately 30 minutes total Prospective: AEP’s Experiences

3. Intro: Discussion Focus Structure: Implementation Strategy Conflicts Encountered Corrective Actions Topics: Engineering Processes SCADA Communications Commissioning Procedures

4. Intro: Presenter’s Background Work Group: AEP Transmission Region Operations – Texas Technical Support Engineering Station Equipment and Protection & Controls Job Functions: Application Engineering & Design Review Technical Aid to Field Personnel Project Coordination & Administrative Support Technical Training of Technicians and Engineers Process Improvement & Quality Control System Performance Analysis & Reporting

5. Microprocessor Technology Electromechanical Steady State Microprocessor Evolution of Protection Devices

6. Microprocessor Technology Advantages –More sensitive and scalable –Communication Options –Fault Oscillography and SER data –Better targeting and annunciation –More reliable; failure alarm also included –Advanced protection features all in one box –Economical both Financially and Physically Disadvantages –Shift in Thought: Digital Logic v. Circuitry –More Complex Logical Systems –Longer Commissioning Procedures –Additional Training Requirements

7. Engineering Processes Engineering Aspects Affected: Standards Design Documentation Philosophy

8. Engineering Processes Implementation Strategy: Develop internal Standard Schemes for Protection & Control using Microprocessor-based Relays that would replace existing Electromechanical Relays and phase them out These replacement schemes would be designed with a “protection zone” scope (Line, Bus, Transformer, etc.) The developed standards defined details such as: –relay brand/model options –general protection scheme with generic wiring –relay panel plate configurations –relay setting templates with predetermined logic

9. Engineering Processes Documentation: The intent of the documentation was to communicate the standards to the design groups for implementation Application Guides were written which described –What standard schemes were available –Where the standard schemes were to be applied –What kind of protection was intended –The general relay setting philosophy CAD drawings with multiple layers were also developed to match the standard relay schemes

10. Engineering Processes Conflicts Encountered: Despite the large effort in strategizing the implementation process, there still were several conflicts encountered: Perpetual evolution of “standards” due to newly gained experiences Design Interpretation of standards resulted in inconsistent implementation Lack of adequate communication and training of standards

11. Engineering Processes Corrective Actions: To combat these engineering problems, we created and adopted… “Design Module” concept that specifically lays out the entire intended design package of protection for a specific station application  E.g. – 25MVA Power Xfmr w/ LV CB (Xfmr and LV Bus protection included) Consistent Relay Setting Calculation Sheets Additional Training of how to use these tools and the philosophy intent Revision control of Standards

12. SCADA Communications SCADA Communication Components: Relay RTU SCADA Master

13. SCADA Communications Implementation Strategy: Send all potentially necessary data points to RTU, then filter which were actually deemed necessary for Dispatchers to be sent to the SCADA Master Let local personnel decide which points the SCADA system are needed, configure the devices themselves, and commission the data path Use existing equipment and communication protocols when able

14. SCADA Communications Conflicts Encountered: Inconsistent amounts / types of data being sent to Dispatch Project Slowdown due to communication discussions on every project Little documentation of what was implemented Confusion regarding data identity due to lack of data point naming conventions SCADA Alarm Logging was not chronological

15. SCADA Communications Corrective Actions: RTU Point Assignment documentation Communication Configurations for relays & RTUs delivered by engineering Training of advanced commissioning techniques Convert RTUs and Communication Protocol

16. Hard Wired Harris DNP Harris

17. Commissioning Commissioning Aspects: Practices Procedures Troubleshooting

18. Commissioning Implementation Strategy: It was initially assumed that commissioning Microprocessor-based relays was essentially very similar to commissioning Electromechanical relays. Test each protection element individually while monitoring trip output. Technician can create his own test plan based on past electromechanical procedures.

19. Commissioning Conflicts Encountered: The “Black Box” phenomena: one device that performs multiple functions with several different outputs (trips, alarms, targets, annunciations, etc.) Element Testing vs. Functional Testing Those installing the scheme often asked, “What’s the intent of the design?” “How should the scheme operate for this scenario?” The procedure for troubleshooting a mis-operation or failed test is much different than that of an electromechanical relay scheme

20. Commissioning Corrective Actions: Commissioning Guides Automated Testing Procedures with Pre-determined Test Plans Design Intent Documents provided with each engineered job Logic Diagrams matching actual programmed internal logic New Training Program at New Training Facility

21. Lessons Learned –Process Improvements Re-engineering the process is sometimes needed Continual auditing of the process –Specify Process Feedback Loops Identify Experts for Focus Groups Defined Time Interval for Revisions to take place –Quality Control Adding quality analysts to team Strengthening peer-review ideals –Workforce Solutions Invest in additional engineers, technicians, and support staff Invest in Training Programs