1. ICAO NAM/CAR/SAM Runway Safety/Runway Incursion Conference John Pallante, ARI-2 October 2002 U.S. Runway Safety Briefing

2. Global Airspace Characteristics Pressure to reduce delays and to enhance safety Millions of operations a year Hundreds of thousands of pilots and aircraft Thousands of airports Thousands of air traffic controllers Growing demand for air travel and system capacity

3. Runway Safety Realities  Systemic, Rare, Potentially Catastrophic Events  Human Factors – Inevitable and Constant  Commercial and GA Incursions – Proportionate to Operations  Airport Design, Procedures, and Local Factors are Significant  Solution includes Cultural Change, Joint and Individual Ownership

4. Types of Runway Incursions Pilot Deviations A pilot deviation (PD) is an action of a pilot that violates any Federal Aviation Regulation. For example, a pilot fails to obey air traffic control instructions to not cross an active runway when following the authorized route to an airport gate. Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations A vehicle or pedestrian deviation (VPD) includes pedestrians, vehicles or other objects interfering with aircraft operations by entering or moving on the runway movement area without authorization from air traffic control.  A runway incursion is any occurrence on an airport runway involving an aircraft, vehicle, person, or object on the ground that creates a collision hazard or results in a loss of required separation with an aircraft taking off, landing, or intending to land.  The FAA investigates runway incursions and attributes the occurrence to one or more of the following error types. Operational Errors An operational error (OE) is an action of an Air Traffic Controller (ATC) that results in:  Less than the required minimum separation between two or more aircraft, or between an aircraft and obstacles (obstacles include, vehicles, equipment, personnel on runways)  An aircraft landing or departing on a runway closed to aircraft

5. Runway Incursions (All Categories) DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE 66.2168.6767.6865.47 Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02 est. 64.85

6. Distribution by Type of Runway Incursions DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE FY 1998-2001 FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02)

7. Runway Incursion Severity Categories Operational Dimensions Affecting Runway Incursion Severity Category D Category C Category B Category A Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision Separation decreases and participants take extreme action to narrowly avoid a collision, or the event results in a collision Increasing Severity Available Reaction Time Available Reaction Time Evasive or Corrective Action Evasive or Corrective Action Environmental Conditions Environmental Conditions Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Speed of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Proximity of Aircraft and/or Vehicle Increasing Severity An incursion that resulted in a runway collision Collision Separation decreases and there is a significant potential for collision Separation decreases but there is ample time and distance to avoid a collision Little or no chance of collision but meets the definition of a runway incursion Category A

8. Category A&B Runway Incursions DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE 66.2168.6767.6865.47 Tower Operations (millions) YTD 09/30/02 53 = FY02 Perf Limit est. 64.85

9. Severity Distribution of Runway Incursions DATA ARE PRELIMINARY AND SUBJECT TO CHANGE FY 1998-2001FY 2002 YTD (09/30/02) Category A includes 2 collisions / 4 fatalities (FLL & SRQ- 4 fatal). Category A includes 2 collisions / 0 fatalities (VNY & LAL).

10. Category A and B Runway Incursions (CY 2000 and 2001)

11. Runway Collisions Met. Conditions (1990 - 2001) NIGHT VMC DAY IMC NIGHT IMC DAY VMC 21 5 0

12. TOTAL OPERATIONS 4 Year Total = 268 Million Annual Average = 67 Million TOTAL OPERATIONS 4 Year Total = 268 Million Annual Average = 67 Million TOTAL INCURSIONS Total Incursions = 1460 Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years TOTAL INCURSIONS Total Incursions = 1460 Average No. of Incursions = 5 per airport over 4 years INCURSION RATE Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations INCURSION RATE Average Rate = 0.55 incursions per 100,000 operations Frequency and Rate of Runway Incursions (CY 1998 - 2001)

13. LAX STLIAD 34 Incursions30 Incursions3 Incursions Airport complexity influences the number and rate of runway incursions (FY 1998 - 2001)

14. Severity Distribution at the 32 Benchmark Airports (CY 1998 – 2001)  The Benchmark Airports accounted for –18% of all operations (approx. 61 Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period –26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied  The Benchmark Airports accounted for –18% of all operations (approx. 61 Million out of 332 Million) at towered airports over the 4 year period –26% (383) of all the runway incursions in the 4 year period studied  The Benchmark Airports accounted for –38% (38/87) A events, –36% (59/163) B events, –35% (178/509) C events, –16% (113/694) D events  The Benchmark Airports accounted for –38% (38/87) A events, –36% (59/163) B events, –35% (178/509) C events, –16% (113/694) D events

15.  Current Situation  Runway Safety Goals What the FAA is Doing Outcome: Zero fatalities from runway incursions

16. Primary Performance Factors of Runway Incursions (1997-2001)  Pilot Deviations –Enters or crosses a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions –Takes off without a clearance after acknowledging position and hold instructions  Operational Errors –Loss of arrival/departure separation on same or intersecting runways –Runway crossing separation errors  Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviations –Crosses a runway without communication or authorization –Enters a runway after acknowledging hold short instructions

17. Runway Safety Blueprint 8 Goals – 39 Objectives 1. Education and Training – Safety Seminars 2. Surface Safety Awareness – Mass Mailings 3. Procedures – Modeling and Simulation – Advisory Circulars 4. Data Collection – Surface Incidents – ASRS

18. 8 Goals – 39 Objectives 5. Communications – Phraseology Workgroup 6. Situational Awareness – Paint Study 7. Local Solutions – Special Emphasis Program 8. Technology – Flashing PAPI – Runway Status Lights (AMASS, ASDE-X) – Moving Map – LED Lights Runway Safety Blueprint (cont’d)

19. Technologies  ARI sponsoring technologies with industry-wide potential –AMASS  18 Commissioned  6 Operational Suitability Demo  13 Remaining –LED lighting  Enhances hold position markings at runway/taxiway intersection  Omaha system activation July 2002

20. Summary  Runway Safety is a multi-dimensional issue that requires a multi-dimensional approach.  People make mistakes – even the most intelligent, well-trained, conscientious, well-intentioned people make mistakes.  Education, training and procedures are important solutions, but they are always susceptible to human error. To be successful, a balanced approach also requires improvements in airport design and technology, and a determination to take ownership of the issue of runway incursions.

21. Backup Slides

22. Approach  Analyze the incident data to determine areas of greatest risks –What are the types and relative frequencies of different types of error?  Identify mitigation strategies for managing human error –Procedures –Technologies

23. Where do we go wrong?  Controllers –Forget (about a closed runway, a clearance that they issued, an aircraft waiting to takeoff or cleared to land) –Get distracted –Fail to coordinate (teamwork) –Don’t catch all readback errors –Act human

24. Where do we go wrong?  Pilots –Fail to “hold short” as instructed (and cross or line up on the runway) –Takeoff without a clearance –Get lost (with and without poor visibility) –Misunderstand the clearance –Act human

25. Resulting in:  Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft taking off or landing  Aircraft/vehicles crossing in front of an aircraft landing  Controllers forgetting about aircraft holding in position and clearing an aircraft to land on the same runway  Other scenarios

26. How do we fix it?  Better tools for pilots and controllers –Better airport signs and markings –Surface radar at more airports –Improved means of controller-pilot communication (to reduce frequency congestion and eliminate blocked transmissions) –Runway status lights –“Loops” –Cockpit moving map displays

27. What Controllers Can Do  Optimize teamwork  Recognize limitations of human memory and attention  Don’t clear an aircraft into “position and hold” if you plan on it being there for more than a minute  Never “assume” – keep up your scan and check that the runway is clear  Good communication techniques

28. What Pilots Can Do  DON’T “mind your own business” – do whatever you can to increase your awareness of the airport operation –LISTEN UP –LOOK OUT –Airport diagram “out and in use” –Is there a runway between you and the gate? –Is there an aircraft on final?

29. What Pilots Can Do (cont’d)  Both pilots should listen for clearances to land, taxi, and take-off  When in doubt, about your position or your clearance - ASK  SOPs and Recommended Practices –Landing lights go on when take-off clearance is received (signal that aircraft is rolling) –Call ATC if you expected an imminent take-off and have been lined up and waiting for more than 90 seconds

30. Technologies

31. BAA Activities  Background –Issued Surface Technology Broad Agency Announcement (BAA): Exploring new and emerging, lower cost technology solutions –Demonstrate technical feasibility of proposed technology –Proceed to technology/solution development phase based on operational transition potential  Status –Six demonstration contracts awarded in 2001 (summary on next slide) –Laser light technology contract awarded in July 2002  System demo - November 2002

32. BAA Activities (cont’d)

33. Other Projects (cont’d)  Hold Line Enhancement with LED lights –Three phases testing at Omaha  LED stand alone  LED with motion sensors  Special scenarios - TBD –Operational Assessment complete  Jan 2003

34. Other Projects (cont’d)  VHF audio alert with motion sensors for non- controlled airports –Two months data collection at Millard Airport completed in May 2002 –Detection rate and false alert rate need enhancement

35. Other Projects (cont’d)  Flashing Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI) –Notifies pilots on approach that it is unsafe to land due to an aircraft or vehicle occupying the Take-off Hold position or other critical position on the runway –System control logic driven by loops detection in Long Beach –Article 7 Brief  August 12, 2002 –Field Demo  September 10-12, 2002

36. Technologies Deployment  Short Term –Utilize existing Surface Movement Guidance and Control System (SMGCS) and install FAA approved light fixtures such as Runway Guard Lights and Stop Bar Lights at those hot spots and high traffic intersections to increase the awareness of pilots and vehicle operators  North Vegas  Long Beach –Phase in automatic control such as loops and motion sensor, and evaluate their effectiveness

37. Technologies Deployment (cont’d)  Mid Term –Evaluate, certify and install R&D equipment and system to improve runway safety  Addressable Sign – TYS  LED/Hold Line Enhancement – OMA  75 MHz Ground Marker – Tech Center  Long Term –Provide low cost surveillance system for smaller airports –Implement and promote the utilization of Automatic Dependent Surveillance – Broadcast (ADS-B) and ground vehicle tracking –Integrate existing and future certified warning equipment/devices with safety logic to provide visual and aural alerts to users including air traffic controllers, pilots and vehicle operators