1. Simple, Black-Box Constructions of Adaptively Secure Protocols joint work with Dana Dachman-Soled (Columbia University), Tal Malkin (Columbia University), and Hoeteck Wee (Queens College, CUNY) Seung Geol Choi Columbia University

2. 2 Outline Motivation Our Work Our Compiler –Comp

3. 3 Outline Motivation Our Work Our Compiler –Comp

4. Criteria of adversarial corruption in Multi-party Computation (MPC) Semi-honest vs. Malicious –semi-honest: corrupted parties should behave honestly –malicious: they can behave arbitrarily How many parties can be corrupted? –Honest majority vs. honest minority. Static vs. Adaptive –static: adv corrupts parties at the outset –adaptive [CFGN96]: during the protocol adaptively

5. Adaptively Secure OT - Simulator (s 0, s 1 ) ReceiverSender m1m1 m2m2 m3m3 srsr Output r Corrupt Sender Bad Simulation Pick (s 0, s 1 ), r, rand for S & R randomly and execute the protocol honestly w/ these values. Given the actual input (s 0 ’, s 1 ’), Sim is unable to patch rand for S consistent w/ the transcript & the input No Corruption

6. MPC (malicious majority) and OT -- Roughly Non-black-box –Basically everything is known: use ZK, e.g., –Static: from semi-honest OT [GMW87] (stand-alone) –Adaptive: from semi-honest OT with F COM [CLOS02] (UC) Black-box –Static: from semi-honest OT [K88,IKLP06,H08] (stand-alone) –Adaptive: from malicious OT [IPS08] (UC) But, malicious OT [B98, CLOS02, KO04] has non-black-box access to the underlying primitive.

7. Goal Achieve MPC –adaptive, malicious majority –black-box (BB) access to lower primitives Of theoretical interest Arguably more efficient: avoid general NP reductions incurred by ZK proofs. –constant-round

8. 8 Outline Motivation Our Work Our Compiler –Comp

9. Main Result UC, adaptive semi-honest bit OT UC, adaptive malicious string OT in F COM hybrid Compiler Black-box constant multiplicative blow-up in rounds Improvement over [IKLP06,H08] : UC and adaptive

10. BB Implications – UC & Adaptive constant-round semi-honest bit OT Trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem DDH RSA Factoring LWE [CDMW09, CLOS02] this work: in F COM hybrid - MPC allowing corruption of any number of parties - constant-round MPC allowing corruption of n-1 parties [IPS08] malicious string OT in F COM hybrid

11. Our MPC Construction F COM hybrid: Can be combined with existing results under various setup –e.g., [CLOS02, BCNP04, CDPW07, K07]. Usually start by how to UC realize F COM. [CLOS02][IPS08]ours #rounds for n, (n-1) corruptions O(depth) O(1) O(depth) O(1) hybridF COM F OT F COM BB/non-BBnon-BBBB

12. UC, adaptive in F COM hybrid - MPC allowing corruption of any number of parties - constant-round MPC allowing corruption of n-1 parties stand-alone, adaptive BB Implications - Stand-alone UC, adaptive, constant-round semi-honest bit OT Trapdoor simulatable cryptosystem DDH RSA Factoring LWE [CDMW09, CLOS02] this work: [IPS08] malicious string OT in F COM hybrid [PW09] - constant-round malicious string OT [PW09]

13. Our Work - Summary Adaptively secure MPC: UC in F COM hybrid / stand-alone - allowing corruption of any number of parties -allowing corruption of n-1 parties in constant-round UC, adaptive semi-honest bit OT UC, adaptive malicious string OT in F COM hybrid Compiler MPC stand-alone, adaptive constant-round malicious string OT String OT

14. 14 Outline Motivation Our Work Our Compiler –Comp

15. Previous Work: Stand-alone & Static case semi-honest bit OT malicious OT Haitner [H08] defensible bit OT Ishai,Kushilevitz, Lindell, and Petrank [IKLP06] eTDP, homomorphic enc [K88] MPC

16. Our Compiler - 1 Basically, [H08]+[IKLP06]. Insight –View [H08] + [IKLP06] as GMW Compiler With ZK proof replaced with cut-and-choose technique. –Our presentation doesn’t need the notion of defensible OT.

17. Our Compiler - 2 Has two modules –Comp: boost receiver-side security (for string) –OT-Reversal [WW06]: reverse the role of sender and receiver (for bit) malicious Apply Comp semi-honestmaliciousApply OT-Reversal malicioussemi-honestApply Comp semi-honest Starting protocol receiver senderOur Compiler defensible [IKLP06] [H08] : Commit input & randomness at the outset semi-honest Parallel executions

18. 18 Outline Motivation Our Work Our Compiler –Comp

19. I. Run con-tossing in the well using F COM to fix R’s input & rand for Phase II. II. Run 2n executions of ¦ in parallel w/ R using input & rand generated in Phase I. III. R opens commitments in Phase I for n random OT execs. IV. Apply combiner to the rest of n executions. Comp( ¦ ) [H08] [IKLP06] Cut & Choose

20. UC Security in Comp Straight-line simulation –Extract receiver’s input in a straight-line manner w/ info from Phase I.

21. Adaptively Secure OT - Simulator (s 0, s 1 ) ReceiverSender m1m1 m2m2 m3m3 srsr Output r Corrupt Sender Upon corruption, Sim has to patch rand for S consistent w/ the transcript & the given input No Corruption

22. Simulation in Comp – Achieving Adaptive Security 1.Extract R’s input & rand. in Phase I w/ F COM 2.For i-th OT execution ¦ i: Run simulator for ¦ i (SIMi) until the R behaves consistently w/ the commitments. Inconsistent R: “corrupt S” on SIMi (input & rand of S in ¦ i is fixed ). Follow spec. of ¦ w/ this fixed info. 3.Patching the S’s overall rand. If R behaved honestly in some ¦ j, can patch using SIMj : with high probability there is at least one such j. Use adaptive security of ¦: Guaranteed as long as R behaves honestly

23. Conclusion Adaptively secure MPC: UC in F COM hybrid / stand-alone - allowing corruption of any number of parties -allowing corruption of n-1 parties in constant-round UC, adaptive semi-honest bit OT UC, adaptive malicious string OT in F COM hybrid Compiler MPC stand-alone, adaptive constant-round malicious string OT String OT

24. Thank you