1. Securing a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran

2. Our National Interests Dictate our Objectives Vital  Survival of the Iranian Islamic Republic with our Fundamental Institutions and Values intact  Stability of Iran and our Territorial Integrity  Prevention of a Military Attack on Iran  Enhancement of Iran‘s Power within the Region and Beyond Very Important  Survival of Iranian allies (Hezbollah, Syria)  Promoting the prosperity and virtue of Iran‘s population Objective Secure a Nuclear Deterrent for Iran by completing at least three nuclear weapons by 2012 while avoiding an attack

3.  IAEA inspectors obstruct secret enrichment  Single, concentrated enrichment facility in Natanz as large target  Economic situation inside Iran already fragile  Enemies‘ fear may trigger attack  Economic sanctions may stir turmoil inside Iran  Technical difficulties with IR-2 may delay enrichment  Strong options for distraction and chaos (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shi‘a Insurgents in Iraq)  Domestic enrichment process means time is our ally  IR-2 will speed up enrichment, offers diversification  Reluctant, over-stretched enemy may endure more provocations  Enemies‘ split interests offer chance for division Background Analysis

4. Assessment of Key Players PlayerInterests/ DriversWeaknesses U.S.Ensure stability in region; decrease price of oil; restore US credibility in region; avoid regional hegemon; ensure Israel’s security; ensure no nuclear weapons in the region (ex. Israel); Iran’s regime transformation/change Weak standing and influence in the region due to Iraq and lack of progress in the Peace process; economic downturn; dependence on the regional oil supply; increasing influence of Russia/China in the region IsraelEnsure survival; mitigate Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah Regional geopolitics; loss in the 2006 Lebanon war EU/EU-3Economic and energy ties to the region; sympathetic to peaceful nuclear energy Lack of a unified policy toward Iran; economic dependence on oil China/RussiaExpand economic ties; get access to energy sector Increasing economic ties to Iran; must maintain delicate balance between US and Iran IAEAMaintain credibility of the NPT regime; prevent nuclear Iran; prevent nuclear arms race in the region Iran controls access; NPT has loopholes

5. Nuclear map Covert site possibility Along route to Tehran Provides cover for transport Sufficiently distant from Natanz (approx 100 miles)

6. “Iran doesn’t have the bomb now, but will have it soon, thus we have to act” We need to change the enemies‘ perception “Iran doesn‘t want the Bomb so we don‘t have to stop them“ “Iran wants the bomb but it is too costly to stop them“ Problem: Continued enrichment reinforces this perception To prevent an attack we need to change the perception in one of two ways A A B B

7. Technological implementation cannot be our only concern Geostrategic End-State Information Policy Technical Implementation Middle Eastern Brotherhood Divide and Conquer Autarky Accomodating Ambiguous Assertive Concealment Diversification Fast Forward

8. Current capabilities and paths for completion by 2012 Goal: 3 Bombs Uranium Enrichment Plutonium Option Bushehr Lightwater Arak Heavy Water Summer 2011 2012 Must exit NPT Single Target Impossible Problematic ProjectCompletion 3,000 P-1 at Natanz + 200 IR-2 per month 1 bomb after 6 months 3 bombs after 12 months 6 bombs by 12/2008 Optimal Enrichment Scenario: Time-frame too long

9. All three options generate enough material by 12 / 2012 “Charming Our Way to the Bomb“ 1 3,000 P-1 at Natanz (normal rate) + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate) 1 bomb after 6 months 3 bombs after 13 months 5 bombs by 12/2009 “Distract and Deter“ 2 3,000 P-1 at Natanz (25% lower rate) + 200 IR-2 per month (25% lower rate, no enrichment before 11/2008) 1 bomb after 7 months 3 bombs after 16 months 4 bombs by 12/2009 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment“ 3 3,000 P-1 at Natanz (50% lower rate) + 200 IR-2 per month (50% lower rate) 1 bomb after 8 months 3 bombs after 20 months 3 bombs by 12/2009

10. Charming our Way to the Bomb 1 RISK of attack IMPACT of attack COST 60/100 80/100 20/100  Mislead the enemy: Continue P-1 enrichment, but focus on IR-2 Seek to complicate and delay IAEA negotiations, e.g. offer multinational consortium  Pacify the enemy: Collaborate in Iraq; restrain Hezbollah in Lebanon Abstain from provocation in the Gulf Moderate public discourse and favor moderate Presidential candidate  Engage the enemy:  Encourage economic and security collaboration with Arabs  Offer advantageous energy deals to EU, China, India CON o Very high risk that our real intentions will be detected o Negotiation over IR-2 enrichment at Natanz will slow production process CON o Very high risk that our real intentions will be detected o Negotiation over IR-2 enrichment at Natanz will slow production process PRO o Minimizes economic sanctions to ensure political stability in Iran o Creates the basis for long-term Iranian hegemony in the Middle East

11.  Distract most likely attacker (Zionists) Arm, instigate Hezbollah, Hamas Provoke Zionist Aggression against Lebanon, Gaza  Demonstrate credible threat but don’t provoke U.S. Conduct missile tests Fake intelligence about possession of bomb Allude to nuclear retaliation to Zionist attack Keep Shi‘a Militias in Iraq generally calm but prepare to instigate of chaos  Accelerate and spread out enrichment Make life harder for inspectors, conduct calculated violations of IAEA rules Push Natanz and secret enrichment at other sites Distract and Deter 2 RISK of attack IMPACT of attack COST 30/100 40/100 CON o Risk of attack if we are caught bluffing o Additional sanctions, but relatively easy to escape in the long run CON o Risk of attack if we are caught bluffing o Additional sanctions, but relatively easy to escape in the long run PRO o Fastest way to the bomb o Uncertainty will split international community (especially China, Russia) PRO o Fastest way to the bomb o Uncertainty will split international community (especially China, Russia)

12. Autarky and Micro-Enrichment 3 RISK of attack IMPACT of attack COST 20/100 90/100  Undermine success of attack  Immediately diversify to large number of targets  Create capability to quickly reconstitute program  Move most sensitive material to densely populated areas  Distract the enemy  Trigger large conflict between Zionists, Hezbollah, Hamas  Create chaos in Iraq by leveraging Shi‘a militias to tie down U.S.  Cut all links to the outside  Exit Non-Proliferation Treaty  Send inspectors home  Prepare for Economic and Security autarky CON o High economic cost, possibly also in the long run o Risk that difficulties of coordinating centrifuges may delay production CON o High economic cost, possibly also in the long run o Risk that difficulties of coordinating centrifuges may delay production PRO o Does not count on deceiving the enemy o Very narrow window for enemy attack PRO o Does not count on deceiving the enemy o Very narrow window for enemy attack

13. Recommendation: “Distract and Deter“ Fall back Option: „Autarky“ 60/100 80/100 20/100 30/100 40/100 20/100 90/100 RISK of attack IMPACT of attack COST “Charming Our Way to the Bomb“ “Distract and Deter“ 1 2 3 “Autarky and Micro-Enrichment “ Option 2: “Distract and Deter“ balances risk of attack, impact of attack and economic costs most effectively

14. Implementation requires 2-step strategy: moderation until US elections, escalation thereafter Until 11 / 2012: Moderation, ambiguity and diversification  Create ambiguity o Publicly deny first use doctrine o Conduct missile tests o Fake intelligence about possession of bomb  Continue current game with IAEA until US elections to moderate result o Calculated violations of IAEA rules, obstruction of inspections o Install IR-2 at secret enrichment sites but wait with operation  Lull the enemy o Moderate Hezbollah, Hamas while supplying with funds, arms o Cooperate in Iraq and hold back Shi‘a militias 12 / 2012 Chaos and Enrichment Push  Instigate major conflict between Zionists and Hezbollah / Hamas  Initiate surge in Iraqi violence for initial distraction of Great Satan  Condem aggression by Zionists, great Satan as excuse for short-term non-cooperation with IAEA but continue cooperating after  Use distraction to withdraw material from Natanz