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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS Hearing European Parliament Shareholders’ rights Directive By: Prof.dr.Lutgart Van den Berghe ecoDa & GUBERNA 2 December 2014
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 The SH rights directive : – Wants to improve corporate governance – By increasing the rights & duties of shareholders as corporate monitors – While shifting key decision-making powers away from the Board of Directors (implicit mistrust of boards?) Will this effectively work??? Will this be sufficient? – Without attention for the great heterogeneity in shareholder models throughout Europe – Without really solving the barriers of the dispersed shareholding model of the listed companies THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 Barriers of the dispersed shareholding model? Challenge n°1: inactive/passive shareholders do not perform a monitoring role as assumed – Will the SH Directive change this situation? Can inactive shareholders become the micro-managers this Directive implies? What remedies are possible? More attention for shareholder duties & transparency Incentives for active monitoring? Giving more rights to nominate/dismiss (independent) directors Allowing ‘acting in concert’ in case of...? THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 Barriers of the dispersed shareholding model? Challenge n°2: many SH are short-term oriented – Will the SH Directive change this situation? What are possible remedies? Incentives for long-term shareholders (SH rights/Div) Quid business model of the stock exchange? More obligations for Asset Managers (and Institutional Investors) to disclose their investment strategy More accountability for proxy advisors Quid self-regulation or hard law? Minimal condition of strict monitoring! THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 Barriers of the dispersed shareholding model? Challenge n°3: the complex investment chain – Will the SH Directive change this situation? What remedies are realistic? Transparency as a first step Making institutional investors & asset managers more accountable towards their customers/final owners BUT can final owners really become monitors of such shareholder policy? THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 Other relevant shareholder models? O bservation 1: the dispersed shareholding model is by far not the dominant form of listed companies, throughout the EU Observation 2: assuming that institutional shareholders are the most important shareholder group in the EU is not correct either => Challenge n°4: controlling shareholders may pose the opposite challenge: abusing their monitoring power and insider position Correct to focus attention in SH Directive on the downsides of both types of governance model THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 Barriers of the controlling shareholder model? What are possible remedies? Sufficient independent directors in the board and board committees to guarantee the focus on the corporate interest Quid group governance recommendations? More attention for related parties transactions However, be aware of regulatory and especially business inefficiencies of the proposed measures! THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 More attention for the monitoring role of an ‘effective’ Board of Directors Advantage 1: legal duty to focus on the corporate interest Advantage 2: in-depth knowledge of the business, its context and operations Conditions: Professional directors (well educated and critically evaluated) Guaranteeing independence of board decision-making Effectively monitored by active shareholders, who have explicit rights as to director nomination, remuneration and dismissal THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 B- 1040 BRUSSELS
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THE EUROPEAN CONFEDERATION OF DIRECTORS ASSOCIATIONS - AVENUE DES ARTS 41 - BRUSSELS 1040 ecoDa The European Voice of Directors Thank you
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