1. Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol
Regional Training Course on State Systems of Accounting for and Control of Nuclear Material for States in the Middle East with Limited Nuclear Material and Activities
Amman, Jordan, 17 to 21 January 2010
Session 3.1 Overview of the Additional Protocol
M. Derrough
Senior Inspector, Division of Operations B

2. Session Outline Limitations under CSAs The Additional Protocol
Information on mines and concentration plants
Information on imports/exports
Information on future plans

3. Limitations under Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements

4. Objective of Safeguards
Provide Assurances on the
Correctness and Completeness
of a State’s nuclear material declarations

5. What kind of assurances?
Under a CSA alone, only credible assurance of the non-diversion of declared nuclear material can be provided
More information and access is required to provide credible assurance of the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities for a State as a whole

6. Some of the limitations under CSAs
Focuses on declared materials at strategic points in declared facilities (access limited)
Covers only partially the nuclear fuel cycle
No assurances of absence of undeclared nuclear material and facilities (completeness)

7. Political changes in 1990-1995 Dissolution of the former Soviet Union
South Africa’s destruction of its nuclear weapons and accession to the NPT
Discovery of Iraq’s clandestine nuclear programme
DPRK
Indefinite extension of NPT

8. IAEA Board of Governors (March 1995)
“…the safeguards system for implementing comprehensive safeguards agreements should be designed to provide for verification by the Agency of the correctness and completeness of States’ declarations,
so that there is
credible assurance of the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities and of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities”

9. Strengthening Programme
June Programme 93+2 measures divided into Part I (within existing authority) and Part II (new authority needed)
June 1996 An open-ended committee of the Board (Committee 24) was established to negotiate the legal instrument for additional authority

10. The Additional Protocol

11. The Model Additional Protocol
New legal instrument approved by Board of Governors in May 1997 (INFCIRC/540)
Concluded by States on a voluntary basis; becomes part of a State’s safeguards agreement

12. better tools for verifying the correctness and completeness
Objective
Provide the IAEA with
better tools for verifying the
correctness and completeness
of States’ declarations

13. Measures of the additional protocol
State’s provision of extended declaration
Inspector’s broader access rights
Better administrative arrangements, e.g. visas
The Secretariat’ proposal for the early provision of design information was accepted by the BOG but it has to be incorporated in the general part of Subsidiary Arrangements (SA) before it becomes an obligation for the State. At this point, every State with significant nuclear activities has so amended their SAs.
The additional information sought under CSA legal authority was specifically
information on SSAC,
information on past nuclear activities including closed-down and decommissioned facilities and available historical records to the extent relevant to assessing the completeness of current declarations
description of nuclear fuel cycle and other nuclear activities with nuclear material
Unannounced inspections provided for in paragraph 84 INFCIRC/153, emphasis was given to them as a Part I measure because of administrative (e.g. multi-entry visas) and technical obstacles we hoped to deal with
Environmental sampling approved as an objective measure shown to be technically feasible paragraph 74 (e) INFCIRC/153
Remote monitoring to include unattended equipment, remote transmission of inspection date, remote monitoring of SGs egp.

14. Coverage under a CSA CSA
If we go back to the picture of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Waste Storage
CSA

15. Expanded coverage with an AP
And look at the expanded coverage with an AP. We now cover the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle and the back end. Also, importantly, we get information and access to equipment manufacturers and locations where R&D on the nuclear fuel cycle not involving nuclear material is taking place.
Waste Storage
CSA AP

16. Extended declaration on nuclear material
Domestically produced source material
Imports/exports of source material for non-nuclear purposes
Locations and uses of exempted material
Waste containing terminated nuclear material

17. Extended declaration on nuclear-related facilities and activities
Co-located nuclear infrastructure
Other locations where nuclear material is located (mines/exempted/terminated)
Nuclear-related research and development not involving nuclear material
Nuclear-related equipment and non-nuclear material
State’s future plans

18. Example (Training Map – Artificial Information) RBA, RURITANIA
1 APRIL 2001
(Training Map – Artificial Information)

19. Broader access rights All places in nuclear installations or on sites
All other places where nuclear material is located
Decommissioned facilities
Some locations where nuclear-related activities are conducted
Other locations, under certain circumstances

20. Better administrative arrangements
Simpler inspector designation
No visas or multi-year multiple entry visas
Modern communications capabilities

21. mines and concentration plants
Information on
mines and concentration plants

22. Mining U and Th naturally occurring
Uniformly distributed on Earth in rock forming minerals, sands
Various techniques:
Open Pit
Underground
In-situ leach
Tails reworking 22

23. Open Pit Mine Arlit mine, Niger Large wide pit dug to reach orebody.
Ore mined from pit bottom - hauled by road up sides.
Most suitable for orebodies:
near the surface
Large volume - low grade
A solid volume (not long and thin or fragmented veins)
Orebody oriented horizontally
Waste to ore ratio generally increases with depth
Examples: Rössing, Ranger, Akouta 23

24. Underground Mine Shaft head frame at Dolní Rožínka, Czech Republic
Underground at MacArthur River, Canada
Ore mined orebody below ground and hauled through shafts or declines to surface.
Most suitable for orebodies that are:
Deep
Narrow/vertical
High grade
Fragmented
Waste to ore ratio not depth dependent
Examples: MacArthur River, Olympic Dam 24

25. In-situ Leach Yellowcake drying and packaging Reagent Supplies *
Control room
Monitoring wells
Well house
Injection well
Recovery well
Uranium deposit
Uranium Extraction
Thickeners
Evaporation ponds
Upper Aquifer
Impermeable
Zone
Mineralized
Aquifer
Leach solution injected into the orebody through wells and extracted through others dissolving uranium from the ore between.
Mining method with least physical impact
Suitable for orebodies that are:
In porous host material
In confined aquifers
Examples: Smith Ranch, Beverley
* Acid or alkaline depending on chemistry of Uranium layers 25

26. Tailings reworking
Tailings (waste) material from old uranium or other mines may be processed again for uranium.
Stored in large piles or dams.
Advantage is material at surface and milled. Suitable when:
Technology/price has improved
Uranium was not previously extracted
Tailings are old (oxidised)
Examples: WERGO (West Rand) 26

27. Reporting of mining materials and activities
Safeguards activities are currently limited
Nuclear material accountancy is not applied to uranium ore concentrates (UOC) but exports are reported
Mine and mills sites annual production are declared under an additional protocol.

28. Information required under Article 2.a.(v)
Location, operational status, and production capacity
Approximate annual production for the State as a whole
Annual production for individual mines or plants if requested by the Agency

29. Information on
imports / exports

30. Information required under Article 2. a
Information required under Article 2.a.(ix) - Exports of Annex II Items
Annex II lists “nuclear use” equipment and non-nuclear material in 7 major categories
Information required about the identity, quantity, location of intended use for each export of Annex II equipment or material
Agency may request confirmation by importing State
Reporting on a quarterly basis

31. 2.a.(ix) – Reactor Components

32. 2.a.(ix) – Non-Nuclear Material

33. 2.a.(ix) – Reprocessing

34. 2.a.(ix) – Fuel Fabrication

35. 2.a.(ix) – Enrichment

36. 2.a.(ix) – Heavy Water Production

37. 2.a.(ix) – Uranium Conversion Plants

38. Information on
State’s future plans

39. Information required under Article 2.a.(x) - Fuel Cycle Plans
Government approved plans for nuclear fuel cycle
Fuel cycle R&D specifically included
For next 10-years

40. Conclusion

41. The Additional Protocol is an integral part of the strengthened safeguards system
The Additional Protocol increases Agency’s ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear material or activities

42. The tools of additional protocol allows the Agency to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, a pre-requisite for the implementation of integrated safeguards
Close cooperation with SSACs is necessary