1. Concepts in the Light of Evolution Session 4 Reza Maleeh Institute of Cognitive Science University of Osnabrück smaleeh@uos.de University of Osnabrueck1

2. Metacognition & Propositional Attitudes University of Osnabrueck2 A capacity for metacognition involves the ability to take different attitudes to the content of propositions.

3. Metacognition & Propositional Attitudes University of Osnabrueck3 In each case, the same proposition is present to the mind, and the organism can use a different part of its mind to take an attitude to this proposition. Bermúdez (2003, pp. 38–39), quite reasonably, makes the ability to take different propositional attitudes to the same propositional content a criterion for full human-like propositional thinking. (Hurford, 2007, p. 32).

4. Metacognition & Propositional Attitudes University of Osnabrueck4 In each case, the same proposition is present to the mind, and the organism can use a different part of its mind to take an attitude to this proposition. Bermúdez (2003, pp. 38–39), quite reasonably, makes the ability to take different propositional attitudes to the same propositional content a criterion for full human-like propositional thinking. (Hurford, 2007, p. 32).

5. Evidence Giving alarm calls 5

6. Metacognition & Awareness University of Osnabrueck6 Mind Phenomenal Concept (Feeling) Psychological Concept (Behavior) UnconsciousConscious Awareness Phenomenal Consciousness Realm of Cognitive Science

7. Metacognition & Awareness University of Osnabrueck7 Animal experimenters keen to emphasize the fact that their animal subjects are not responding directly to some external stimulus, but to some internal state generated by the problematic nature of the stimuli, sometimes use the terms ‘know’ and ‘aware’.

8. Metacognition & Awareness & Propositional Attitudes University of Osnabrueck8 Awareness Propositional Attitudes Metacognition

9. Objection University of Osnabrueck9 ‘Granted, the animal needs to have some way of telling when it is in a state of the required sort [uncertainty]... But this doesn’t mean that the animal has to conceptualize the state as a state of uncertainty’ (Carruthers 2003, p. 243).

10. Response University of Osnabrueck10 Etymologically, Telling is even more language-bound than knowing.

11. Hurford, 2007, p. 32 University of Osnabrueck11 I take the position that while the use of coherent language is the strongest indicator of awareness, there can be awareness without language. One can be ‘dimly aware’ of many things. The animal experiments on metacognition have established that some animals can become aware (perhaps only dimly, but enough to affect their behaviour) of their own inner states. It is clear that the levels of metacognition discovered, with some effort and ingenuity, in animals, are far below what normal adult humans are capable of.

12. Hurford, 2007, p. 32 University of Osnabrueck12 I take the position that while the use of coherent language is the strongest indicator of awareness, there can be awareness without language. One can be ‘dimly aware’ of many things. The animal experiments on metacognition have established that some animals can become aware (perhaps only dimly, but enough to affect their behaviour) of their own inner states. It is clear that the levels of metacognition discovered, with some effort and ingenuity, in animals, are far below what normal adult humans are capable of.

13. Hurford, 2007, p. 32 University of Osnabrueck13 I take the position that while the use of coherent language is the strongest indicator of awareness, there can be awareness without language. One can be ‘dimly aware’ of many things. The animal experiments on metacognition have established that some animals can become aware (perhaps only dimly, but enough to affect their behaviour) of their own inner states. It is clear that the levels of metacognition discovered, with some effort and ingenuity, in animals, are far below what normal adult humans are capable of.

14. Metacognitive Knowledge vs. Metacognitive Regulation University of Osnabrueck14 Yet the seeds of human metacognitive capacity are present in some animals. If one were to go further into this topic, it might be held that animals display metacognitive regulation but not metacognitive knowledge, a distinction made by Flavell (1979). That is, possibly some animals can plan, monitor, and correct their own ongoing mental activity, without having a permanent store of ‘known’ facts about their own cognition in general, such as knowing that they can always find the way home (Hurford, 2007, p. 33).

15. Metacognitive Knowledge vs. Metacognitive Regulation University of Osnabrueck15 Yet the seeds of human metacognitive capacity are present in some animals. If one were to go further into this topic, it might be held that animals display metacognitive regulation but not metacognitive knowledge, a distinction made by Flavell (1979). That is, possibly some animals can plan, monitor, and correct their own ongoing mental activity, without having a permanent store of ‘known’ facts about their own cognition in general, such as knowing that they can always find the way home (Hurford, 2007, p. 33).

16. Metacognitive Knowledge vs. Metacognitive Regulation University of Osnabrueck16 Yet the seeds of human metacognitive capacity are present in some animals. If one were to go further into this topic, it might be held that animals display metacognitive regulation but not metacognitive knowledge, a distinction made by Flavell (1979). That is, possibly some animals can plan, monitor, and correct their own ongoing mental activity, without having a permanent store of ‘known’ facts about their own cognition in general, such as knowing that they can always find the way home (Hurford, 2007, p. 33).

17. Metacognition vs. Metarepresentation University of Osnabrueck17 Metacognition: Being aware of some inner state of one’s own and solipsistic. Metarepresentation: Being aware of the mental states of others.

18. Some Important Points University of Osnabrueck18 1. Experiments show what animals can do, if pushed … Somehow or other, in the evolution of humans, abilities latent in animals were pushed by some contingency or other, and our ancestors started to move along the road to language.

19. Some Important Points University of Osnabrueck19 1. Experiments show what animals can do, if pushed … Somehow or other, in the evolution of humans, abilities latent in animals were pushed by some contingency or other, and our ancestors started to move along the road to language.

20. Some Important Points University of Osnabrueck20 1. Experiments show what animals can do, if pushed … Somehow or other, in the evolution of humans, abilities latent in animals were pushed by some contingency or other, and our ancestors started to move along the road to language.

21. Some Important Points University of Osnabrueck21 2. There is a lot of individual variation in their animal subjects. There are smarter pigeons and dumber pigeons, savvy piglets and slower piglets, clever macaques and not-so-clever macaques.

22. Some Important Points University of Osnabrueck22 We can be sure that there was similar individual variation in our ancestors. Some had better abilities to work with abstract relational concepts than others, and some sometimes had more vivid awareness of their own inner mental states than others.

23. Some Important Points University of Osnabrueck23 Individual variation is the fuel of natural selection. In the area of ability to entertain concepts approaching human concepts, the top-performing animals were presumably our ancestors.

24. Write a Review from P. 36 to P. 49 University of Osnabrueck24 Object Permanence and Displaced Reference  Three different schemes of reference relevant to understanding systems of perceptual representation (Clark, 2004)  Visible & Invisible Displacement Biological Motion and Animacy Transitive Inference