1. Transparency, secrecy and arms control - fissile materials Annette Schaper Presentation at the Workshop Managing Nuclear Material Stockpiles in the 21 st Century, March 3-4, 2005

2. Weapon usable materials Inside weapons, military purpose, or considered excess Declared excess Under IAEA safeguards Already disposed of Civilian (owned) USA Russia UK France China India Pak Israel NNWS tons 47.5100 3.2 5 40.310.0050.51- 635470152420small0.69?- 52.5344.400000- 174500000000- 200.100000- 100000000- 00 096 4-530.359.840.300.759.4 5 – 10~ 9 under IAEA safeguards, country figures not published Majour source: ISIS-Website www.isis-online.org * Albright/Berkhout/Walker 1996

4. Properties of weapons usable fissile material Most is HEU, weapon grade most is ”reactor- grade” Pu multiplicity of forms many un-known locations inventory inhe- rently complex uncomplete pro- duction records small number of forms, well known locations technically unproblematic high standards of MPC&A no safe- guards most of it under IAEA or Euratom safe- guards TypeControl propertiesSafeguardsOwner a few countries many industri- alized countries Problems great challenge: inventories must be taken facilities adapted to MPC&A, safeguards, specific technical problems comparatively few problems: Pu surplus civilian use and trade of HEU... Quant. smaller quantities By far the largest

5. Properties of weapons usable fissile material Most is HEU, weapon grade most is ”reactor- grade” Pu multiplicity of forms many un-known locations inventory inhe- rently complex uncomplete pro- duction records small number of forms, well known locations technically unproblematic high standards of MPC&A no safe- guards most of it under IAEA or Euratom safe- guards TypeControl propertiesSafeguardsOwner a few countries many industri- alized countries Problems great challenge: inventories must be taken facilities adapted to MPC&A, safeguards, specific technical problems comparatively few problems: Pu surplus civilian use and trade of HEU... Quant. smaller quantities By far the largest

6. Increasing the security of fissile materials existing, nonexisting (and partly existing) voluntary measures halt production: NWS have stopped Ind,Pak,Isr ongoing phase out Pu use, diminuish stocks of existing separated Pu stop HEU production and civilian use Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty NPT Euratom Treaty INFCIRC/153 Additional Protocol (I/540) Guidelines of Pu management (I/549) Military: Inside weapons, military purpose, naval fuel, considered excess, declared excess, already disposed of, under IAEA safeguards Civilian create transparency: publish inventories & future policy plans US, UK published Pu inventories dispose of materials: HEU disposition started Pu disposition attempt failed so far verify disposition and non-military use: negotiations on trilateral initiative improve MPC&A: CTR intensify international efforts convert naval reactors internationally binding commitments International Fissile Materials Register with the UN International Nuclear Weapons Register with the UN U.S.-Russian agreement on the disposition of excess weapons Pu implementation pending financing Internationally agreed standards for MPC&A Internationally agreed standards for export controls Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (only international transports)

7. Increasing the security of fissile materials existing, nonexisting (and partly existing) voluntary measures halt production: NWS have stopped Ind,Pak,Isr ongoing phase out Pu use, diminuish stocks of existing separated Pu stop HEU production and civilian use Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty NPT Euratom Treaty INFCIRC/153 Additional Protocol (I/540) Guidelines of Pu management (I/549) Military: Inside weapons, military purpose, naval fuel, considered excess, declared excess, already disposed of, under IAEA safeguards Civilian create transparency: publish inventories & future policy plans US, UK published Pu inventories dispose of materials: HEU disposition started Pu disposition attempt failed so far verify disposition and non-military use: negotiations on trilateral initiative improve MPC&A: CTR intensify international efforts convert naval reactors internationally binding commitments International Fissile Materials Register with the UN International Nuclear Weapons Register with the UN U.S.-Russian agreement on the disposition of excess weapons Pu implementation pending financing Internationally agreed standards for MPC&A Internationally agreed standards for export controls Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (only international transports)

8. Why transparency? Best arguments from U.S. “openness initiative” (formed by thorough and transparent public discussions): Transparency promotes peaceful applications of science enables peer reviews and exchange disseminates information needed for public discussion promotes public trust in government makes the work in the weapons labs more attractive reduces costs of classification facilitates arms control, verification, has positive effect on intern. rel....

9. Why transparency? Interests of the international community concerning nuclear information: participation in nuclear arms control (NPT, CTBT, Cutoff, Safeguards...) nucl. disarmament (deployments, tactical NW, excess weapons-Pu,...) nonproliferation (situation in Iraq, Iran, N.korea,..) risk reduction (securing the nuclear complex in Russia and other NWPS) decisions in export controls (dual-use-technologies, international guidelines...) interests in NATO context

10. Openness Initiative rules: ”in no case shall information be classified... in order to - Conceal violations of law, inefficiency, corruption...; - Prevent embarrassment; - Restrain competition; - Prevent or delay the release of information that is not specially protected; - Assign an improper classification level; - or prevent release of information on the physical environment or health and safety”

11. Why secrecy? Nonproliferation: - technical details on nuclear weapons - on the fabrication of materials - on the fabrication of tools -... national security: - uncertainties of capabilities and intentions as part of stratgies (Cold War) - uncertainties of arsenals for deterrence (China) - uncertainties of locations to maintain second strike capabilities, and their protection - hide weaknesses and vulnerabilities

12. Why secrecy? status: - secrecy is associated with privileges - uncritical perception of a status attribute by certain politicians and military - replaces appreciation of scientists in the open scientific community democratic deficiencies: - concealment of mismanagement and corruption - protection of certain interests - setting of political agendas - preservation of autonomy in decision-making - avoid scrutiny by the public

13. Why secrecy? conservative inertia and historic traditions: - passive non-action has no immediate consequence - preserving status quo is often unreflected attitude - no way of starting a process in favour of change rejection of the NPT: - avoid outside pressure

14. (3) Nuclear materials and production a) Information: - quantities, - political status (civilian, excess military, in mil. use, future use..), - chemical and isotopic composition, production facilities, - storage sites and their security, - weapons usability of different kinds of materials b) reasons for secrecy: national security status?, conservative inertia ?? nonproliferation ?? c) Advantages of transparency: triggers better “control culture” which reduces diversion risks adds to the preparation for universal international safeguards gives realistic assessment of rearmament potential facilitates disarmament of weapons materials

15. (3) Nuclear materials and production d) arms control: follow-up of NW register facilitates Cutoff verification e) country comparison: US: the most transparent, publication of Pu production, no HEU Cutoff without verification! (Others: „focused approach“) Russia far less transparent UK: documentation on Pu F: rejects transparency, as others f) what should a NNWS know? should try to get all this information

16. (1) Deployments a) Information: - absolute stockpiles, - identification names, - yield, -types, - ranges, - operational status, - locations b) reasons for secrecy: deterrence status?, conservative inertia ?? c) Advantages of transparency: creates confidence, avoids unnecessary arms race gives a realistic image of capabilities motivates transparency in other NWS d) arms control: could enable arms control on TNW German proposal 1993: NW-Register at the UN

17. (1) Deployments e) country comparison: US: the most transparent, but no. of active warheads not published, NGOs can find sources, opposed to NW register Russia: less transparent, especially on TNW UK: some infos on gov. web site F: some infos hidden in special gov. documents China: almost completely intransparent Ind, Pak, Isr: intransparent f) what should a NNWS know? should try to get all this information

18. (2) Warhead dismantlement a) Information: technical infos to enable warhead identification b) reasons for secrecy: nonproliferation, national security status?, conservative inertia ?? c) Advantages of transparency: verification measures would be facilitated: „fingerprinting“, „information barriers“, „attribute identification“ d) arms control: verification of disarmament beyond START, incl. TNW NWFZ

19. (2) Warhead dismantlement e) country comparison: US: the most transparent, detailed lists: „Restricted Data Declassification, RDD-7“ Russia and U.S. in difficult working processUK: some infos on gov. web site UK has conducted feasibility study others: no known information f) what should a NNWS know? should be able to understand the significance of this information, to develop political positions on verification but details beyond RDD not necessary