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Dee studying IMPACT (M. Rhee’s pay reform) Value Added measures for teachers just below and just above the minimally effective and highly effective cutoffs.

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Presentation on theme: "Dee studying IMPACT (M. Rhee’s pay reform) Value Added measures for teachers just below and just above the minimally effective and highly effective cutoffs."— Presentation transcript:

1 Dee studying IMPACT (M. Rhee’s pay reform) Value Added measures for teachers just below and just above the minimally effective and highly effective cutoffs on the first year (those just below were threatened with dismissal if they did not perform subsequently, those above highly effective cutoff faced permanent salary increase) For simplicity, we will consider minimally effective cutoff (analogous for highly effective cutoff) Control group: those just above (they did not have an incentive to improve) Treatment group: those just below High quality (internal validity) for this group: those around the cutoff  Main problem: can’t really say anything about anybody else (those who weren’t around these cutoff points (90% of teachers): those that are really bad or those who are really good)

2 1. Dee studies IMPACT 2. Class size in the context of other reforms 3. School principals

3 Distribution of teachers under IMPACT Ineffective (2%) Minimally effective (14%) Effective (69%) Highly effective (14%)

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5 Other problems The first year Dee finds no effect: he argues the threat of dismissal was not credible, but you may think his results are just weak Maybe other problems : – Does the effect vanish after the second year (long-term effects)? Why would it if the dismissals do happen? – Would this effect apply in other non-urban districts? Why would they not: can threats of dismissal not be credible? Unlikely to be problems – Do improvements on test scores have important consequences later in life? See Chetty study. – The study is not correct because it does not control for background and family characteristics. But they use value-added measures

6 Evolution of pupil/teacher ratio Two third more teachers per 100 pupils: from 4 to 6.66 Two thirds more cost of instruction

7 Evolution of total expenditure in education Of the 4x per pupil increase in educational cost, 40% may be due to class size reductions 3,200 13,507 Total/ pupil

8 Alternatives Higher human capital: – Teacher incentives – Teacher recruitment – Principal effectiveness Charter schools? Technology?

9 Dimensions of analysis Impact/ unit of cost Political feasibility (Scalability)

10 School principals

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14 Management practices considered

15 15 Score(1): Measures tracked do not indicate directly if overall business objectives are being met. Certain processes aren’t tracked at all (3): Most key performance indicators are tracked formally. Tracking is overseen by senior management (5): Performance is continuously tracked and communicated, both formally and informally, to all staff using a range of visual management tools Monitoring - i.e. “How is performance tracked?”

16 Is this what being a good principal means? – What about instruction support and leadership? – Others? Can we be sure that it is school principals that are driving this higher performance? Why are school principals worse performers than managers in other sectors?


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