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Cryptography & Security Presented April 16, 2010 By Dave Stycos, Zocalo Data Systems
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Security Goals Confidentiality Integrity Availability
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Security’s Methods Authentication Access Control Accountability
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Discussion Overview Algorithms Protocols Implementations Resources
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Classes of Encryption Symmetric Encryption Hashing Random Number Generation Asymmetric Encryption (Public Key)
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Symmetric Algorithms Use a secret key to both encrypt and decrypt Are fast Operate on fixed-size blocks (8 or 16 bytes) DES, Triple-DES, AES, RC4, Blowfish
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NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology www.nist.gov www.nist.gov Computer Security Resource Center (CSRC) Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) Special Publication 800 (SP-800) http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/
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Symmetric Modes Electronic Code Book (ECB) Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Output Feedback (OFB) Cipher Feedback (CFB) Counter (CTR) More …
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Electronic Code Book (ECB)
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Encrypted Using ECB Mode
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Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
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Encrypted Using CBC Mode
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Initialization Vector Not secret Must be unique for each stream or file. Reused IVs reveal patterns in the first blocks of ciphertext.
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Common File Headers PDFs %PDF-1.3 JPEG JFIF EXE MZ Therefore, IVs must be unique for each key!
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CBC Weaknesses One bad block corrupts the chain Only sequential access Unsuitable for stream ciphers
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Block vs. Stream Ciphers Block Ciphers –Operate on data of known, finite size –Files, hard drives Stream Ciphers –Operate on data of unknown, indefinite size –Network flow, media
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Cipher Feedback (CFB) Symmetric cipher is a pseudo-random number generator. Plaintext XOR’ed with PRN, not encrypted by cipher.
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CFB Weaknesses One bad block corrupts the chain. Only sequential access. Can’t be computed in parallel.
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Counter (CTR)
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Common Weaknesses Key Secrecy Key Quality
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Key Management Locking Is EasyKey Management Is Hard
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What Is Key Quality? Computational infeasibility of brute-force attack
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What Is Key Quality? Computational infeasibility of brute-force attack DES Key: 56-bits = 72,057,594,037,927,936 keys
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What Is Key Quality? Computational infeasibility of brute-force attack DES Key: 56-bits = 72,057,594,037,927,936 keys How secure? Security measured in time. “When” not “if”
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Security of 56 Bit DES? 29 PCBs of 64 ASICs = 1856 ASICs! Checked +90b keys/s 9 days Built by EFF in 1998 for $250,000
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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) AES Key: 128-bits = 3.402 e+38 = 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,770,000,000
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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) AES Key: 128-bits = 3.402 e+38 = 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,770,000,000 AES Key: 192-bits = 6.277 e+57 = 6,277,101,735,386,680,763,835,789,423,207,700,000,000, 000,000,000,000,000,000
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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) AES Key: 128-bits = 3.402 e+38 = 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,770,000,000 AES Key: 192-bits = 6.277 e+57 = 6,277,101,735,386,680,763,835,789,423,207,700,000,000, 000,000,000,000,000,000 AES Key: 256-bits = 1.157 e+77 = 115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,690,000,000,00 0,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000
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Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) AES Key: 128-bits = 3.402 e+38 = 340,282,366,920,938,463,463,374,607,431,770,000,000 AES Key: 192-bits = 6.277 e+57 = 6,277,101,735,386,680,763,835,789,423,207,700,000,000, 000,000,000,000,000,000 AES Key: 256-bits = 1.157 e+77 = 115,792,089,237,316,195,423,570,985,008,690,000,000,00 0,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000,000 Mass of all visible matter in the universe equiv. 4.0 e+78 hydrogen atoms!
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Measuring Key Quality Entropy The likelihood of selecting any single key out of all possible keys.
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How to Measure Entropy? 0x50615373576F5264
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How to Measure Entropy? 0x50 61 53 73 57 6F 52 64 P a S s W o R d
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How to Measure Entropy? 0x50 61 53 73 57 6F 52 64 P a S s W o R d Many keys are derived from passwords. Memorizable pwds = negative effect on entropy.
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Entropy of Passwords 64-bits = 1.8 E+19 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 keys
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Entropy of Passwords 64-bits = 1.8 E+19 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 keys 8 chars of lower, upper, numeric = 62^8 = 218,340,105,584,896
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Entropy of Passwords 64-bits = 1.8 E+19 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 keys 8 chars of lower, upper, numeric = 62^8 = 218,340,105,584,896 ~ 47 bits
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Entropy of Passwords 64-bits = 1.8 E+19 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 keys 8 chars of lower, upper, numeric = 62^8 = 218,340,105,584,896 ~ 47 bits –Deep Crack Brute Force in 40 minutes!
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Entropy of Passwords 64-bits = 1.8 E+19 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 keys 8 chars of lower, upper, numeric = 62^8 = 218,340,105,584,896 ~ 47 bits –Deep Crack Brute Force in 40 minutes! 8 chars of alpha-only = 52^8 = 53,459,728,531,456 ~ 45 bits
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Entropy of Passwords 64-bits = 1.8 E+19 = 18,446,744,073,709,551,616 keys 8 chars of lower, upper, numeric = 62^8 = 218,340,105,584,896 ~ 47 bits –Deep Crack Brute Force in 40 minutes! 8 chars of alpha-only = 52^8 = 53,459,728,531,456 ~ 45 bits 8 chars, lower-only = 26^8 = 208,827,064,576 ~ 37 bits
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Measuring Key Entropy
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Dictionary Attacks Reduce entropy by leveraging language patterns
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Dictionary Attacks Reduce entropy by leveraging language patterns Merriam-Webster: 250,000 words 250,000 special/scientific 250,000 proper nouns (?) - 1,000 words that are <5 characters = 740,000 ~ 19 bits
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Dictionary Attacks Reduce entropy by leveraging language patterns Merriam-Webster: 250,000 words 250,000 special/scientific 250,000 proper nouns (?) - 1,000 words that are <5 characters = 740,000 ~ 19 bits Random use of upper and lower case –Add one bit per char length (max) Random use of upper, lower and numbers –Add ~1.5 bits per char length (max)
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Cryptographic Hashing Works like a CRC or checksum Impossible to reverse 128, 160 and 256 bits long Small changes in the plaintext create vast changes in the hash MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256
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Hashing Applications Validating data –Verifying download packages (md5sum) Increasing key entropy –2 n hash operations adds n bits of entropy Obscuring passwords
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Sending Passwords in the Clear
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Obscuring Passwords
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Replay Attack
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Zero-Knowledge Proof Proving a user knows a piece of data without divulging that piece of data.
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Challenge-Response Protocol
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NTLM Authentication
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! 0000 0000 00
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Challenge-Response Protocol Vulnerabilities “Stolen Verifier” Attack No Mutual Authentication
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Implementations SSL IPSec Secure Protocols
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Recommended Reading “Applied Cryptography” By Bruce Schneier “Practical Cryptography” By Bruce Schneier “Secrets and Lies” By Bruce Schneier “Cryptographic Security Architecture” By Peter Gutmann “Parallelizable Enciphering Mode” By Phillip Rogaway
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Organizations Commercial –Schneier.com CryptoGram & blog –RSA, Inc. (rsa.com) PKCS –Internet Engineering Taskforce (ietf.org) RFCs –ANSI, ISO, IEEE, W3C Government –Natl. Inst. of Standards & Tech. (nist.gov) FIPS & SP-800 documents –Natl. Security Agency (NSA)
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Happy Crypting! Presentation Created By Dave Stycos April, 2010 © 2010, Zocalo Data Systems, Ltd.
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