1. © 2008 Carnegie Mellon University Preventing Insider Threats: Avoiding the Nightmare Scenario of a Good Employee Gone Bad Dawn Cappelli October 31, 2008

2. 2 TRUE STORY : Personal information stolen for millions of customers of phone companies, credit card companies and banks … Companies contracted with a consumer data organization that hired a data mining organization whose system administrator stole the data

3. 3 TRUE STORY: Emergency services are forced to rely on manual address lookups for 911 calls on Friday night …. Employee sabotages the system and steals all backup tapes

4. 4 TRUE STORY: Financial institution discovers $691 million in losses... Covered up for 5 years by trusted employee

5. 5 Agenda Introduction How bad is the insider threat? Background on CERT’s insider threat research Brief overview of findings from our research Tools for preventing or detecting insider threats

6. 6 What is CERT? Center of Internet security expertise Established in 1988 by the US Department of Defense on the heels of the Morris worm that created havoc on the ARPANET, the precursor to what is the Internet today Located in the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) Federally Funded Research & Development Center (FFRDC) Operated by Carnegie Mellon University (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania)

7. 7 CERT’s Definition of Malicious Insider Current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who o has or had authorized access to an organization’s network, system or data and o intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that o negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization’s information or information systems. Note: This presentation does not address national security espionage involving classified information.

8. 8 2007 e-Crime Watch Survey CSO Magazine, USSS, Microsoft, & CERT 671 respondents Percentage of Participants Who Experienced an Insider Incident 41 39 55 49

9. 9 CERT’s Insider Threat Research Insider Threat Cases Database Hundreds of cases have been analyzed US cases from 1996 to 2007 in critical infrastructure sectors US Secret Service Carnegie Mellon CyLab Department of Defense Data includes both technical & behavioral information

10. 10 Breakdown of Insider Threat Cases in CERT Database Theft or Modification for Financial Gain Theft for Business Advantage IT Sabotage 76 24 74 17 Misc

11. 11 Comparison of Insider Crimes - 1 IT Sabotage Theft or Modification for Financial Gain Theft for Business Advantage % of crimes in case database 45%44%14% Current or former employee? FormerCurrent Current (95% resigned) Type of position Technical (e.g. sys admins or DBAs) Non-technical, low- level positions with access to confidential or sensitive information (e.g. data entry, customer service) Technical (71%) - scientists, programmers, engineers Sales (29%) Gender Male Fairly equally split between male and female Male [1

12. 12 Comparison of Insider Crimes - 2 IT Sabotage Theft or Modification for Financial Gain Theft for Business Advantage Target Network, systems, or data PII or Customer Information IP (trade secrets) – 71% Customer Info – 33% Access used UnauthorizedAuthorized When Outside normal working hours During normal working hours Where Remote accessAt work Recruited by outsiders None ½ recruited for theft; less than 1/3 recruited for mod Less than 1/4 Collusion None Mod: almost ½ colluded with another insider Theft: 2/3 colluded with outsiders Almost ½ colluded with at least one insider; ½ acted alone; 25% stole for foreign gov/org [1

13. 13 What Can You Do? Review CERT’s Common Sense Guide to Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats http://www.cert.org/archive/pdf/CommonSenseInsider ThreatsV2.1-1-070118.pdf Version 3 to be published in January 2009

14. 14 Tools for Preventing or Detecting Insider Threats

15. 15 Change Control Help to prevent or detect Planting or downloading of malicious code or unauthorized software Unauthorized modification of critical files Unauthorized changes to source code Unauthorized installation of hardware devices

16. 16 Data Leakage Tools Help to prevent or detect accidental or intentional leakage of confidential information Emails Documents Printing, copying, or downloading Removable media

17. 17 Network/Employee Monitoring Tools Help to detect Unauthorized access Suspicious activity around resignation Unauthorized escalation of privileges Anomalous user activity

18. 18 Identity Management Systems Help to Prevent creation of or detect usage of backdoor accounts Implement and maintain access control Disable all access upon termination

19. 19 Others Encryption Physical access control systems Automated data integrity checks Backup and recovery systems

20. 20 Contact Information Insider Threat Team Lead: Dawn M. Cappelli Technical Manager, Threat and Incident Management CERT Program Software Engineering Institute Carnegie Mellon University 4500 Fifth Avenue Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890 +1 412 268-9136 – Phone dmc@cert.orgdmc@cert.org – Email http://www.cert.org/insider_threat/