1. Towards Lasting Peace and Stability Lessons Learned in Iraq and Afghanistan UN and GCTF Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegrtation of Violent Extremist Offenders Presented by Dr. D.M. Stone, MajGen USMC (Ret)

2. Detention: Viewed as a Problem Historic failures in custody and care serve as recruiting tools for foreign fighters. Detention had also served as a place for insurgents to conduct recruiting, training, and disciplining of future combatants.

3. Defining Strategic Success VICTORY Establish an alliance with moderate Iraqis Empower them to effectively marginalize violent extremists Provide momentum to the process of reconciliation with Iraqi society

4. Phase I: Apply COIN principles to TIF, separate extremists from population, and protect populations both inside and outside the TIF Phase II: Defeat the insurgency within the TIF, succeed in the battlefield of the mind, and identify ideas which are contagious Phase III: Engaging populations with detainees, families, and releasees and establish a “social epidemic” which advances the objective of empowering the moderate ummah to marginalize the violent extremists within Iraq The Plan

5. TF-134 Goals Ensure standards of care and custody Determine if detainee is Imperative Security Risk - if so, reduce the risk, replace the destructive ideology - when no longer a threat, release Identify detainees who are Enduring Security Risks Collect information from detainees and provide intelligence Defeat any insurgency within the TIF

6. CRRBCapture MAG CELL & Release Detention Previous Detention Process (before July 2007) GO Review UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

7. Govt of Iraq Reintegration & Reconciliation MNFRC & C2X/Corps Vetting Education Civics & Islamic Discussions VOTECH & Work Programs Family Advocacy Pledge & Guarantor Post-Release Release MAG CELL & CCCI Assessment & Transition In MNFRC Rehearing C2X/Corps Vetting Capture Current Engagement Process Interrogation AFTER UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

8. The Powder Keg Exploding, Jihadist University 2004-2007 Poor Intelligence Inability to Segregate Extremists Inadequate Command and Control In 2007 there were a total of SIX detainee murders and up to 25 severe mutilations. In 2008 there have been zero detainee murders and zero mutilations. No Services BEFORE UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

9. Empowering moderates through: Intelligence AFTER UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO Segregating Violent Extremists Reconciliation Services Proper Command and Control

10. * TIFRC SERVICES BEGIN ARRIVAL OF 16 TH MP BDE DEPARTURE OF 16 TH MP BDE TF Bucca Force Reduction Impacts * TIFRC Services did not start until Sep 07 Surge AFTERBEFORE UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

11. TIF Weekly Re-internments 2004-2008 2004 26 Week Moving Avg. 2005 200620072008 Pledge Start MNFRC Start Reintegration Services Start AFTER BEFORE UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

12. ACTIONABLE INTELLIGENCE PV2 Byron Fouty CACHE LOCATIONS SAFE HOUSES PENDING ATTACKS MEETING PLACES INTEL SUPPORT TO MISCAP SOURCE OPNS OVER 1000 INTERROGATIONS TRIBAL ENGAGEMENT INSURGENT AND TERRORIST TTPs CELL ORGANIZATION IDENTIFY INSURGENT LEADERS IED EFFORTS WITH JIEDDO, CEXC, AND NGIC WEAPON SMUGGLING ROUTES UTILIZE LEGAL SYSTEM INTEL SUPPORT TO SONS OF IRAQ IDENTIFY SONS OF IRAQ INFILTRATORS IDENTIFY RECONCILIATION CANDIDATES AQI PERCEPTION OF SOI ASSESS SONS OF IRAQ EFFECTIVENESS IP CDR ABU NUR 5XIIRs NINEWA DEVELOP TARGETS JIDC 4XEFP IIRs RECOVERED

13. TIF Release & Re-Internment Cumulative Re-Internment AFTER UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO

14. Detainees Special Populations - Youth - Women - Mentally challenged - Foreign Fighters - Enduring Threats COIN Operations Engagement Programs - Civics - Education - Votech - Jobs - Religious Discussion MNFRC MEDIA GoI Partnerships Western Pan- Arab Iraqi INGOs ICRC Amnesty International UN Executive Ministries Legislature MOJ MOE MOHR President Vice Presidents Prime Minister Social/Cultural Outreach Families Tribes/Clans Sheiks/Leaders USG & MNF-I MNC-I USM-I CALL OSD

15. “Bernie’s” Timeline (ISN 168058— al Shayie) Dec 2004 – Failed VBIED attack on Jordanian Embassy 31 July 05 – Turned over to Saudi Arabia Mar 2008 – Bernie meets the DCG-DO in Saudi Arabia Sunday, 18 September 2005 Strategic Releases: Capitalize on external Arab IO capabilities using Foreign Fighter detainees willing to publicly speak against Jihad Strategic Releases

17. There is inadequate prison bed space in which to house current and projected inmate populations. CJIATF-435 MajGen StoneUNCLASSIFIED / FOUO17

18. Battlefield of the Mind Moderates GOI and CoalitionExtremists

19. United Nations Best Practices Defining Goals and Objectives Prison Context The Role of Different Actors Reintegration Components Looking to Other Relevant Fields

20. Defining Goals and Objectives #1 In developing a rehabilitation program, it is important to first clearly define the program’s goals and objectives and identify indicators of success and failure. #2. Good prison standards and practices can offer an appropriate starting point for building an effective, safe and smoothly operating rehabilitation program.

21. CJIATF-435 MajGen StoneUNCLASSIFIED / FOUO21 In Coalition and GIRoA detention/corrections, there is a lack of a validated inmate classification system to identify prisoners by category, risk and radicalization.

22. #3. An importanat first step is developing an effective intake, assessment and classification system for new inmates. #4. Where possible, States should consider establishing separate facilities for those inmates going through the rehabilitation programs. #5. Ensure that all relevant staff are appropriately and professionally trained and educated to deal with the complexities of reintegration or rehabilitation efforts.

23. “Radicalization” Afghan Prisons U.S. Detention Afghan Criminals Radical Islamists CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone23UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

24. The Role of Different Actors #6. Some measure of control should be maintained over the inmates’ communication, both within and outside the prison. #7. Rehabilitation Programs should incorporate a broad range of cross-disciplinary experts, with close coordination among the relevant departments and personnel involved. #8. Psychologists can play a key role in the rehabilitation process and should be fully integrated into these programs.

25. The Next Attack Just One Cell Phone Call Away... Serena Hotel Attack CPD Headquarters Bombing Pol-i-Charki Wing 3 Take Down Bombs Kidnappings Assassinations CPD Action Insurgent Retaliation

26. #9. As the personnel in most frequent contact with the inmates, it is important that prison officers understand and are carefully attuned to the rehabilitation process, even if they are not directly responsible for its delivery. #10. When appropriate, States should integrate religious scholars into the rehabilitation process. #11. Law enforcement officers who are interviewing inmates during the rehabilitation process should receive specialized training and should coordinate these activities closely with the rehabilitation professionals.

27. #12. Victims and victim’s advocates can be powerful voices and States should consider including them in rehabilitation programs, where appropriate. #13. Former violent extremists can be influential with those going through the rehabilitation process and should be included where possible and appropriate. #14. Charismatic members of the community can also help inspire change and should be included in rehabilitation programs where possible and appropriate.

28. Reintegration Components #15. Rehabilitation efforts should include behavioral and cognitive skills programs. #16. Rehabilitation programs should include basic education courses where possible and appropriate. #17. Rehabilitation programs should include vocational skills training and employment assistance where possible and appropriate.

29. #18. States should consider finding ways to recognize the achievement of inmates who have completed the rehabilitation program. #19. States should consider whether inmates should be eligible for sentence reduction or other more lenient treatment based on the completion of rehabilitation courses. #20. States should consider whether additional financial support can be provided to inmates and their families who have completed the rehabilitation courses.

30. #21. States should consider developing aftercare programs to enable the treatment to continue after the inmate has left the prison setting. #22. Consideration for protective measures should be given when there is evidence that a reformed terrorist may face threats to his or her life, or the lives of family members, upon release from custody. #23. Formal or informal, parole-like monitoring post release can be an effective method to prevent recidivism.

31. # 24. Families should be integrated where possible and appropriate into rehabilitation programs. #25. Fostering a welcoming community environment for the inmate post-release is critical to long-term success.

32. Other Relevant Fields. #26. As States design rehabilitation programs, they should look, as appropriate, to other relevant fields beyond terrorism for lessons learned.

33. Success Dependencies Isolate insurgent forces from external support Political Will War Strategy Police Training Agriculture Reconstruction /PRT Rule of Law Corrections CJIATF-435 MajGen Stone33UNCLASSIFIED / FOUO

34. Kuwait City Hamadan Ahvaz Dezful Tigris R. Euphrates R. IRAN H3 22 6 Baghdad 1 KUWAIT JORDAN H4 Tallil 2 5 12 1 10 1 Mosul Irbil An Najaf Kirkuk Al Kut Al Amarah Ar Ramadi Ar’ar As Samawah Umm Qasr An Nasiriyah Al Basrah Baqubah Ar Rutbah Dayr az Zawr Rafha Karbala Sulaymaniyah Al Qaim Bashur Al Hillah Samarra Fallujah Al Kufa Dahuk Az Zubayr Safwan Tall Afar Ad Diwaniyah Karbala Al Muthanna’ Al Basrah Dhi Qar Maysan Wasit Babil Al Qadisiyah Al Anbar Diyala Salah ad Din Ninawa At Tamim As Sulaymaniyah Arbil Dahuk An Najaf 9 SYRIA SAUDI ARABIA SAUDI ARABIA LSA ANACONDA FLB SYCAMORE FLB JOSHUA FLB CEDAR 4 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PL ALPHA PL BRAVO OBJ CHARLIE BATTLEFIELD of the MIND