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Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards without the PIN 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications.

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Presentation on theme: "Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards without the PIN 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications."— Presentation transcript:

1 Harvesting High Value Foreign Currency Transactions from EMV Contactless Credit Cards without the PIN 21st ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security Martin Emms, Budi Arief, Leo Freitas, Joseph Hannon, Aad van Moorsel

2 Structure of presentation
Brief overview of EMV contactless payments Overview of our work Analysis methodology High value foreign currency transaction flaw Science / Vulnerability / Attack Why it works MasterCard vs Visa contactless protocol Live Demonstration

3 EMV Contactless Payments 101
Magnetic Strip Contactless Chip & PIN Europay MasterCard Visa – “Chip & PIN” Used in 76 countries worldwide Dynamic transaction authorisation 3DES and RSA Contactless payments Fast / low value (£20) transactions - No PIN required Offline transactions - No card issuer authorisation Contactless transactions are designed to be a quick and convenient way to pay for low value purchases ($20) such as coffee or lunch. To make the transaction faster there is no PIN required from the cardholder. Make the card secure without the PIN entry; contactless is limited to 5 consecutive payments at £20 / $25 each. Contactless transaction limits USA $25 Australia $100 New Zealand $80 Europe €25 Ireland €15, UK £20

4 Overview of Our Work Analysis of EMV contactless payment protocol
Contactless cards and mobile payments Software emulation of the contactless protocol Z abstract model of contactless protocol Methodology establishes link between “real world” errors and the EMV specification Bad implementation by card manufacturer Fundamental flaw in the specification Practical demonstrations for general public Overview of the objectives of our work Its all about the protocol because if the EMV contactless card protocol is broken, that means payment systems such as mobile contactless payments are also broken as they use the same protocol.

5 EMV Payment protocol specification
14 books 2392 pages 1 Chip & PIN protocol 7 contactless protocols Visa, MasterCard, American Express, JCB, UnionPay and Discover Greater complexity Greater potential for errors This is a very complicated specification... Contactless made the speck much more complex as each of the card payment schemes (Visa, MasterCard etc.) now have their own contactless payment protocol whereas in Chip & PIN they all conformed to the single protocol.

6 Analysis Method Interpreting the Specification
EMV Specification References Tables UML Diagrams This is how we make sense of the complicated specification.

7 Analysis Method Modelling the Specification
Abstract Model (Z notation) EMV Protocol Emulation Anomalies Test Cases Results We have built an Abstract model in Z and a software model in Java (the emulator) With these two we can investigate the robustness of the EMV protocol When we find a theoretical flaw with the Abstract Model we can investigate it with the Protocol Emulator to see if it exists in the real-world implementations of credit/debit cards an/or POS terminals. When a flaw in the specification is found we create a practical demonstration that (1) can be understood by the general public (2) shows that this is doable in the real-world and is not just an “academic exercise” as the banks like to claim. This enhances the impact of our work. Practical Demonstrations

8 Documenting the Link Error  Specification
EMV Specification UML Diagrams + Reference Tables Practical Attack The methodology allows us to link the exploitable weakness back to the EMV specification. So where we have built a practical demonstration in Android we need to be able to say that this derives from our understanding in the UML diagram “here” which thru the table of references links back to the Book / Page and Section in the original EMV specification. This allows us to show that this is not just a bad implementation by a particular card manufacturer or POS terminal vendor. This is actually a fundamental weakness in the specification.

9 Contactless Foreign Currency: The Science
Abstract Model for Visa fDDA transaction Pre-conditions - Amount, Currency and Date Transaction limit (£20) is in card’s home currency Transactions above the limit require PIN entry EMV Book 3 (version 4.3) page 163 “If transaction is in the application currency and is under X value” - (X = card transaction limit) What if transaction currency != application currency? How did we discover the foreign currency flaw? Transaction currency != Application currency is not specified so that lead us to ask the question what does the card do in that circumstance? Card cannot store currency tables as they would be hopelessly out of date...

10 Contactless Foreign Currency: The Vulnerability
In a foreign currency, ALL cards say YES Bypasses transaction limits Max value 999, in any currency Contactless transactions => NO PIN required Attack can occur while card still in cardholders’ wallet Visa fDDA contactless transactions are offline No additional checks by the card issuer “Chip & PIN is broken” shows Application Cryptogram is not checked by the card issuer Visa cards say YES - does not know so defaults to YES

11 Contactless Foreign Currency: The Attack
Send Transaction Victim’s Card Rogue Merchant €200 No PIN Capture Transaction Collect Funds Store Transaction

12 Why It Works: Chip & PIN Protocol
Select(Application) Card Information GetProcessingOptions() AFL records list ReadRecord(AFL) Card public keys GenerateAC(Transaction) Auth Response Cryptogram (ARPC) Verify(PIN) OK / incorrect GenerateAC(ARPC) Application Cryptogram (AC) Issuer Bank POS terminal Credit/Debit Card ARQC ARPC + ARC Transaction + AC

13 Why It Works: MasterCard Contactless Protocol
Select(Application) Card Information GetProcessingOptions() AFL records list ReadRecord(AFL) Card public keys GenerateAC(Transaction) Auth Response Cryptogram (ARPC) Verify(PIN) OK / incorrect GenerateAC(ARPC) Application Cryptogram (AC) Issuer Bank POS terminal Credit/Debit Card ARQC ARPC + ARC Transaction + AC

14 Why It Works: Visa fDDA Contactless Protocol
Select(Application) Card Information GetProcessingOptions(Transaction) Application Cryptogram (AC) + AFL ReadRecord(AFL) Card public keys GenerateAC(Transaction) Auth Response Cryptogram (ARPC) Verify(PIN) OK / incorrect GenerateAC(ARPC) Application Cryptogram (AC) Issuer Bank POS terminal Credit/Debit Card ARQC ARPC + ARC Transaction + AC

15 Demonstration 1. Set the transaction amount
- Same amount from each card 2. Set the transaction currency - UK = 0826, USA = 0840 3. Search for a contactless card - Audible alert when card found 4. Harvest the transaction - Transmit over Internet

16 Summary Bypasses contactless transaction limits
NO PIN required to authorise the transaction Attacked while the card is in the wallet Android attack platform - NOT just in the lab Visa fDDA approved offline no Issuer checks Application Cryptogram (AC) is not checked Bad transactions accepted by issuing bank Visa cards say YES - does not know so defaults to YES

17 Contactless Attack Methods

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