2. The Case for Animals

3. Singer’s Utilitarian Argument  What is morally relevant?  What makes someone/somethi ng worthy of moral consideration?  What is morally relevant?  What makes someone/somethi ng worthy of moral consideration?

4. Suffering  The capacity for suffering and enjoyment  Bentham: “The question is not, Can they reason? Nor Can they talk? But, Can they suffer?”

5. Equal Consideration  Equality: Everyone’s interests deserve equal consideration  A prescription of how we should treat beings  Bentham: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.”  Sidgwick: “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.”  Equality: Everyone’s interests deserve equal consideration  A prescription of how we should treat beings  Bentham: “Each to count for one and none for more than one.”  Sidgwick: “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.”

6. Racism, Sexism, Speciesism  Refusal to give equal  consideration on the basis of  Racismrace  Sexismsex  Speciesismspecies  In each case, interests of one group are favored unfairly over those of others  Refusal to give equal  consideration on the basis of  Racismrace  Sexismsex  Speciesismspecies  In each case, interests of one group are favored unfairly over those of others

7. Utilitarian Basis  Capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests  Capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment gives us interests  We must into account all interests equally  So, we must take into account all who have the capacity to suffer and/or enjoy anything  Capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment is a prerequisite for having interests  Capacity for suffering and/or enjoyment gives us interests  We must into account all interests equally  So, we must take into account all who have the capacity to suffer and/or enjoy anything

8. Animal Suffering  Animals can feel pain  This is just as important as the same amount of pain felt by humans  But capacities for suffering and enjoyment may differ  Equal consideration does not imply equal treatment  Animals can feel pain  This is just as important as the same amount of pain felt by humans  But capacities for suffering and enjoyment may differ  Equal consideration does not imply equal treatment

9. Equal consideration and worth  Equal consideration does not imply equal worth  Typically, humans have capacities that animals do not: self-awareness, abstract thought, planning, complex communication  These affect value of life, though not evil of pain  So, typically, human life is more valuable than animal life  Equal consideration does not imply equal worth  Typically, humans have capacities that animals do not: self-awareness, abstract thought, planning, complex communication  These affect value of life, though not evil of pain  So, typically, human life is more valuable than animal life

10. Relevant Differences  Sensitivity (slapping horse v. baby)  Mental capacities  Terror  Anticipation  Memory  Knowledge of what’s happening  Sensitivity (slapping horse v. baby)  Mental capacities  Terror  Anticipation  Memory  Knowledge of what’s happening

11. Cross-species consistency  Severely brain-damaged or retarded infants and adults may have fewer mental capacities than animals  Dilemma: Either animals also have rights to life, or it is acceptable to kill the brain-damaged and retarded  Severely brain-damaged or retarded infants and adults may have fewer mental capacities than animals  Dilemma: Either animals also have rights to life, or it is acceptable to kill the brain-damaged and retarded

12. Cross-species consistency  Singer’s path: neither may be killed for trivial reasons, but both may be killed for serious reasons

13. The Case Against Animals

14. Benefits of use of animals  Even if animal pain must be given equal consideration, medical research on animals is justifiable  Elimination of disease  Increase in longevity  Avoidance of pain  Saving lives  Improving quality of lives  Every advance must be tried on a living being for the first time: if not animal, then human  Even if animal pain must be given equal consideration, medical research on animals is justifiable  Elimination of disease  Increase in longevity  Avoidance of pain  Saving lives  Improving quality of lives  Every advance must be tried on a living being for the first time: if not animal, then human

15. Common Sense Morality  Animals have partial moral standing  Their lives and experiences have direct moral significance  But much less than those of human beings

16. Common Sense Morality  Causing animals gratuitous suffering is wrong  Killing animals for no good reason is wrong  Killing animals for a reason may be acceptable

17. Vagueness  We should worry about possible abuse of the rules we adopt  There are no sharp boundaries between babies and adults, the retarded or damaged and the intelligent, normal adults and the senile, etc.  There are borderline cases  Slippery slope: If we fail to treat them as having moral standing, we jeopardize our own moral standing  We should worry about possible abuse of the rules we adopt  There are no sharp boundaries between babies and adults, the retarded or damaged and the intelligent, normal adults and the senile, etc.  There are borderline cases  Slippery slope: If we fail to treat them as having moral standing, we jeopardize our own moral standing

18. Animals  There are sharp boundaries between humans and other animals *  There is no danger of slippery slope (“If we say raccoons have no rights, soon some will say that Republicans have no rights!”)  So, we would not analogously grant moral standing to animals  There are sharp boundaries between humans and other animals *  There is no danger of slippery slope (“If we say raccoons have no rights, soon some will say that Republicans have no rights!”)  So, we would not analogously grant moral standing to animals

19. Partial moral standing  But animals have some moral standing: it is wrong to kill or hurt them without good reason  Virtues: we want rules that will encourage the development of virtues  One can’t be cruel to animals but kind to human beings  So, we should adopt rules that will encourage kind treatment of animals  But animals have some moral standing: it is wrong to kill or hurt them without good reason  Virtues: we want rules that will encourage the development of virtues  One can’t be cruel to animals but kind to human beings  So, we should adopt rules that will encourage kind treatment of animals

20. The Case for Animals

21. Regan’s Kantian Argument  You and I have inherent value as individuals  We are all equal in inherent value  Irrelevant: race, sex, religion, birthplace, talents, skills, intelligence, wealth, personality, pathology, popularity, usefulness....  Your value as an individual is independent of your usefulness to me  You and I have inherent value as individuals  We are all equal in inherent value  Irrelevant: race, sex, religion, birthplace, talents, skills, intelligence, wealth, personality, pathology, popularity, usefulness....  Your value as an individual is independent of your usefulness to me

22. Rights View  Categorical Imperative:  Act only on maxims that can be willed as universal law  Treat everyone as an end, not merely as a means  Treat others with the same respect you have for yourself  You have the right to respect as an end- in-yourself  Categorical Imperative:  Act only on maxims that can be willed as universal law  Treat everyone as an end, not merely as a means  Treat others with the same respect you have for yourself  You have the right to respect as an end- in-yourself

23. Consequences of Rights View  Racial, sexual, social discrimination all in principle forbidden  Ends do not justify means that violate rights  Can never violate an individual’s rights in the name of social good  Racial, sexual, social discrimination all in principle forbidden  Ends do not justify means that violate rights  Can never violate an individual’s rights in the name of social good

24. Species Boundaries  What makes you worthy of respect?  You are the experiencing subject of a life  You are a conscious creature with individual welfare important to you regardless of your usefulness to others  Animals are also experiencing subjects of a life  So, animals have inherent value  What makes you worthy of respect?  You are the experiencing subject of a life  You are a conscious creature with individual welfare important to you regardless of your usefulness to others  Animals are also experiencing subjects of a life  So, animals have inherent value

25. Degrees of inherent value?  Do animals have less inherent value than humans?  Why? Whatever feature they lack is also lacked by some humans: Do they therefore have less inherent value?  All who have inherent value have it equally, as experiencing subjects of a life  Do animals have less inherent value than humans?  Why? Whatever feature they lack is also lacked by some humans: Do they therefore have less inherent value?  All who have inherent value have it equally, as experiencing subjects of a life

26. Implications  Lab animals: used— we may not experiment on them  Farm animals: used— abolish commercial animal agriculture  Eliminate hunting  Eliminate trapping  Vegetarianism  Lab animals: used— we may not experiment on them  Farm animals: used— abolish commercial animal agriculture  Eliminate hunting  Eliminate trapping  Vegetarianism

27. The Case Against Animals

28. Cohen’s Kantian Argument  A right is a (potential) claim that one party may exercise against another  Rights are claims within a community of moral agents  To have a right, you have to be  Able to make a claim  Part of a community of moral agents  A right is a (potential) claim that one party may exercise against another  Rights are claims within a community of moral agents  To have a right, you have to be  Able to make a claim  Part of a community of moral agents

29. Autonomy  Kant: we deserve moral respect because we are autonomous: self- legislating  Animals lack free moral judgment  They cannot comprehend duties  They cannot make moral claims  They cannot respond to them  They therefore cannot have rights  Kant: we deserve moral respect because we are autonomous: self- legislating  Animals lack free moral judgment  They cannot comprehend duties  They cannot make moral claims  They cannot respond to them  They therefore cannot have rights

30. Rights and Obligations  We may nevertheless have obligations not based on rights  Obligations may arise from  Commitments  Differences of status  Special relationships  Particular acts or circumstances  We may nevertheless have obligations not based on rights  Obligations may arise from  Commitments  Differences of status  Special relationships  Particular acts or circumstances

31. Humane Treatment  We are obliged to treat animals humanely  We owe animals the decency and concern required but their status as sentient creatures  But this is not to treat them as humans or holders of rights  We are obliged to treat animals humanely  We owe animals the decency and concern required but their status as sentient creatures  But this is not to treat them as humans or holders of rights

32. Dilemmas  Brain-damaged, retarded, etc.:  Are still members of the moral community  We do not apply tests to individuals one by one  Continuity between species  Animals are not autonomous moral agents  No animal can exhibit mens rea, commit a crime (monkey jails?)  Does a lion have a right to eat a zebra? Does the zebra have a right not to be eaten? Absurd.  Brain-damaged, retarded, etc.:  Are still members of the moral community  We do not apply tests to individuals one by one  Continuity between species  Animals are not autonomous moral agents  No animal can exhibit mens rea, commit a crime (monkey jails?)  Does a lion have a right to eat a zebra? Does the zebra have a right not to be eaten? Absurd.

33. Moral standing  Not all sentient creatures have equal moral standing  Speciesism is NOT like racism or sexism  There are no morally relevant differences among races or sexes that affect equality of moral standing  There are morally relevant differences among species: moral reflection, autonomy, making and recognizing claims....  Not all sentient creatures have equal moral standing  Speciesism is NOT like racism or sexism  There are no morally relevant differences among races or sexes that affect equality of moral standing  There are morally relevant differences among species: moral reflection, autonomy, making and recognizing claims....

34. Vagueness  In the original position, we would worry about possible abuse of the rules we adopt  There are no sharp boundaries between babies and adults, the retarded or damaged and the intelligent, normal adults and the senile, etc.  There are borderline cases  Slippery slope: If we fail to treat them as having moral standing, we jeopardize our own moral standing  In the original position, we would worry about possible abuse of the rules we adopt  There are no sharp boundaries between babies and adults, the retarded or damaged and the intelligent, normal adults and the senile, etc.  There are borderline cases  Slippery slope: If we fail to treat them as having moral standing, we jeopardize our own moral standing

35. Animals  There are sharp boundaries between humans and other animals *  There is no danger of slippery slope (“If we say raccoons have no rights, soon some will say that Republicans have no rights!”)  So, we would not analogously grant moral standing to animals  There are sharp boundaries between humans and other animals *  There is no danger of slippery slope (“If we say raccoons have no rights, soon some will say that Republicans have no rights!”)  So, we would not analogously grant moral standing to animals

36. Partial moral standing  But animals have some moral standing: it is wrong to kill or hurt them without good reason  Virtues: we want rules that will encourage the development of virtues  One can’t be cruel to animals but kind to human beings  So, we should adopt rules that will encourage kind treatment of animals  But animals have some moral standing: it is wrong to kill or hurt them without good reason  Virtues: we want rules that will encourage the development of virtues  One can’t be cruel to animals but kind to human beings  So, we should adopt rules that will encourage kind treatment of animals

37. Natural Law  We have a right to use animals to further our own survival or biological welfare  But we may not go beyond that  We have a right to use animals to further our own survival or biological welfare  But we may not go beyond that

38. Carruthers’s Argument  Things often matter without having moral standing: ancient buildings, trees, works of art  They may give rise to duties indirectly, by way of the interests and concerns of those who care about them  Things often matter without having moral standing: ancient buildings, trees, works of art  They may give rise to duties indirectly, by way of the interests and concerns of those who care about them

39. Common Sense Morality  Animals have partial moral standing  Their lives and experiences have direct moral significance  But much less than those of human beings  Causing animals gratuitous suffering is wrong  Killing animals for no good reason is wrong  Killing animals for a reason may be acceptable  Animals have partial moral standing  Their lives and experiences have direct moral significance  But much less than those of human beings  Causing animals gratuitous suffering is wrong  Killing animals for no good reason is wrong  Killing animals for a reason may be acceptable

40. Dilemmas  Kant: animals are not rational agents, so don’t have moral standing  Isn’t that true of babies, the brain- damaged, senile, etc.?  Astrid and her grandfather  We have to rethink the grounds of moral standing  Kant: animals are not rational agents, so don’t have moral standing  Isn’t that true of babies, the brain- damaged, senile, etc.?  Astrid and her grandfather  We have to rethink the grounds of moral standing

41. Vagueness  We should worry about possible abuse of rules we adopt  There are no sharp boundaries between babies and adults, the retarded or damaged and the intelligent, normal adults and the senile, etc.  There are borderline cases  Slippery slope: If we fail to treat them as having moral standing, we jeopardize our own moral standing  We should worry about possible abuse of rules we adopt  There are no sharp boundaries between babies and adults, the retarded or damaged and the intelligent, normal adults and the senile, etc.  There are borderline cases  Slippery slope: If we fail to treat them as having moral standing, we jeopardize our own moral standing

42. Animals  There are sharp boundaries between humans and other animals  There is no danger of slippery slope (“If we say raccoons have no rights, soon some will say that Republicans have no rights!”)  So, we would not analogously grant moral standing to animals  There are sharp boundaries between humans and other animals  There is no danger of slippery slope (“If we say raccoons have no rights, soon some will say that Republicans have no rights!”)  So, we would not analogously grant moral standing to animals

43. Partial moral standing  But animals have some moral standing: it is wrong to kill or hurt them without good reason  Virtues: we want rules that will encourage the development of virtues  One can’t be cruel to animals but kind to human beings  So, we should adopt rules that will encourage kind treatment of animals  But animals have some moral standing: it is wrong to kill or hurt them without good reason  Virtues: we want rules that will encourage the development of virtues  One can’t be cruel to animals but kind to human beings  So, we should adopt rules that will encourage kind treatment of animals