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The entrances to the Baltic – their limitations and effect on the transport of oil, safety and environmental concerns by Christian Breinholt at GOING SIF.

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Presentation on theme: "The entrances to the Baltic – their limitations and effect on the transport of oil, safety and environmental concerns by Christian Breinholt at GOING SIF."— Presentation transcript:

1 The entrances to the Baltic – their limitations and effect on the transport of oil, safety and environmental concerns by Christian Breinholt at GOING SIF International oil trading and transportation Conference Moscow 30-31 March 2006

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3 The Sound Distance (Skaw – Bornholm)approx. 250 nautical miles Maximum draft:7.7 meters Traffic separation scheme:Between Helsingør and Helsingborg off Falsterbo

4 The Great Belt – Route T: Distance (Skaw – Bornholmapprox. 370 nautical miles Maximum draft:15.0 meters Deep water routes:Hatter Barn Belt off Langeland North east of the Kadetrenne Traffic separation Scheme:Hatter Barn Between Korsør and Sprogø South of Gedser Reporting system:SHIPPOS Great Belt Traffic VTS:Great Belt Traffic

5 The Sound In general fewer passages but larger ships A dramatic increase in size of tanker passages

6 The Great Belt Dead weight tonnage In general an increase in the size of ships A dramatic increase in size and number of tanker passages

7 The major limitations for tranport of oil are A maximum draft of 15.0 m in route T (equivalent to about 105,000 DWt.) The characteristics are Increased traffic density Strong sea current, shallow depth, sharp turns, coming traffic, head-on-situations

8 The effect is: Extensive and growing volumes of ship-to-ship operations Groundings Collisions Increasing traffic of large oil tankers will lead to a need for allocating timeslots for passage of Hatter Barn and Agersø Flak

9 Number and volume of Ship to Ship transfer in Danish waters 2005 distribution on locations

10 10 Admiral Danish Fleet Civilian tasks AARHUS: Admiral Danish Fleet CIVILIAN TASKS: MAS JRCC MARITIME INVIRONMENT OIL SPILL RESPONSE AERIAL AND SATELLITE SURVEILLANCE MARITIME SECURITY ICEBREAKING VTS KORSOER: VTS

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12 Groundings and collisions in the Great Belt from 1 January 1997 to 1 July 2005 8 years and 6 months

13 Delimitation of the area

14 Facts on collisions 13 collisions

15 Weather conditions Wind and current have not been mentioned as a contributing factor at any of the collisions Visibility 2 collisions occurred in dense fog (visibility under 0.25 nm) 2 collisions occurred in limited visibility (0.5-2 nm) 2 collisions occurred in moderate visibility (2-5 nm) 4 collisions occurred in good visibility (over 5nm) There is no information on the last 3 collisions

16 Size and type of the ship Gross tonnage of the ships 0 – 995 100 – 4992 500 – 30003 3000 – 10,0003 10,000 – 50,0007 Over 50,0002 Total22 GT of navy vessels and pleasure crafts are not known

17 Tanker3 Bulk carrier2 Ro-ro cargo ship2 Container ship2 General cargo ship3 Reefer ship1 Passengership2 Fishing vessel5 Pleasure craft3 Other3 Total26 Size and type of the ship Ship types

18 Consequences None of the 13 collisions resulted in oil pollution The cargo ships involved in collisions in October 2004 and May 2005 got considerable indents and was detained after the collisions Three of the fishing vessels sank One fisherman died when the fishing vessel sank after the collision Two crewmembers on a pleasure craft died when the craft was sailed down by a coaster

19 Damage on a container ship after a collision

20 Facts on groundings

21 Red: Collisions Green: Groundings

22 Where do the groundings occur?

23 Leveret Hatter

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25 Resolution MSC.138(76) on recommendation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea entered into force on 1 December 2003

26  On ships with draught of 11 m or more  On ships carrying shipment of irradiated nuclear fuel, plutonium and high-level radioactive wastes - when following the established routing system through the entrances to the Baltic Sea (Route T) The resolution recommends use of pilot:

27 None of the ships involved in the 46 groundings had a pilot on board

28 The ship was penetrated over a length of 40 m of the bottom The oil polluted the coast over a long distance More than 4,000 seabirds died or had to be put down The latest oil pollution in the Great Belt took place in January 2005

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30 A pollution response vessel is sent to the scene and remain standby until the grounded ship has been set afloat and there is no longer any risk for pollution. The ships await the authorisation of the authorities before it may be set afloat or continue its journey. The Danish authorities detain all grounded ships until it is considered safe for the ships to proceed.

31 It is often necessary to lighter the ship before tugboats set it afloat. Lightering of a grounded ship lasts up to one week. The maximum period of time that a ship grounded in the Great Belt had to wait before it was set afloat was 30 days. Typically, it is the relevant classification soceity which on behalf of the flag state – sets out the criteria for the ship’s further navigation.

32 Off-hire lossUSD 1,450,000 Repair expensesUSD 1,000,000 Salvage expensesUSD 350,000 Environmental protection USD 30,000 TotalUSD 2,830,000 Estimated costs of the grounding that took place during last year’s MARE FORUM in St. Petersburg

33 The Great Belt is part of the Baltic Sea, which is recognised by the IMO as a particularly sensitive area, highly vulnerable to oil pollution There is a high political and public attention on the risk of groundings in the Danish waters, particularly in the narrow straits including the Great Belt Further groundings will continue to fuel the negative image that the public has of the shipping industry Conclusion

34 Not taking a pilot in accordance with Resolution MSC.138(76) on recommendation on navigation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea is: a repellent exploitation of a legal regime established long before any one could imagine the type and size of cargo of today detrimental to our common goals on safety and protection of the environment and very bad business Conclusion – continued

35 October 2005: DMA produced an information paper showing that the grounded ship could have taken pilot more than 375 times for the amount spent on the grounding The information paper was sent to relevant partners of the shipping industry Strongly advising large ships always to take pilot on their way in and out of the Baltic Sea, and as minimum, to follow Resolution MSC.138(76) on recommendation through the entrances to the Baltic Sea

36 November 2005: The paper was submitted to the 24th session of the IMO Assembly

37 December 2005: INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO and the Danish authorities decided to establish the Joint Pilotage User Group (JPUG)

38 May 2006: The JPUG will be established with participation of DMA, RDANH, INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, BIMCO, ICS and OCIMF

39 www.dma.dk Safety Study: Groundings and Collisions in the Great Belt 1997 - 2005 can be downloaded from the DMA’s homepage under Casualty Investigation – Safety Studies

40 Grounding of ELETHERIA, Panama flag, on 5 June 2005

41 1 2 3 4

42 Collision between German Arngast and ATLANTIC, Marshall Islands, on 4 August 2005 ATLANTIC ARNGAST

43 Grounding of EVER MIGHTY, Panama flag, on 11 November 2005

44 Collision between VERTIGO, Jamaica flag, and ZIEMIA LODZKA, Liberia flag on 7 December 2005


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