2.  Introduction  Related Work  Design Overview  System Implementation  Evaluation  Limitations 2011/7/19 2 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab

3.  There are many different kinds of threats and attack vectors against current browsers. › Drive-by-Download attacks › Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) › Clickjacking 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 3

4.  The root cause of this problem is the fact that an attacker can compromise the integrity of almost all DOM properties of a website by injecting malicious JavaScript code. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 4

5.  We introduce IceShield, a novel approach to perform light-weight instrumentation of JavaScript, detecting a diverse set of attacks against the DOM tree. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 5

6. OfflineOnline Machine Learning Auto-Selected Features Cujo, Zozzle Manual-Selected Features Wepawet[link] (JSAND)link IceShield Security Policy Gatekeeper[link], Caja[link]link Gazelle [link]link 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 6

7.  We assume that almost every JavaScript based attack will have to use native methods at some point in order to prepare necessary data structures. › Heap spray › JIT spray 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 7

8.  An attacker can render any signature based malware detection lacking advanced de-obfuscation routines useless. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 8

9.  We do not rely on any form of static code analysis.  We instrument objects and functions dynamically, and providing an execution context in which we can analyze their behavior. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 9

10.  Our heuristics are based on a manual analysis of current attacks, and we tried to generalize the heuristics such that they are capable of detecting a wide variety of attacks. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 10

11.  External domain injection ›,,, …  Dangerous MIME type injection  Suspicious Unicode characters › %u0c0c  Suspicious decoding result 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 11

12.  Overlong decoding results › 4096 characters  Dangerous element creation ›,, …  URI/CLSID pattern in attribute setter  Dangerous tag injection via the innerHTML property 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 12

13.  We overwrite and wrap the native JavaScript methods into a context that allows us to inspect dynamically.  IceShield utilizes an ECMA Script 5 feature called Object.defineProperty () to implement the instrumentation in a robust way. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 13

14.  The most relevant descriptor for IceShield is configurable and the possibility to set it to false, thereby freezing the property state.  All modern user agents such as Firefox 4, Chrome 6-10, and Internet Explorer 9 support object freezing. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 14

15.  Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA)[link]link 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 15

16.  To avoid interference with the user experience, we null the payload of the possible exploit, which mitigates the danger to the user, but in most cases has no visible impact. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 16

17.  New window context › point to Javascript URI  › Data URI  evil()%3c/script >" > › and target=_blank › redirection 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 17

18.  The solution to the problems discussed above can be found in scanning and analyzing the website's markup during parsing of the DOM tree. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 18

19.  We implement: › Extension for Gecko based browser › BHO for Internet Explorer › Greasemonkey[link] user scriptlink 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 19

20.  Known-good dataset › Top 61,554 websites from Alexa ranking › Check the malwaredomainlist.com (MDL)[link] block-listlink  Known-bad dataset › 81 URLs selected from MDL › all URLs point to exploit kits 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 20

21.  High-end workstation › Intel Core i7-870 and 8GB RAM › Ubuntu 10.04 and Firefox 3.6.8  Mid-range system › ASUS EeePC 1000H › Intel Atom N270 and 1 GB RAM › Ubuntu 10and Firefox 3.6.12  Low-end device › Nokia n900 › 600 MHz ARM7 Cortex-A8and 256 MB RAM › Maemo and Firefox 3.5 Maemo Browser 1.5.6 RX-51 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 21

22. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 22

23.  Training set › Top 50 sites from Alexa ranking › 30 sites from known-bad dataset  Testing set › 61,504 sites from known-good dataset › 51 sites from known-bad dataset 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 23

24. CorrectIncorrect Known-good97.83%2.17% Known-bad98.04% (50)1.96% (1) 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 24

25.  To protect the user, IceShield does not need to block access to a site that triggers an alert.  We can strip malicious data from the site, and thus mitigate the attack. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 25

26.  We manually evaluated a 10% sample set (134 sites) randomly chosen from the false positives to confirm that the majority of pages remain usable. › not noticeable: 82.9% › partially usable: 9.6% › Unusable: 7.5% 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 26

27.  2 ms to 760 ms, average 11.6ms › 99.5% sites are smaller than 25 ms › Average overhead 6.27% 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 27

28. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 28

29.  In case an attacker deploys a malicious PDF, Java Applet, or Flash le without using any native DOM methods.  The lack of heuristic coverage on ActiveX based attacks  The lack of tamper resistance support for older user agents. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 29

30. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 30

31.  !’’ ›  “true”  [!{}] ›  “false”  {} ›  an object  !’’+[!{}]+{} ›  “trueflase[object Object]” 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 31

32.  _ =[[$,__,,$$,,_$,$_,_$_,,,$_$]=! ‘'+[!{}]+{}][_$_+$_$+__+$], _()[_$+$_+$$+__+$](-~$) 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 32

33.  jjencode[link]link  aaencode[link]link  JSF*ck[link]link 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 33

34.  Because IE 8 include DEP  Some exploit may not use heap spray  Dion Blazakis propose JIT spraying at BlackHat DC 2010 › INTERPRETER EXPLOITATION: POINTER INFERENCE AND JIT SPRAYING › Generate executable code at runtime 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 34

35. 2011/7/19 A Seminar at Advanced Defense Lab 35  var y = ( 0x3c54d0d9 ^ 0x3c909058 ^ 0x3c59f46a ^ 0x3c90c801 ^ 0x3c9030d9 ^ 0x3c53535b ^...