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Quality signaling when the Market moves from a Monopoly to a Duopoly Experimental Economics Sumon Datta.

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Presentation on theme: "Quality signaling when the Market moves from a Monopoly to a Duopoly Experimental Economics Sumon Datta."— Presentation transcript:

1 Quality signaling when the Market moves from a Monopoly to a Duopoly Experimental Economics Sumon Datta

2 Advertising Dissipative advertising / Burning money – Signal for quality Informative advertising - raising awareness Response curve – S-shaped; Saturation; Irritating.

3 Pricing High quality  High c  High p c = 1 or 2 (H type) = 0 (L type) A Low quality firm could signal a high quality by pricing high.

4 Game theoretical prediction “All requisite signaling takes place through price. When price by itself cannot achieve the necessary differentiation, only in this case is advertising used as a signal.” – Milgrom et al., JPE (1986) Dissipative advertising is more expensive than a low price as a means to deter entry. “When a low quality firm mimics a High quality firm by quoting a high price, it can afford / risk to advertise more.” “In order to differentiate, a high quality firm should price high and advertise low.” – Hao Zhao, Marketing Science (2000)

5 The experiment looks at the scenario where the market moves from a Monopoly to a Duopoly. The good is an Experience good and the quality perception is ‘relative’. The robustness of the theoretical prediction is tested under different scenarios: A H type incumbent threatened by a L type entrant. A L type incumbent threatened by a H type entrant. Three periods – more realistic? H type firm with a low or high cost (1 or 2).

6 R ‘n D L H (c = 1) H (c = 2) Period Price

7 Advertising L H (c = 1) H (c = 2)

8 H Incumbent L incumbent L entrant H entrant L H

9 L type - Price As an incumbent it set very high prices ( ) in period 2, mimicking a H type incumbent and forcing the H type entrant to set lower prices. In period 3 it tried to mimic the H type entrant by setting low prices but ended up setting lower prices than the entrant (  ). As an entrant it observed high prices and set a price that seemed to mimic a H type entrant. This price was however lower than the price of the incumbent H type.

10 L type - Advertising As an incumbent it set high advertising in period 2, mimicking a H type incumbent ( ). In period 3 it reduced its advertising (  ) and this was lower than that of the entrant H type. As an entrant it observed high advertising and set low advertising (  ) that was lower than that of the H type incumbent and also lower than what a H type entrant would set.

11 H type - Price As an incumbent it set prices that were higher than the L type entrant ( ). As an entrant it observed high prices and tried to differentiate by setting low prices (  ) (mimicked by the L type entrant).

12 H type – Advertising As an incumbent it differentiated itself by setting high advertising which was higher than that of the L type entrant and was higher than that of a L type incumbent. (  ) As an entrant it observed high advertising and went for high advertising which was higher than that of the L type incumbent and was also higher than that of a L type entrant. (  )

13 Bottom line A L type incumbent was, to some extent, able to mimic a H type, more so in pricing than in advertising. A L type entrant did a poor job of mimicking a H type incumbent by setting low prices and low advertising. A H type incumbent differentiated itself by setting high prices and high advertising than the L type entrant or a L type incumbent. A H type entrant was able to differentiate itself thru high advertising though its strategy of low price was mimicked by by the L type incumbent.

14 Avg. profits per period: 3 rd pd. profits L type incumbent - $ 3.40($ 6.10) L type entrant - $ 2.50($ 2.50) H type incumbent - $ 5.81($ 8.33) H type entrant - $ 5.25($ 5.25)

15 Comparison with theoretical prediction In a monopoly the incumbent L type behaves as predicted, setting high price and advertising. When the market moves to a duopoly the prediction does not hold. In a monopoly the incumbent H type did not behave as predicted, setting high advertising. Even as the market moved to a duopoly the H type was able to differentiate itself by advertising high. As an entrant a H type set a low price but it would be better off if it’d price high.


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