1. Space Security  Ways forward  SETI Institute, CA, USA 10.12.08 Will Marshall

2. Content Overview 1.Introduction 1.Vulnerabilities of satellites 2.Space Debris 2.Ways forward 1.Technical 2.Diplomatic 3.Space Weapons 4.Conclusions

3. 1. INTRODUCTION Why is space is important to International Security? Take Iraq: -Decision to go in based in part on Satellite reconnaissance and SIGINT -Entire Military Operation conducted from Florida via comms satellite -Military units, ships, tanks, planes and missiles guided by GPS  Modern military functions near impossible without satellites PROBLEMS - Vulnerabilities of critical satellites - Increasing density of space debris

4. 1. INTRODUCTION AIM “Secure and sustainable access to and use of space and freedom from space based threats.” * PRE-REQUISITS FOR GENERALS AND POLICY MAKERS - Keplers’ Laws - Rocket Equation * Space Security Index, http://www.spacesecurity.orghttp://www.spacesecurity.org

5. 1.1. VULNERABILITIES T1.Electronic warfare, such as jamming or spoofing of satellite communications; T2.Physical attacks on satellite ground stations; T3.Dazzling or blinding of satellite sensors; T4. Radio-Frequency (RF) weapons, e.g. High-Powered Microwaves (HPM); T5.‘Heat-to-kill’ ground-based laser ASAT weapons; T6.Pellet cloud attacks on low-orbit satellites; T7.Attacks in space by micro-satellites; T8.Hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons; and T9.High-Altitude Nuclear Detonations (HAND). 1. Adapted from B. de Blois et al. International Security Fall 2004

7. 1.2. SPACE DEBRIS Millions of pieces of man made debris Debris >1mm can cause s/c malfunction But SSN can only track objects >5cm !! ~100,000 pieces that are *untrackable* today and yet threaten s/c Potential for going critical NASA study: even if no new launches, debris continues to rise Chinese ASAT 3000 debris >5cm Increase of ~20% Conjunctions up >30% US ASAT Less debris Still increased risks

8. 2. WAYS FORWARD 2.1. TECHNICAL 1.Protection of satellites, Communication links and Ground Stations 2.Space Situation Awareness (SSA) 3.Operationally Responsive Space (ORS) 4.Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture 5.Space Traffic Management 2.2. DIPLOMATIC 1.Treaties 1.Prohibit ASATs and other kinetic weapons - Space is a very transparent domain for kinetic events – for any ASAT event it is easy to (1) detect the event, and (2) determine who was the perpetrator. 2.Orbital Space Debris - Chinese and US ASATs show that ‘guidelines’ are not enough 3.Space Traffic Management 2. Confidence Building Measures

9. Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA) Concept Design a new satellite architecture less vulnerable to threats Current Architecture: Few key satellites Many in LEO Each system in single orbital tier  Many places of single point failures MMCA Features 1. Multi-tiered (several orbital altitudes) 2. Higher altitudes (where attack is harder and including terrestrial layers where possible) 3. Constellations (disperse) 4. Modular 5. Networked 6. Micro-satellites  Same capabilities as the few key satellites do today  Less vulnerable to attack  Using Existing technologies  Similar or lower cost Transition Through replacement of existing system as it fails/is retired/becomes obsolete

10. Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA) Main functions of military satellites 1. Early Warning of Missile Attack –Early Warning of Missile Attack –Detection of nuclear explosions 2. Reconnaissance (Photo and Synthetic Aperture Radar) –Imagery Intelligence 3. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) –Listening to Communications (COMINT), Radar (ELINT), Telemetry of missiles/rockets (TELINT) 4. Communications –Military-to-military communication 5. Navigation –Military navigational information –Rocket guidance

11. Multi-tiered microsatellites constellations architecture (MMCA) Example: Early Warning Satellites Difference of MMCA: More satellites Multiple layers (GEO and MEO layer) Smaller Infra-Red telescope Telescope and other instruments split into two satellites Example: Topsat bus (SSTL) or Spiralle (CNES)

12. SPACE TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT Collision avoidance: Conjunction Analysis Manoeuvre SSO slots 12 altitudes 42 planes >1000 slots minimum Up to 12000 slots max. (Currently ~300 SSO Satellites in operation)

13. 3. SPACE WEAPONS Part of the Solution or Part of the Problem? Why relevant at all? - Some propose SW to reduce s/c vulnerabilities! Questions: 1.Can Space Based Weapons reduce Satellite Vulnerabilities? 2.Can Space Based Weapons ensure continued Secure access to space? Net Security Analysis: Security BenefitsSecurity Costs 1.Missile Defense 2.Protecting Space Assets 3.Prompt Global Strike 4.Space Defense/Attack Capability (space control) 5.Secondary Security Benefits 1.Arms race --> bankrupting adversary 2.Maintaining Aerospace Workforce 3.Stable domination 1.Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets, asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed 2.Harming the Environment (space debris) 3.Long-term impact on security; inability to retract that system if destabalizing

14. 6. SPACE-BASED WEAPONS Example: Space Based Interceptor for Missile Defense Advantages: - Potential to intercept missiles from rogue states Disadvantages: - Technical Difficulty  V. Large cost - Other nations may do asymmetric capabilities to negate missile defense e.g. ASATs - Missile Defense is provocative for many nations (e.g. Russia)

15. 4. CONCLUSIONS Satellites are important and yet vulnerable Main ways forward that need more energy: 1.Technical 1.Multi-tiered micro-satellite constellations architecture 2.Space Traffic Management 2.Diplomatic 1.Treaty Prohibiting ASATs and other kinetic weapons Space Weapons: In my analysis, Space based weapons reduce US security principally because of relative technical ease of countermeasures.

16. MORE INFORMATION 1.Space Security Index -- annual review of military space developments “Military Balance for Space” -- www.spacesecurity.orgwww.spacesecurity.org 2. Space Traffic Management -- International Space University Study -- www.isunet.edu + small study team at NASA-Ameswww.isunet.edu 3.US National Space Policyhttp://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default- file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20Policy%20--%20FINAL.pdfhttp://www.ostp.gov/galleries/default- file/Unclassified%20National%20Space%20Policy%20--%20FINAL.pdf 4.W. Marshall, “Reducing the Vulnerability of Space Assets: A Multitiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture”, Astropolitics, Volume 6, Issue 2 May 2008, pages 154 - 199 QUESTIONS? william.s.marshall@nasa.gov

17. Back up Slides

18. CategorySpecific weaponsPast Use Primary Task (secondary) 1. Space-to- Missile 1. Space-based InterceptorUMissile Defense (protection/control) 2. Space-based Laser(U)Missile Defense (protection/control) 2. Space-to- Earth 3. Orbital Bombardment System (Long Rod Penetrator or Space-based Common Aero Vehicle) Ground Attack (control) 3. Space-to- Space 4. Space Mine (Space-based ASATs/DSAT)(U)Control (Protection) 4. Earth-to-SpaceGround-based ASATs (KK or pellet cloud)  Laser Blinding  Laser Dazzling  Radio-frequency (RF) weapons e.g. high-power microwave (HPM) Radio communications jamming/spoofing  High Altitude Nuclear Detonation  5. Earth-to-Space- to-Earth Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile  Fractional Orbital Bombardment System  Key(U) = formerly under development but programme largely discontinued  = developed and tested U= under development TYPES OF SPACE WEAPON

19. 1. HOW CAN SPACE-BASED WEAPONS EFFECT NATIONAL SECURITY Security Benefits 1.Missile Defense 2.Protecting Space Assets 3.Prompt Global Strike 4.Space Defense/Attack Capability (space control) 5.Secondary Security Benefits 1.Arms race --> bankrupting adversary 2.Maintaining Aerospace Workforce 3.Stable domination Security Costs 1.Arms Race --> more vulnerability of space assets, asymmetric means found by adversary, out competed 2.Harming the Environment (space debris) 3.Long-term impact on security; inability to retract that system if destabalizing