1. Taiwan's Partisan Politics and Its Impact on the US-Taiwanese Relations Democratic Accountability and Foreign Policy Commitments in Asia April 8-9, 2011, Henry R. Luce Hall, Yale University, 34, Hillhouse Avenue, New Haven, CT, USA Yasuhiro Matsuda, Ph.D. The Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia The University of Tokyo Visiting Fellow, Todai-Yale Initiative

2. 2 Key Questions  Why did relations between Chen Shui-bian/DPP government and GW Bush administration, once described as “best,” become “worst”?  Was the first progressive government after decades- long conservative government destined to fail in its national security policy?  If so, why and how?

3. 3 Quick Review on Taiwan  Dual separation (1895 and 1949) from the mainland China  Multi ethnic society: Hokkiens, Hakkas, Mainlanders, and aborigines  Growing Taiwanese identity and high status-quo orientation  ROC=Taiwan/Taiwan=ROC: anyway, it’s a “sovereign state” consensus  Taiwanese people basically do not trust China, China has offered no alternative other than to pursue reunification

4. 4 Quick Review on Taiwan continued  Traditional US policy to China and Taiwan: engagement and hedging toward China, strategic ambiguity, and dual deterrence of any attempts to change the status-quo by either one of them  Democratization during the Lee Teng-hui: “vicious cycle” of tension in the triangle relations emerges  GW Bush administration’s ABC policy: more hedging China, more supporting Taiwan (huge arms sales), no ambiguity (“Whatever it takes…”) until 9.11  US as a “guardian angel” of Taiwan: arms sales, “appropriate actions” under the Taiwan Relations Act

5. 5 Characteristics of Chen Shui-bian administration (2000-2004)  Strong grass-rooted popularity (the son of Taiwan)  Minority government plus less experienced  Bad relations with government officials  Strong desire for comprehensive reform  Supporters: disparity between “pro-independence” elements and the middle  Divided party elites: grass-rooted local politicians and human/social science intellectuals (lawyers)  Election oriented political mobilization and populism  Chen’s weak legitimacy and little prospect for reelection in 2004  Weak connections with the PRC and USA

6. 6 Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with China(2000-2004)  Formulation of Anti-Chen coalition between the opposition KMT and PFP in the wake of the forth nuclear power plant issue  China’s intervention: China began to “take over” diplomatic relations with Taiwan’s friends  Chen administration started with the middle of the road, but began to tilt towards pro-independence for reelection  “Provocation” against China as reelection strategy: “Yibian Yiguo,” national referendum on Taiwan’s national defense and “new Taiwanese constitution”

7. 7 Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with the US(2000-2004)  China’s successful cooptation with the USA  Partisan politics: opposition parties opposed US arms sales package  US’s mixed messages to Taiwan: on one hand, criticizing Taiwan’s “provocation” against China, on the other hand, supporting Chen’s visit to the US, and fought a war on Iraq under the name of “democratization”  Chen’s reelection at the cost of national unity, relations with China and the US

8. 8 Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with China(2004-2008)  Chen’s challenges for his “legacy”: cease of “National Unification Platform,” “Name Rectification Campaign,” national referendum on “getting back to the UN”  Hu Jintao’s new Taiwan policy: more “status-quo oriented” stance (anti-secession law ), more engagement with the KMT (Hu-Lien summit meeting) and PFP, and military build-up  China’s growing intervention: policy with benefit for Taiwan was promoted through CPC=KMT platform  Chen’s financial scandal made him a lame duck

9. 9 Process of Partisan Politics and Deterioration of Relations with the US(2004-2008)  US “humiliatingly” did not allow Chen’s transit to the mainland US (May, 2006)  Zeolick’s warning: “Independence means war”  US arms sales package (PAC-3, P-3C, diesel submarine) stagnated by opposition from KMT and PFP, then partially passed in 2007  US criticism against Taiwan: both “trouble maker” and “free rider”  US “rejected” Taiwan’s F-16 C/D request  Frank Hshieh, DPP presidential candidate lost terribly in March 2008

10. 10 Ma Ying-jeou’s efforts to reassure China and the US(2008-)  Ma’s triumph against DPP: winning 58.45% of turnout, 2/3 majority in the Legislative Yuan  Cross-strait cooperation: Cross-strait talks, Cross- strait direct flights, Taiwan welcomes Chinese tourists, and ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement)  Ma’s “diplomatic truce” address to China, low-key transit to the US  But…GW Bush administration “punished” the KMT: partial arms sales package passed on the last date of the 110 th Congress in 2008

11. 11 Conclusions  Democratized Taiwan’s partisan politics: accelerating politicization of its mainland policy and national security policy  China’s shrewd approaches toward Taiwan and US: co-opting efforts with the KMT, PFP and US government  The US dual deterrence policy will work either China or Taiwan, if either one of them tries to change the status-quo  The initial government-change in the government can worsen existed socio-political problems and relations with important foreign partners

12. 12 Taiwan’s domestic Politics: rising Taiwanese Identity and partisan politics Relations with the Mainland China: confronts with growing Chinese nationalism Relations with the US: incompatible with dual US deterrence approach to China and Taiwan Taiwan’s Chess Games during the DPP government