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Japan’s Foreign Policy between the Pacific Ocean and the Continent Thursday, March 27, 2008 Thursday, March 27, 2008 Kazuhiko Togo.

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Presentation on theme: "Japan’s Foreign Policy between the Pacific Ocean and the Continent Thursday, March 27, 2008 Thursday, March 27, 2008 Kazuhiko Togo."— Presentation transcript:

1 Japan’s Foreign Policy between the Pacific Ocean and the Continent Thursday, March 27, 2008 Thursday, March 27, 2008 Kazuhiko Togo

2 Contents Origin: defeat at World War II  impact  new values & new policies First contradiction: from selfish passive pacifism to a more responsible security policy  US Second contradiction: from total negation to regain honor and national identity  China and South Korea Future: US and Asia, where to go?

3 Theoretical framework Eclectic approach: realism (power), liberalism (‘values), constructivism (identity) = all valid Practitioners’ view: role of leading individuals, their perception and decision making important  freedom of choice and responsibility  Inclined to Constructivist view, counterfactual history = valid exercise

4 Starting point: end of WWII Defeat  spiritual vacuum  new values = democracy, peace, economy Allies judgment IMTFE accepted Yoshida doctrine: economic development, minimum forces, US security treaty  51 San Francisco PT Contradictions: (1) selfish passive pacifism = no armament, neutrality (2) total negation = no flag, no anthem

5 Toward Realist Power: 1990’s Government realist; first contradiction continued during the Cold War Turning point: “Defeat of Japan” at the first Gulf War (91) NK Nuclear crisis was a wake up call for defense-security specialists (94) Taiwan Strait missile crisis shook politicians, especially Hashimoto (96) Reconfirmation of Alliance, Defense Guideline, back up law (96-99)

6 Koizumi: Defense, security and US strengthened 9/11: stands with US and act, MSDF at the Indian Ocean for fuelling (01) NK visit  abduction and missile  genuine sense of threat (02) War in Iraq: boots on the ground (03) Partner in the US realignment (05) Responsible, realist, pro-active; G.W. Bush: “unique relationship”

7 Abe-Fukuda continue Abe (06-07.9): revise constitution & normal country  Article 9 denies the right of collective self-defense = burden of asymmetry; “babysat by coalition forces” = irresponsible participation (07.9) Ozawa and Democratic Party wins Upper House election Fukuda (07.9~): managed to maintain MSDF in the Indian Ocean to contribute in the war against terrorism

8 Asia 60’s ~80’s: identity slowly sought, reconciliation pursued diligently 65 normalizing relations with S. Korea 52 Taiwan; 72 China: no reparation 78 China Reform & Opening; Peace & Friendship Treaty; 79 “engaging” ODA 82 Text book controversies 85 Nakasone official visit to Yasukuni 89 Tiananmen Incident  no isolation

9 1990’s: efforts to reenter Asia continued persistently 92 Emperor’s visit to China 93~ Atonement of Comfort Women 95 turning point: Japan: Murayama Statement; China: Nanjing exposition; Korea: demolition of governor- general’s office Hashimoto & Obuchi: $80b to Asian financial crisis  APT 97; Kim’s and Jiang’s visits 98; Triple breakfast 99

10 Murayama statement 95 During a certain period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in a fateful crisis, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history, and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt apology.

11 Koizumi: China, SK strained China’s economic, political &military rise  challenge and threat 05 Bandung statement = Murayama Yasukuni visits 01-06, “matter of his heart, no diplomatic card” No sate visits from 02, no multilateral talk, demonstration 05; Japan leading EAS whereas China sticks to APT SK: Joint world soccer 02; Roh Moo- Hyum’s dialogue policy 03; “Winter Sonata” & Yongsama phenomena 04 Explosion on Shimane Takeshima day 05; Roh’s “diplomatic war”

12 Abe-Fukuda: Asian policy re-established Abe: Yasukuni: NCND policy; two wheels development of political and economic relations 06.10 Wen’s visit 07.4: Diet speech “appreciates Japanese apology” Fukuda = known Asianist; visit to China 07.12: no Yasukuni visit; “learn from history” speech Lee Myung –bak 07.12: eager to “future oriented” relations with Japan; summit visits resumed

13 Future: Japan-US? Where would US go? Is US values sustainable? Is US power becoming limited?  assertive partner? Where would US-China go? Why is China so Japan friendly now? Japan passing?  autonomous partner? When and how historical memory would be taken up in Japan-US context?  truly reconciled partner?

14 Future: Japan-Asia? Political leadership: can they stay away from the minefields? (1)Yasukuni, (2) textbook, (3) comfort women, (4) Takeshima /Senkaku People: engaged in positive exchanges; or drifted to emotion and antagonism? Geopolitics: China’s military power; energy exploitation; NK threat and unification; Taiwan; regionalism


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