1. The European Theater in World War II

2. 2 The Use of Airpower in Europe: An Overview  US enters the war -- background  Allied strategy for winning WW II  The role of airpower in European Theater and lessons learned North African campaign Strategic bombing of Germany

3. 3 US Enters WW II -- Background  Relations between US and Germany deteriorate -- US destroyer sunk in Oct ‘41  Relations with Japan worsened in 1941 Japan continues Asian aggression Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in US and halts all American trade with Japan -- Jul ‘41 Japan attacks Pearl Harbor -- Dec 7, 1941

4. 4 Allied Strategy for Winning World War II  Priority One -- Safeguard Britain and US  Priority Two -- Fight a decisive air offensive against the Axis powers in Europe and fight defensively in Asia  Priority Three -- Sustained air offensive against Japan after the Axis powers were defeated in Europe Use land forces when, and if, necessary

5. 5 US First Offensive Action of WW II North Africa  First use of US ground forces against the Germans  Provided valuable combat experience for ground and air forces  Opportunity for British and US to fight a combined arms campaign  First defeat of the German forces since 1930

6. 6 North Africa  US learned some valuable lessons concerning the employment of airpower in tactical situations  Initial problems experienced by the Allies Air units were split among ground units Ground commanders didn’t share aircraft Airpower was used defensively Airpower was fragmented and inflexible

7. 7 North Africa (Cont)  Allied airpower was reorganized in 1942 Command of the air forces went to airmen The air officer decided the missions and allocated forces Missions became offensive in nature  Flexibility of Allied airpower was restored and air superiority was attained  Allies achieve victory in North Africa in May ‘43

8. 8 US Strategic Bombing of Germany  Heavily influenced by ACTS and bomber advocates Some felt strategic bombing alone would defeat Germany Others believed strategic bombing would weaken Germany and a ground invasion would be required for her surrender

9. 9 US Bombing Strategy  Committed to high-altitude, daylight precision bombing  Belief heavy bombers, flying in formation, could fight their way to the target and back Fighter escorts were not necessary  Targets identified by AWPD were best hit in day time  Strategy ignored weather conditions, target obstruction, fighter opposition and anti-aircraft artillery

10. 10 Strategic Bombing of Germany Early Efforts  Strategic bombing of Europe was responsibility of the 8th Air Force  First raid were against marshaling yards in France little effect  Late ‘42 and early ‘43 -- 8th attacked small targets in Europe -- good experience, little effect  Casablanca Conference (Jan ‘43) established strategic bombing (destruction of German industry) as a major objective

11. 11 Strategic Bombing of Schweinfurt Germany  8th Air Force bomb the ball-bearing plants at Schweinfurt in Summer 1943 Aug ‘43 -- 8th inflicts heavy damage but lost 36 B-17s and 360 crewmen Oct ‘43 -- AAF lost 60 bombers, had 138 aircraft damaged and 600 men lost  Losses were unacceptable  No fighter escorts - bombers vulnerable to enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery

12. 12 Strategic Bombing in Europe: Ploesti  Aug ‘43 -- USSAF launch attacks against oil refineries at Ploesti, Romania 180 aircraft launched, 55 aircraft lost Raids were costly but needed to shorten the war  Attacks were designed to reduce Germany’s oil and lubricant production Generally ineffective and deliveries increased until ‘44 when attacks resumed

13. 13 Strategic Bombing in Europe (Cont)  Long-range fighter escorts arrived in theater in Dec ‘43 Took significant toll on German aircraft and their experienced pilot force  8th resumed raids into Germany in Feb ‘44 Launched a 1000 plane raid by end of Feb ‘44 Attacked Berlin in Mar ‘44 German POL production was reduced to 25% capacity by Sep ‘44

14. 14 Strategic Bombing in Europe: Lessons Learned  Target list was not what it should have been Attacks on sub-pens and ball bearing plants were ineffective Best targets were the POL production facilities and sources of electrical power  Terror bombing of civilians was ineffective and did little to lower morale  Bombers needed fighter escorts to and from the target