1. 1 Self Knowledge 自我知識 第六單元： Historical background: Locke 歷史背景 : 洛克 梁益堉 教授 2012.4.2 【本著作除另有註明外，採取創用 CC 「姓名標示 －非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版授權釋出】創用 CC 「姓名標示 －非商業性－相同方式分享」台灣 3.0 版 本課程指定教材為 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge 。 本講義僅引用部分內容，請讀者自行準備。 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2007 多媒體藝廊，依據 Microsoft 服務合約及著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 Microsoft 服務合約

2. Inner sense and personal identity Personal identity: numerical identity not property identity Locke 由 inner sense theory 內省來談 PI ， person 具自我意識，區別他人與自己， 不同時空下是不是同一個人。 P. 44 A person is a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, …, which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking. From the inside ，不是透過推論、從外部來察覺自己的心智狀態。 P. 44 What makes a particular thought (or action) mine, on Locke’s theory, …,namely through inner sense or through memory “from the inside.” 2 以上著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ，頁 44 ，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。

3. Inner sense and personal identity Locke effectively rejects that persons are individuated by the bodies they inhabit. 同一個身體可以是不同的 person 。 Ex: 補鞋匠與王子。 某個心智狀態是不是我的思維呢？ Reading 1: A thought or action belongs to me insofar as I am conscious of it (through inner sense or memory), though I may not recognize it as mine. Reading 2: A thought or action belongs to me only insofar as I recognize it as mine, or appropriate it. What do you think? 你確定是你在痛而不是別人在痛，是個合理的問題嗎？ R 1:yes, R2: no. 3

4. Inner sense and personal identity According to Reading 1: 即使我沒察覺到那 是我的思維。透過內省，察覺到一個思維 就蘊含察覺到那是我的思維。 According to Reading 2: these belong to a single person if and only if these are appropriated by him, or recognized as belonging to his consciousness. 對自我最基本的認識是有 thought and sensation 。有沒有身體就不那麼重要。 What do you think? 4 Flickr ，作者： Chicago Art Department 。

5. Minimal self-consciousness One can be conscious of oneself-as-object, or one can be conscious of oneself-as-subject. It is the latter that makes self-consciousness fundamentally special. Distinction between self-as-subject and self-as-object. Self-as-object: My arm is broken. I have grown six inches. I am bleeding. Example of self-as-object: a base-runner and a catcher collide at home plate. The catcher’s leg is gashed by the spikes on the base- runner’s shoes, even though the catcher doesn’t immediately feel any pain. Because their limbs are entangled, upon first seeing the wound, the catcher might not immediately recognize it as his. As they disentangle, the catcher comes to realize that it is he who is bleeding. My consciousness of self-as-object can be mistaken. 5

6. Minimal self-consciousness Self-as-subject: I am in pain. I have toothache. I see a canary. I am waving my arm. Every experience has a unique subject. Wittgenstein: “there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have tooth-ache. To ask ‘are you sure it is you who have pains?’ would be nonsensical.” There is no possibility of a misidentification. If I have my usual access to my hunger, there is no room for the thought “Someone is hungry all right, but is it me? When we introspectively grasp that there is pain, hunger, etc. we cannot be mistaken about the subject of experience. Shoemaker: Considered as self-as-subject, we are “immune to error through misidentification relative to the first-person pronouns” (IEM). 6

7. 反例 : The rubber hand illusion (RHI) Body ownership proprioceptive drift: most subjects judged (by proprioception) their real hand as located closer to the rubber hand, not where it really was. touch referral: the tactile sensations they felt were located on the rubber hand. Misrepresentation of body ownership: many subjects feel that the rubber hand is their hand. 7 Flickr ，作者： dhammza 。

8. 反例 : Somatoparaphrenia Mental ownership Bottini et al. (2002) describe a case of somatoparaphrenia. A woman (FB) reported that her left hand belonged to her niece and that she (FB) felt no tactile sensations there. FB, blindfolded, was told that her left hand will be touched; next the examiner touched the dorsal surface of her hand. Whenever this was done, FB said that she felt no tactile sensations. But when told that her niece’s hand will be touched, upon actually being touched, FB reported feeling tactile sensation. L & L (2011): In the latter case, FB misrepresented her tactile sensation as belonging to someone else. 8

9. 版權聲明 9 頁碼作品授權條件作者 / 來源 1-9 本作品轉載自 Microsoft Office 2007 多媒體藝廊，依據 Microsoft 服務合約及著作權 法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 Microsoft 服務合約 2 A person...... inseparable from thinking. 本著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ，頁 44 ，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 2 What makes a particular ……“from the inside.” 本著作轉載自 Brie Gertler (2011). Self-knowledge. London ; New York : Routledge ，頁 44 ，依據著作權法第 46 、 52 、 65 條合理使用。 4 Flickr ，作者： Chicago Art Department 。 本作品轉載自 http://www.flickr.com/photos/chicagoartdepartment/2423339575/sizes/m/in/photo stream/ ，瀏覽日期 2012/4/6 。本作品採取創用 CC 「姓名標示」 2.0 版授權釋出。 http://www.flickr.com/photos/chicagoartdepartment/2423339575/sizes/m/in/photo stream/創用 CC 「姓名標示」 2.0 版 7 Flickr ，作者： dhammza 。 本作品轉載自 http://www.flickr.com/photos/dhammza/492882480/sizes/m/in/photostream/ ，瀏 覽日期 2012/4/6 。本作品採取創用 CC 「姓名標示 - 非商業性 - 相同方式分享」 2.0 版 授權釋出。 http://www.flickr.com/photos/dhammza/492882480/sizes/m/in/photostream/創用 CC 「姓名標示 - 非商業性 - 相同方式分享」 2.0 版