1. Dimensions of Governance: A Selectorate Pilot Study Bruce Bueno de Mesquita Alastair Smith New York University

2. 2 Objectives Measure selectorate theory governance variables Selectorate Size (S) Nominal Real Blocs Winning Coalition Size (W) Absolute Relative Blocs Demonstrate the new data’s potential to improve the government’s ability to identify, explain, and alter: Prospects for democratization Emerging national security risks

3. 3 Pilot Project Countries: Expert Survey ChinaDPRKEgyptIranNigeriaPakistanRussiaSaudi Arabia SyriaVenezuela Experts Asked 752214 15812511 Complete Surveys 5566445455 Usable Data 5465445455

4. 4 Standard View of Governance Autocracy Continuum Democracy Alternative Arbitrary Dividing Lines Between Systems AutocracyDemocracy

5. 5 Limitations of Standard View Dimensions of democracy are conceived as linear and additive Theoretical links to governance or national security are unclear Institutions Behavior Judgements Measures over-weight elections, even if they are rigged, relative to: Accountability Transparency Bloc-controlled choices vs. individual choices regarding Leaders Policies Institutions

6. 6 Governance Dimensions: Nested Selectorate Institutions Population Nominal Selectorate Real Selectorate Winning Coalition Blocs

7. 7 Ten Countries in 2006: W and S

8. 8 Selectorate View of Policy Choices Source: Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson and Morrow, The Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003

9. 9 Selectorate View: Democratization Prospects 0 Coalition Size (W) 1000 Predicted Diminution of Coalition Size/Democracy Predicted Expansion of Coalition Size/ Democracy Low High Leader ’ s Welfare Predict No Change in Coalition Size Credible Threat to Political Institutions Institutions Secure: No Incentive for Anti-Government Movement Institutions Secure: Too Low Probability of Successful Anti- Government Movement Contract W Expand W Blue line = Predicted response to threats to the regime in power. Source: Bueno de Mesquita and Smith. 2007. “Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change.” NYU Working Paper.

10. 10 Democratization Predicting Changes in Governance

11. 11 Predicting Polity’s Estimate of Democracy-Autocracy (t+5 Years): A Difficult Test Significance of Selectorate model’s explanatory improvement : p < 0.000

12. 12 Predicting Governance in Five Years The selectorate model is optimistic about Egypt; the Polity model is pessimistic

13. 13 Predicting Governance in Five Years Polity model was more optimistic about China but is now becoming pessimistic relative to the selectorate model

14. 14 Predicting Governance in Five Years The selectorate and Polity models anticipate improvement followed by decline in Venezuela

15. 15 Predicting Governance in Five Years The selectorate model anticipates a more precipitous decline for Nigeria than does Polity

16. 16 Predicting Governance in Five Years The models share a common view for Pakistan’s governance future

17. 17 Predicting Governance in Five Years The selectorate view anticipates improvement followed by new erosion in democracy in Iran

18. 18 Predicting Governance in Five Years Both models anticipate very poor governance performance for Saudi Arabia through 2011

19. 19 Predicting Governance in Five Years Both models anticipate improvement in Syria around 2010, but the selectorate takes a dimmer view of current Syrian governance than does Polity

20. 20 Predicting Governance in Five Years The selectorate view expects russia to get worse before it gets better (around 2010)

21. 21 A Sample Application in the National Security Arena Predicting Coups, Civil War, and Interstate War

22. 22 Predicting Coups, Civil War or Interstate War in One Year

23. 23 Nominal Selectorate Survey Question How many people have at least a nominal say in choosing the national leader whether these people are in the selectorate or not? (Recall, for instance, all adult citizens in the Soviet Union had a nominal say through the ballot box even if they were not members of the Communist Party; that is, even if they were not members of the selectorate.)

24. 24 Nominal Selectorate (0-100%) ChinaDPRKEgyptIranNigeriaPakistanRussiaSaudi Arabia SyriaVenezuela Mean 3.671.349.338.532.037.773.233.310055.0 Median 3.610040.141.531.329.71000.010046.6

25. 25 Middle Eastern Nominal Selectorates

26. 26 Asian Nominal Selectorates

27. 27 Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Nominal Selectorates

28. 28 Selectorate Size Survey Question What was the size of the selectorate as a percentage of the total population? (Recall that the selectorate is the politically relevant class of the society, those with the opportunity to influence the selection of leaders.)

29. 29 Selectorate: % of Nominal Selectorate Selectorate: % of Population ChinaDPRKEgyptIranNigeriaPakistanRussiaSaudi Arabia SyriaVenezuela S to Nominal S: Mean 0.10.515.940.486.548.032.40.09.093.3 S to Nominal S: Median 0.1 9.946.187.240.433.51002.794.1 S: Mean 0.00.47.415.025.619.430.30.09.051.0 S: Median 0.1 3.98.522.18.533.50.02.743.6

30. 30 Middle Eastern Ratio of Selectorate to Nominal Selectorate

31. 31 Asian Ratio of Selectorate to Nominal Selectorate

32. 32 Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Selectorate to Nominal Selectorate

33. 33 Winning Coalition Size Survey Question What was the size of the winning coalition? (Recall that this is not based on the total number of people who supported the leader; it is the number of supporters who are essential to maintaining the leader in power and who receive policy concessions and/or personal benefits for their support).

34. 34 Winning Coalition: % of Selectorate Winning Coalition: % of Population ChinaDPRKEgyptIranNigeriaPakistanRussiaSaudi Arabia SyriaVenezuela W/S: Mean 0.30.241.86.114.9 25.83.82.127.0 W/S: Median 0.30.239.86.00.317.827.82.40.628.7 W: Mean 003.11.07.83.28.700.714.4 W: Median 003.11.403.30.90015.2

35. 35 Middle Eastern Coalition to Selectorate Size (W/S)

36. 36 Asia: Coalition Size to Selectorate Size (W/S)

37. 37 Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Coalition to Selectorate Size (W/S)

38. 38 Bloc Size as % of Coalition ChinaDPRKEgyptIranNigeriaPakistanRussiaSaudi Arabia SyriaVenezuela Mean 100 48.210019.4010093.396.7 Median 100 0.31000.10100

39. 39 Middle East: Blocs as % of Coalition Size

40. 40 Asia: Blocs as % of Coalition Size

41. 41 Oil Exporters on Three Continents: Blocs as % of Coalition Size

42. 42 Comparing Polity Scores and Coalition Size

43. 43 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

44. 44 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

45. 45 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

46. 46 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

47. 47 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

48. 48 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

49. 49 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

50. 50 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

51. 51 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

52. 52 Comparing Coalition Size to Polity’s Democracy-Autocracy

53. 53 Future Work The pilot study sows it is feasible to collect subtle data on numerous governance dimensions suggested by the logic of the selectorate theory. The selectorate dimensions seem to be better predictors of democratization, defined in Polity terms or in selectorate terms (not shown here), than are Polity scores themselves. The selectorate dimensions seem to better predict conflict than Polity. The pilot study was limited to 10 non-randomly selected countries chosen by the contractor. The evidence encourages the view that data on selectorate dimensions should be collected for all countries for at least the past 50 years and should be updated annually. The evidence suggests that it may make sense to commission studies of general patterns of governance and of specific countries and their susceptibility to democratization in the coming years.