1. Anwar Shah, World Bank Lessons from International Practices of Intergovernmental Fiscal Transfers Anwar Shah, World Bank XVI Regional Seminar on Fiscal Policy CEPAL/ECLAC, Santiago de Chile January 26-29, 2004

2. Anwar Shah, World Bank Instruments of intergovernmental finance Unconditional vs conditional transfers –Unconditional: preserving local autonomy and enhancing inter- jurisdictional equity –Conditional: providing incentives to undertake specific activities Conditional Transfers –matching vs non-matching –open-ended vs. closed-ended matching –Input based conditionality vs output based conditionality –Input based conditionality often intrusive and unproductive. Output based conditionality can advance grantor’s objectives while preserving local autonomy

3. Anwar Shah, World Bank Perceptions on intergovernmental finance are generally negative Federal/Central : Giving money and power to sub-national governments is like giving whiskey and car keys to teenagers Provincial and Local : We need more grant monies to demonstrate that “money does not buy anything”. Citizens: The magical art of passing currency from one government to another and seeing it vanish in thin air.

4. Anwar Shah, World Bank Ironically these perceptions are well grounded in reality in LDCs Primary focus on dividing the spoils Passing the buck transfers – revenue sharing with multiple factors (Brazil, Argentina, India, RSA, Philippines and more) Asking for more trouble grants – deficit grants (Hungary, India, and more) Pork barrel transfers or political bribes (Brazil, India, Pakistan, USA) Command and control transfers (most countries) Overall: Intergovernmental finance is the dominant source of revenue but creates perverse incentives for fiscal management and accountability

5. Anwar Shah, World Bank No need to despair …. As properly designed fiscal transfers can be part of the solution rather than part of the problem.

6. Anwar Shah, World Bank Governance Structure: 20th Versus 21st Century Unitary Centralized Center manages Bureaucratic Focused on inputs Command and control Internally dependent Closed and slow Intolerance of risk Federal / confederal Globalized & localized Center leads Participatory Results matter Responsive and Accountable Competitive Open and quick Freedom to fail/ succeed

7. Anwar Shah, World Bank From Dividing the Spoils to Creating An Enabling Environment for Responsive and Accountable Local Governance Tax Decentralization Output based fiscal transfers – operating – capital Fiscal equalization transfers Responsible borrowing

8. Anwar Shah, World Bank Considerations in the Design of Fiscal Transfers uConsistency of design with a single objective uSimple and transparent allocation criteria uCreate incentives for competitive service delivery and support citizen-centered governance u Provide incentives for fiscal prudence u Ensure flexibility in use but accountability for results u Stable and predictable uEquitable ( entitlements vary inversely with fiscal capacity and directly with fiscal needs) u One size does not fit all – urban vs. rural, large vs. small u Sunset clauses to ensure periodic review and assessment

9. Anwar Shah, World Bank ObjectiveGrant Design Better Practices Practices to Avoid Fiscal GapReassign, tax base sharing CanadaDeficit grants, tax by tax sharing Regional fiscal disparities Fiscal capacity equalization Australia, Canada, Germany, Denmark, ECA General revenue sharing with multiple factors Setting national minimum standard Block transfers, conditions on service standards Ex-Indonesian roads and education, Chile Conditions on spending Benefit spilloversMatching grantS. Africa teaching hospitals Influencing local priorities Open-ended matching Canada social assistance Ad hoc grants StabilizationCapital grant with upkeep requirements Political and policy risk guarantee Stabilization without upkeep

10. Anwar Shah, World Bank Transfers to deal with fiscal gap u Fiscal Gap: Structural imbalance as a result of a mismatch between revenue means and expenditure needs. Reasons: Inappropriate assign: Reassign Limited tax bases: Allow joint occupancy or tax decentralization. Tax competition: Federal collection and general (not on a tax-by-tax basis) revenue sharing. Tax room lacking: Tax abatement and tax base sharing (Canada ). Practices to avoid: deficit grants; tax by tax sharing.

11. Anwar Shah, World Bank Transfers to set national minimum standards uRationale: uNational economic union or internal common market u Redistributive role of the public sector and the national government uDesign: conditional non-matching block transfers with conditions on standards of service and access. uBetter practices: Indonesia roads and primary education grants; Colombia and Chile education transfers; Canada health and post-secondary education transfers. uPractices to avoid: Conditional transfers with conditions on spending; ad hoc grants.

12. Anwar Shah, World Bank An Example: Education grant to encourage competition and innovation uAllocation basis to state/local governments: Population aged 5-17 uDistribution basis to providers: Equal per pupil to both public and private schools uConditions: Universal access to primary and secondary education. Private school access to poor on merit. Improvements in achievement scores and graduation rates. No conditions on the use of funds uPenalties: Public censure, reduction of grants funds and termination uIncentives: Retention of savings

13. Anwar Shah, World Bank Indonesia - Specific Purpose Transfers to Local Governments (now defunct) L2. District/Town Road Improvement Grant  Length of roads  Condition  Density  Unit cost L3. Primary School Grant  School age children (ages 7-12)  Needs for facilities

14. Anwar Shah, World Bank Federal financing of health care in Canada Per capita transfers tied to rate of growth of GDP (plus transfer of tax points - for health and post secondary education in 1977,13.5% points of PIT and 1% point of CIT) Conditions: (1) Universality (2) Portability (3) Public insurance but public/private provision (4) Opting in and out (5) No extra billing Penalties: Threat of discontinuation for breach of the conditions (1)- (4) above. Dollar for dollar reduction for breach of the condition (5). Sunset clause: Parliamentary review every 5 years.

15. Anwar Shah, World Bank Fiscal Equalization Transfers: Rationale Political : Large regional fiscal disparities can be politically divisive. May even create threat of secession. Fiscal equalization grants to create a sense of political unity Makes it possible for all citizens to be treated alike regardless of the places of residence. Thereby advances social justice ( fiscal equity) and efficiency in market resource allocation (fiscal efficiency).

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18. Transfers to reduce regional fiscal disparities uDesign: General non-matching fiscal capacity equalization transfers. uBetter practices: Fiscal equalization programs (sources of data: CGC, Finance Canada, Lotz, Shah & Spahn) uPaternal: Australia (fiscal capacity plus fiscal needs) and Canada (fiscal capacity only) u Solidarity, Fraternal or Robin Hood: Germany (fiscal capacity), Sweden, Denmark uPractices to avoid: General revenue sharing with multiple factors e.g. practices in Brazil, India and South Africa.

19. Anwar Shah, World Bank Fiscal Equalization Program AustraliaCanadaGermany Legal Status Law Constitution Paternal or Solidarity Paternal Solidarity Total Pool determination Ad hocFormula AllocationFormula Fiscal capacity equalization Yes, RTS

20. Anwar Shah, World Bank Fiscal Equalization Program AustraliaCanadaGermany Fiscal Need Equalization Yes, RES No Program Complexity HighLowMedium Political Consensus NoYesMay be ? Who recommends Independent agency Intergov. Committees Bundesrat Dispute resolution Supreme court Supreme Court Constitutional court

21. Anwar Shah, World Bank A Representative Tax System approach to fiscal capacity equalization Equalization from revenenue source i = NationalPer capitaState’s average base in—own base tax rate i all states i per capita i = Per capita potentialstandardized revenue in — revenue in All states (i)state A (i)

22. Anwar Shah, World Bank A Representative Expenditure System approach to Fiscal Need Equalization Equalization entitlement from expenditure category i EQUALS Per capita potential expenditure of State A for category i based upon own need factors if it had national average fiscal capacity MINUS Per capita potential expenditure of State A on expenditure category i if it had national average need factors and national average fiscal capacity

23. Anwar Shah, World Bank Federal Fiscal Equalization Program of Canada is enshrined in the constitution ____________________________________ __ Canada Constitution Act 1982, Article 36.(2) Parliament and the Government of Canada are committed to the principle of making equalization; payments to ensure that provincial governments have sufficient revenues to provide reasonably comparable levels of services at reasonably comparable levels of taxation.

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25. An Example of Expenditure Need Determination in Australia: Secondary Education Expenditure Need Factors

26. Anwar Shah, World Bank Figure 4 – Australia - Relative Revenue Raising Capacity Ratios - 1995-96 Figure 3 - Australia - Relative Cost of Service Provision Ratios - 1995-96

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30. Denmark: Equalization models and standards Equalization type Counties Metropolitan areas Local Govts. Fiscal capacity 85% Robin Hood 90% Robin Hood 50% central grant Fiscal Needs 85% Robin Hood 60% Robin Hood 35% Robin Hood

31. Anwar Shah, World Bank Institutional Arrangements for Fiscal Transfers Intergovernmental committees: Canada, Germany (with strong role of Bundesrat) Independent grant commissions: Australia (permanent secretariat), India (limited duration) and South Africa (permanent) Intergovernmental cum civil society commissions: Pakistan (limited duration)

32. Anwar Shah, World Bank Fiscal Equalization Grants: Some Lessons Fiscal capacity equalization with an explicit standard is desirable and do-able in most countries. Fiscal need equalization is much more complex – desirable but may not be worth doing. Rough justice may be better than precise justice. For local equalization – one size does not fit all. Important to have societal consensus on the standard of equalization Must have a sunset clause and provision for a review and renewal Institutional arrangements for a continuous review and periodic revision

33. Anwar Shah, World Bank Negative Lessons: Practices to Avoid General revenue sharing with multiple factors Deficit grants Fiscal Effort Provisions Input or process based or ad hoc grants Capital grants without assurance for upkeep Negotiated or discretionary transfers

34. Anwar Shah, World Bank Positive Lessons: Practices to Strive For K.I.S. (keep it simple) Focus on single objective Introduce sunset clause Output based conditional transfers with citizens’ evaluations Fiscal capacity equalization to a defined standard Political consensus on the standard of equalization Institutional arrangements for broad based consultation