1. Asset Prices and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 Marc Hayford A.G. Malliaris Loyola University Chicago International Banking, Economics & Finance Association at the ASSA Annual Meetings Denver, Colorado, January 7-9, 2011

2. Focus of the Paper Asset Prices and the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-09 Theoretical Perspectives: How Do We Understand Financial Crises? Scope of Financial Regulation: How Do We Fix Financial Crises?

3. The Global Financial Crisis Causes of the Crisis Have Been Debated Present a Selective List of Causes Why Was It Missed By Academics, Policy Makers, Practitioners and Regulators?

4. A Selective List of Causes The Bursting of the Housing Bubble Easy Monetary Policy during 2002-2005 Global Imbalances Government Housing Policies, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac Opaque Financial Instruments Shadow Financial System Interconnectedness and Too Big to Fail

5. Why Was It A Surprise? Academics: Neoclassical Theories Practitioners: Short-term Trading Horizons Regulators: Market Discipline Policy Makers: Inflation Targeting

6. Current Theories Rational Consumers, Firms and Investors Markets are Efficient; Allow for Behavioral Deviations Reality of Business Cycles: Great Moderation Monetary Policy and Taylor Rules Financial Innovation Contributes to Growth Market Discipline vs. Market Regulation

7. Corollaries Priority for Monetary Rather than Financial Stability Inflation Targeting Promotes Economic and Financial Stability Diversification and Risk Management Financial Crises Are Unavoidable; Little in Common; Hard to Predict

8. Current Theories Do Not Fully Explain Financial Instabilities Asset Bubbles Financial Crises

9. Financial Instabilities Challenging to Define Financial Stability Means the Efficient Allocation of Funds to Investment Opportunities F. Mishkin: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Slow Return to the Pre-shock State Keynes: Capitalism is Unstable

10. Financial Instabilities Financial Instabilities Increase Uncertainty and Generate Risks Valuation Risks: valuing securities during a financial distress Macroeconomic Risks: deterioration of the real economy with high social costs

11. Proposed Definition Let X = R + F denote a vector of real and financial variables that are endogenous Let I and U denote exogenous and random variables An economy f(X, I, U) is stable if shocks to any of the variables do not translate to significant deviations from trend GDP. Role of Leverage

12. Asset Price Bubbles Controversial Topic Kindleberger: “An Upward Price Movement Over an Extended Range that then Implodes” Soros on Reflexivity Keynes, Minsky, Shiller on Animal Spirits Preconditions for Bubbles?

13. Evolution of Bubbles Some Deflate Some Crash Some Do not Affect the Real Economy Some Cause Serious Economic Damage

15. Asset Bubbles and Monetary Policy Price Stability Economic Growth Risk Management Approach to Financial Instabilities

16. Bubbles and Monetary Policy Two Questions Normative: Should Monetary Policy Target Asset Prices? Positive: Does Monetary Policy Target Asset Prices?

17. The Normative Question Greenspan, Bernanke and Gertler: The Fed Should Not Target Asset Prices Cecchetti and Others: React Cautiously Filardo: Deflate Bubbles Roubini: Burst Bubbles

18. Positive Question Hayford and Malliaris: Fed Policy may have Encouraged Bubbles Greenspan: Appears to Have Tried Using an Axe to Do Brain Surgery

19. Conceptualizing the Debate Monetary Policy is Symmetric: increase Fed funds as bubbles grow and decrease them when they crash Monetary Policy is Asymmetric: ignore bubbles until they burst, then lower Fed funds to minimize problems to the real economy (Greenspan’s put)

20. Legislative Response

21. The Asymmetric Approach Greenspan’s Clarification Some support from the Historical Record Central Bankers Appear Skeptical About the Theoretical Simulations Targeting Bubbles may Destabilize the Real Economy There is No Political Consensus for Targeting Bubbles

22. Origins of the Financial Crisis Among Various Causes, Consider the Role of Easy Monetary Policy Did the Fed Contribute to the Housing Bubble? Yes (Taylor); No (Greenspan)

23. Productivity and Real Fed Rates

25. Moving Forward: Theories Revise Neo-classical, Friedman, Lucas, Fama, Greenspan, Bernanke tradition: Economy is Stable Formalize Schumpeter, Fisher, Keynes, and Minsky Tradition: Endogenous Instability Reformulation of Current Debate on Bubbles and Monetary Policy Social and Psychological theories

26. Moving Forward: What Policies? Do Not Act Until We Understand Incremental Regulation During Normal Times: Micro-prudential Substantial Steps During Major Crises From Micro Financial Regulation to Macro- Prudential Regulation: Systemic Risks Yellen: Linkages Between Regulation and Monetary Policy (excessive credit growth)

27. Regulatory Developments Curb Excessive Risk-Taking Reduce Leverage Reform Compensation Protect Consumers Regulate Derivatives Markets Address “Too Big to Fail” Ensure Taxpayers Do Not Bear Costs of Failed Institutions

28. Conclusion Difficult Task to Integrate Theories Even Greater Challenge to Formulate Optimal Economic Policies and Regulation