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1 Routing Worm: A Fast, Selective Attack Worm based on IP Address Information Cliff C. Zou, Don Towsley, Weibo Gong, Songlin Cai Univ. Massachusetts, Amherst.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Routing Worm: A Fast, Selective Attack Worm based on IP Address Information Cliff C. Zou, Don Towsley, Weibo Gong, Songlin Cai Univ. Massachusetts, Amherst."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Routing Worm: A Fast, Selective Attack Worm based on IP Address Information Cliff C. Zou, Don Towsley, Weibo Gong, Songlin Cai Univ. Massachusetts, Amherst

2 2 Routing Worm Summary Routing worm: contains information of BGP routing prefixes in the worm code. A faster spreading worm  Internet routable IP space < 30% of entire IPv4 space.  Scanning routable space instead of entire IPv4 space.  Increasing propagation speed by 2 ~ 3.5 times. A selective attack worm  IP address  routing prefix  AS  ISP, country  Pinpoint attacking vulnerable hosts in a specific target  Selective attack based on any information derived from compromised hosts.

3 3 BGP Routing Table Introduction BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)  Inter-autonomous system routing protocol. Backbone BGP routers contain all routable prefixes (without default route) Routable IPv4 space increases slowly  NAT  CIDR  DHCP

4 4 BGP Routing Worm Contains BGP non-overlapping prefixes:  Non-overlapping prefixes:  Remove “ 128.119.85/24 ” if BGP contains “ 128.119/16 ”.  140602 prefixes  62053 prefixes (Sept. 22, 2003) Payload requirement: 175KB  Big payload for Internet-scale worm propagation. Increasing worm’s speed by 3.5 times.  Scanning space is 28.6% of entire IPv4 space.

5 5 Class A Routing Worm IANA provides Class A address allocations  Class A (x.0.0.0/8); 256 Class A in IPv4 space. 116 Class A contain all BGP routable space.  Scanning space: 45.3%; payload: 116 Bytes. 002/8 : IANA - Reserved 003/8 : General Electric Company 056/8 : U.S. Postal Service 214/8 : US-DOD 216/8 : ARIN 217/8 : RIPE NCC 224/8 : IANA - Multicast

6 6 Routing Worm based on Aggregated BGP Prefixes Two extreme cases of routing worms:  BGP routing worm: all prefixes in BGP  Class A routing worm: only “/8” prefixes Routing worm based on aggregated prefixes  “/n” aggregation : combine several longer prefixes into a shorter “/n” prefix.  “128.119.5/24” + “128.119.2/24”  “128.119/16” or “128.119.0/19”  Class A prefixes are results of “/8” aggregation.

7 7 Routing Worm based on Aggregated BGP Prefixes Flexible trade-off between:  Scanning space  Prefix payload “/n” aggregation (n=8~16) Payload vs. Scanning space trade-off

8 8 Routing Worm Propagation Study : # of vulnerable : Scan rate : Scanning space where N=360,000;  =358 scans/min; I(0)=10 ( 10,000 for a hit-list worm ) Comparison of the Code Red worm, a routing worm, a hit-list worm, a hit-list routing worm

9 9 Routing Worm: A Selective Attack Worm Selective Attack: worm has different behaviors on different compromised hosts. Routing worm: imposes damage based on geographical information of IP addresses of compromised hosts Geographical information of IP addresses  IP address  Routing prefix  AS AS  Company, ISP, Country  Pinpoint attacking vulnerable hosts in a specific target  Potential terrorist’s attack  BGP routing table  Researches

10 10 Selective Attack: a Generic Attacking Technique Selective attack: imposes damage based on any information a worm can get from compromised hosts  OS (e.g. : illegal OS, language, time zone )  Software (e.g. : installed a specific program)  Hardware ( e.g. : CPU, memory, network card) Selective attack: improving propagation speed  Maximize infectious power of each compromised host.  Multi-thread worm: generates different numbers of threads on different computers based on CPU, memory, and connection speed.

11 11 Defense: Upgrading IPv4 to IPv6 Routing worm: Reducing worm scanning space  Effective, easier than hit-list worm to implement  Difficult to prevent:  public BGP tables and IP geographical information Defense: Increasing worm scanning space  Upgrading IPv4 to IPv6  The smallest network in IPv6 has 2 64 IP address space.  A worm needs 40 years to infect 50% of vulnerable hosts in a network when N=1,000,000,  =100,000/sec, I(0)=1000  Limitation: for scan-based worms only

12 12 Summary Routing worm: contains information of BGP routing prefixes in the worm code. Routing worm: a faster spreading worm  Scans routable space (< 30%) instead of entire IPv4 space.  Increasing propagation speed by 2 ~ 3.5 times. Routing worm: a selective attack worm  IP address  routing prefix  AS  ISP, Country  Pinpoint attacking vulnerable hosts in a specific target  Selective attack based on any information a worm can get from compromised hosts. Defense : Increase a worm’s scanning space  IPv4 upgrade to IPv6


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