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Concerted Action -collusion -Article 7 of FTL -Oligopoly Market -To Restrict activity of enterprise.

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Presentation on theme: "Concerted Action -collusion -Article 7 of FTL -Oligopoly Market -To Restrict activity of enterprise."— Presentation transcript:

1 Concerted Action -collusion -Article 7 of FTL -Oligopoly Market -To Restrict activity of enterprise

2 Forms Contract (s) Agreement(s) Other mutual understanding between parties Communication of intent

3 Activities Standard price set by trade association Limitation on kinds, specifications of goods or services Restriction the expansion of goods production or scale of services Restrict goods manufactured, shipment or sales. Agreeing on, drawing up, announcing, maintaining or changing prices charged by members

4 Authorization or exemption ? FTL #14, sub 1-7 1.unify specification or model of goods 2. Joint research and development on goods or market 3. Develop a separate and specialized area 4. Agreement to promote exports 5. Import of goods for trades *6. Limit P& Q of products in economic downturn 7. Joint action of small and medium enterprises

5 * The Criteria of Limit P& Q of products -Depression-blue, green, yellow,red light Economic Planning Commission Product market price < average production cost Oversupply Limit price, quantity, facility of products

6 Underlining promises 1. Problem recognition: a. b. c. 2. Information research : investigation 3. Alternative formulation : a. b. c. 4. Choose the alternative: a or b 5. Solve the problem

7 The process of investigation FTL# 27 (TPA 155) 1. Information providing 2. Interviews 3. Spot investigation 4. Government institutions (central competant unit) 5. Trade or industry association’s information 6. Investigation bureau’s information or assistances 7. Police department’s assistance 8. Quasi-information comparison: a. go to 1 b. go to 2. C. go to 3.

8 Investigation Results 1.Product’s price setting is unreasonable 2.Price decided by the association 3. Price suggested by upstream suppliers 4. Demand and supply (raw material, commodity ) 5. Unfair trade practices 6. Cut-throat competition by counterpart 7. Restriction of operation territory 8. Unreasonable transaction terms 9. Counterfeiting 10.Goodwill hit by other companies

9 case Industry:cement Parties :11 manufacturers, 10 silo holders or distributors Fine:210 million NTD(6.5 mUSD) Behavior: anti-competitive practices-jointly raising the prices of their products

10 Resources Invetigation duration: 4 years Frequency: 1000 investigators accumulated Data collection: 100 files, 20 thousand pages Expertise: TFTC task forces, formal public hearing process

11 Collusion analysis 1.Manufacturers reached an agreement to set up a joint venture to acquire the silo of harbor in order to prevent the international cement groups from establishing domestic marketing channels. 2.Resulting from oversupply of cement, cement manufacturers negotiated the retreat of some enterprises from the market. 3.The int’l cartel and local manufacturers reached an agreement to allocate the mktplace among themselves, to stay out of each other’s territories and make a compensation by using counterpart’s silo to keep foreign enterprises out of the mkt. 4.They reached an agreement to sell domestic cement to each other instead of importing from other countries at lower price for the purpose of restricting market competition and facilitating the joint hiking of cement price. 5.By reducing their production capacity and quantity supplied, shortening the effective term of order, and fixing their terminal selling price, cement suppliers have jointly hiked the price of cement substantially from 1300 to the present 2250 per metric ton. 6.Viewing that slag, the substitute product of cement, had severely affected the sales of cement, domestic cement enterprises have reached an agreement or arrived at an understanding with thel enterprises in Japan to reduce the annual exporting volume of slag to Taiwan.

12 89-92 年度國內水泥銷售市場平均占有率

13 國內水泥製造廠分布圖

14 國內水泥倉儲發貨站( SILO )分布圖 基隆港 67000 1 台泥、嘉新 38000 2 亞泥 20000 3 台宇 9000 臺中港 294000 1 台泥 42000 2 亞泥 11000 3 台宇 60000 4 東宇 60000 5 嘉國 45000 6 環中 52000 7 幸福 24000 安平港 20000 萬青(台泥) 20000 高雄港 298000 1 台泥 70000 2 亞泥 15000 3 台宇 30000 4 國興 30000 5 幸福 20000 6 力華(力霸) 40000 7 士新 60000 8 嘉環東 33000

15 臺中港水泥倉儲發貨站( SILO )圖

16 ACPAC東亞七國水泥出口國產銷資料(表一)

17 ACPAC東亞七國水泥出口國產銷資料(表二)

18 ACPAC東亞七國水泥出口國產銷資料圖

19 世界前五大水泥集團 89 年控制東南亞五國水泥產能狀況表 資料來源:國內水泥公會提供

20 嘉國 環球東南欣欣亞泥幸福 華東 信大台泥 東宇國興 力霸 台宇 水泥業者整合前後態勢圖 士新環中 控制 生產銷售業者生產銷售業者 通路銷售業者通路銷售業者 嘉新建台 虛化 嘉環東通發進中聯萬青 工具 進口轉銷退出進口轉銷 虛化 特殊水泥轉銷

21 各家水泥業者成本變動圖

22 90-93 年台、亞泥臺北地區牌價變化圖

23 90-93 年台、亞泥臺中地區牌價變化圖

24 90-93 年台、亞泥高雄地區牌價變化圖

25 89-92 年度國內水泥消耗量變化率

26 國內水泥產品平均內銷單價變動圖 資料來源:本會整理自經濟部統計處『工業生產統計月報』


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