1. Humanitarian Intervention: Somalia, 1992-93 Prof. Theo Farrell King’s War Studies

2. Humanitarian Interventions?  India in East Pakistan (1971)  Tanzania in Uganda (1978)  Vietnam in Cambodia (1978)

3. Post CW interventions  Northern Iraq (1991)  Somalia (1992-93)  Bosnia (1992-94)  Rwanda (1994)  Haiti (1994-95)  Kosovo (1999)  East Timor (1999)

4. Impact of end of CW  Created new opportunities and imperatives  New view of 3 rd world conflict  Growing public pressure for HI  Unlocked the UNSC

5. UN peacekeeping budget  1988: $230 m  1990s: $800-1,600 m

6. Post CW interventions  Northern Iraq (1991)  Somalia (1992-93)  Bosnia (1992-94)  Rwanda (1994)  Haiti (1994-95)  Kosovo (1999)  East Timor (1999)

7. Somalia: the essentials  Two missions (i) UNITAF: Dec 92 – May 93 (ii) UNOSOM: up to Feb. 1995  Three UNSC resolutions 794: UNITAF mandate 814: UNOSOM II mandate 837: Declaration of war

8. Somalia on the map

9. Background: Somalia  Cold War legacy: economic ruin and country awash with weapons  1991: USC overthrow Siad Barre  1992: Somali state collapses

10. 1992: Death of Somalia  USC splits in warring factions (a) President Ali Mahdi (b) Gen. M. Farah Aideed  Growing humanitarian crisis: war and famine  UN agencies flee Somalia  Deployment of UNOSOM (Aug)

11. Somalia: war and famine

12. 1992: Death of Somalia  USC splits in warring factions (a) President Ali Mahdi (b) Gen. M. Farah Aideed  Growing humanitarian crisis: war and famine  UN agencies flee Somalia  Deployment of UNOSOM (Aug)

13. 1991: brave new world  The Gulf War (w/Soviet help)  Kurdistan  Collapse of Soviet Union  New BOP and emerging normative order

14. Agenda for Peace (Jan. 1992) Peace-keeping is the deployment of a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and frequently civilians as well.

15. Pressure builds in DC  Ismat Kittani report to UNSC (25 Nov): 70-80 of food aid not reaching the hungry  CARE USA leads alliance of INGOs calling for intervention  Debate within deputies group: “our helicopters don’t work in deserts.”

16. NGOs divided  For: CARE USA and Oxfam-USA  Against: MSF and Save the Children  Unsure: Concern Worldwide and Oxfam-UK

17. Pressure builds in DC  Ismat Kittani report to UNSC (25 Nov): 70-80 of food aid not reaching the hungry  CARE USA leads alliance of INGOs calling for intervention  Debate within deputies group: “our helicopters don’t work in deserts.”

18. What’s this then…?

19. Operation Restore Hope  VCJCS says “yes”  3 Dec: UNSCR 794  9 Dec: Marines hit the beaches  Why? (a) public opinion (b) Clinton and Bosnia

20. Weinberger-Powell Doctrine  Clear (doable) goals  Success likely  Decisive and overwhelming force  Clear (quick) exit strategy

21. UNITAF  37,000 strong, over 20 nations  28,000 = US forces (10 Mt Div and 1 MEF)  Also large and capable contingents from France (2800), Canada (2200), Italy (1300) and Belgium.

22. UNITAF: rapid deployment  Robert Oakley clears the path  9-16 Dec: secured Mogadishu, Kismayo, Baidoa, and Baledogle  16-28 Dec: completed full deployment, one month ahead of schedule

23. Somalia: major urban centres

24. UNSCR 794  Based on Chap VII  UNITAF was to use “all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”

25. Secure environment  Disarmament?  Guarding NGOs?  Creating secure zones and corridors

26. Disarmament?: not likely Bush (5 Dec): UNITAF to “open supply routes, to get the food moving, and to prepare the way for a UN peacekeeping force.” Boutros-Ghali letter to Bush (8 Dec). CJCS Powell: “Disarmament is not possible in a country where everybody has a weapon.” Lt. Gen. Johnson: “totally naïve.”

27. Creating security?  UNITAF engaged in haphazard disarmament (French/Belgium v US)  Guarding NGOs: * disarming NGO guards! * practice changes in Mogadishu after March * Australian (Baidoa) & Belgian (Kismayo)  Patrolling: US “human tanks” v French in skirts

28. Disarmament agreements  7 point agreement btw Aideed and Ali Mahdi (11 Dec 1992)  Addis Ababa agreement by 15 factions (8 Jan 1993)  Addis Ababa Conference on National Reconciliation (27 March 1993)

29. UNOSOM II  28,000 troops from 30 nations  Major contingents from Pakistan, Belgium, France and Italy  US force stays on: logistics (3,000) and QRF (1,150)  Chaotic handover: Pakistanis and Italians ill-equipped, Indians late, “exhausted and demoralised” HQ

30. UNSCR 814  Prevent resumption of violence  Take action against peace spoilers  Control heavy weapons and seize small arms  Secure aid and protect UN/NGOs all under Chap VII

31. Adm Jonathan Howe

32. Road to war  Early shows of force in Jan  SNA sneak heavy weapons back into Mogadishu  May: Belgians repulse SNA from Kismayo  Possible op against Radio Mogadishu  5 June: SNA ambush Pakistan unit, killing 24 and injuring 57

33. UNSCR 837 UNSOM II to “take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks.” Including those responsible for inciting the attacks

34. The UN-SNA war  June: UNOSOM offensive  July: UN under siege  August: hunt for Aideed (led by Task Force Ranger)

35. UN’s obsession

36. Mission over

37. UNOSOM II collapses  3 Oct: 18 killed, 78 injured  7 Oct: Clinton ceases offensive ops, and US to pull out by March 1994  Europeans follow suit  India, Malaysia, and Pakistan left holding the fort until Feb. 1995

38. Myth of mission creep  Boutros-Ghali & Albright pushing the HI agenda  UNOSOM II mandate: overly- ambitious from the start  BBG backed Howe’s gunboat diplomacy

39. Public opinion  CNN effect: - policy: certainty v uncertainty - political: unity v disunity  Body-bag syndrome: - cause and time - political v public tolerance

40. Force protection v protecting civilians  US “human tanks” in Mogadishu  Haiti (Sept 1993): * 10 Mt Div in Port-au-Prince v US Marines in Cap Haitien * MNF CO Maj. Gen. Meade v CJSC Gen. Shelton

41. The shadow of Somalia  Gen. Sir Michael Rose (UNPROFOR): “the Mogadishu Line”  PDD-25: don’t call us  Agenda for Peace 1995: consent, impartiality and non-use of force  Rwanda: April-July 1994

43. Bosnia 1992-1995

44. Haiti 1994-1995

45. Inducing consent  “Escalating to success”  Request for armour and AC-130s turned down  Danish tanks in Bosnia  Getting heavy in Kosovo