1. Voting Review Material

2. Walking

3. How many people voted in this election?13 35 45 55
Can’t tell 13 9 12 11 A B C D #3
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4. How many different preference ballots are there for an election with 6 candidates?21 36
120
720
None of the above #5
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5. A preference schedule can have a row in which the same candidate appears twice
True
False
Can’t tell 2
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6. What’s wrong with this preference schedule?5 2 3 A B C
Column 1
Column 2
Column 3
Nothing
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7. “Plurality” means Most number of votes 50% of the votes
More than 50% of the votes
More votes than most of the candidates
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8. Who wins using Plurality?13 9 12 11 A B C D A B C D
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9. Who wins using IRV? 13 9 12 11 A B C D A B C D
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10. Who wins using Hare? A B C D 13 9 12 11 A B C D 0 of 30
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11. Who wins using Borda? A B C D 13 9 12 11 Pts A B C D 3 2 1 0 of 30A B C D
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12. Who wins using Condorcet?13 9 12 11 A B C D A B C D
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13. Who wins using Approval? (Voters approve of the candidates in RED)B C D 13 9 12 11 A B C D
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14. Jogging

15. An election involves three candidates
An election involves three candidates. The preference schedule has two columns. So, there must be a majority winner.
True
False
Can’t tell
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16. A Plurality winner Must be a majority winner Can be a majority winner
Cannot be a majority winner 2
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17. The greatest flaw of Plurality voting is
Time consuming
A small plurality could win
Encourages voter apathy
Costly
Difficult to carry out
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18. The greatest flaw of IRV is
A strong 3rd place finisher would be eliminated on 1st round
A small plurality could win
Time consuming
Costly
Difficult to explain
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19. An IRV winner always winds up with
A plurality
A majority
Neither
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20. If there are three candidates in an election IRV and Hare
Never choose the same candidate
Sometimes choose the same candidate
Always choose the same candidate
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21. Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters
Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the IRV method
Must choose A
May not choose A
Cannot choose A
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22. Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters
Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the Hare method
Must choose A
May not choose A
Cannot choose A 2
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23. On each re-tally, the Hare method eliminates the candidate with13 9 12 11 A B C D
The least number of first place votes
The most number of last place votes
Neither 2
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24. Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters
Suppose that A is favored by a majority of the voters. Then the Borda method
Must choose A
May not choose A
Cannot choose A 1
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25. The Condorcet Method Never produces a winner Always produces a winner
May not produce a winner
Can produce two different winners 3
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26. Using the Condorcet method, if A beats B, and B beats C, then
A must beat C
A can’t beat C
A may beat C 2
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27. In the Approval method you
Can vote for any number of candidates
Cannot vote for all candidates
Must vote for at least 2 candidates 1
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28. Some voters exhibited irrational behavior when voting using the Approval method. How many columns contain highly suspicious entries?
1 column
2 columns
3 columns
4 columns
None 13 9 12 11 A B C D
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29. Who wins? A B C D Can’t tell 13 9 12 11 A B C D 0 of 5 Voting - Review

30. Running

31. A student club has 10 members
A student club has 10 members. They will use the Borda method (3 – 2 – 1 – 0) to elect A, B, C, or D president. A gets 19 points, B gets 20, and C gets 18. How many points does D get? 3 6 9 15
Can’t tell
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32. The Borda method will pick the same winner regardless of how the points are assigned to each preference level
True
False 2
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33. To show that Approval voting violates the Majority Criterion we must show
If a candidate wins using Approval, that candidate has a majority
If a candidate has a majority that candidate wins using Approval 2
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34. To show that Hare voting violates the Condorcet criterion we must show
There is a Condorcet winner but Hare doesn’t pick that candidate
The Hare winner is not a Condorcet winner. 2
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35. To show that Borda violates the Irrelevant Alternative criterion we must show that
C wins the 1st election but H wins the 2nd
C wins the 1st election but Me wins the 2nd
Me wins the 1st election but H wins the 2nd 2
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36. End

37. A candidate having a majority of the votes may not win using
Plurality and IRV
Plurality and Hare
Borda and Approval
Borda and Condorcet
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