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The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations.

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1 The Prisoners’ Dilemma and IR theories International Relations

2 Understanding the Prisoners’ Dilemma International politics is unique:  absence of higher authority  Main actors (states) are functionally similar Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

3 What is the Prisoners’ Dilemma? Player 2 Player 1 Confess (defect)Don’t confess (cooperate) Confess (defect) P1: 3 years – P2: 3 years (1) P 1: Free – P2: 25 years (2) Don’t confess (cooperate) P1: 25 years – P2: free (3) P1: 3 mon/s – P2: 3 mon/s (4) Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

4 The pay off structure For player 1: 2 > 4 > 1 > 3 For player 2: 3 > 4 > 1 > 2 Most likely outcome is: 1 (both confess to avoid 25 years). However, this is collectively suboptimal and results in prison terms for each person (3 years). Why?: lack of communication and self-interest Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

5 Nowak/May reading Anarchy and anarchism Hobbes vs. Darwin Competition/free-riding vs. cooperation/reciprocity Kin aid vs. reciprocity Solutions: enforcement, tit-for-tat. Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

6 Nowak/May reading Results (p. 5 of 10):  Cooperation is more likely over the long run.  Collapse of cooperation is always a possibility.  Pavlov: win-stay, loose-shift.  Pavlov survives after more earlier punishment for non- cooperation.  ‘shadow of the future’  Spatial games: do outsiders spoil cooperation? Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

7 Theories of IR Neo-Realism: Prisoners’ Dilemma best describes international politics. Cooperation is unlikely because states are threatened by other states (self-interested survival under anarchy). Institutionalism: PD can be overcome by building international institutions and communication (self- interested solution to collective action problems). Constructivism: PD neglects identities and norms. States may share identities (democracy) and naturally cooperate (appropriate behavior expressing one’s identity). Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

8 Solving the Prisoners’ Dilemma Neo-Realism: States must attain a position of strength to secure survival. Other states will interpret such efforts as threats and also strengthen their military: prisoners’ dilemma Institutionalism: States have an incentive to work together to overcome the prisoners’ dilemma. Constructivism: States are driven by norms and ideas: “Anarchy (PD) is what states make of it” (Alexander Wendt) Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz

9 Who, what, why, and how? RealismInstitutionalismConstructivism What is the organizing principle? AnarchyInterdependenceNorms/ideas Who are the main actors? States States/IGOs/NGOs What are their main goals? Survival/power (protect domestic population) Economic gain and cooperation (maximize domestic well-being) Solving global problems (maximize everyone’s well- being) What are the core capabilities? MilitaryTechnologic and economic Knowledge Friday, 1/25/2008Hans Peter Schmitz


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