1. Outline Prisoners’ Dilemma Security Dilemma Structural realism (Waltz)
Structure forms a wedge between intentions and outcomes
Why relative gains matter
Three types of interactions among states
Implications of realism for international relations
Review of realism

2. Prisoners’ Dilemma
How structures can prevent actors from getting their desired outcomes
How individuals pursuing clear incentives in pursuit of self-interest leads them to behave in ways that lead them NOT to best achieve those self-interests
Examples in international relations:
Arms races, trade wars, pollution problems

3. Row’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
R gets 2 yr
R gets 10 yr
R gets 0 yr
R gets 5 yr

4. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
C gets 10 yr
C gets 5 yr

5. Overall game COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
R gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
R gets 10 yr
C gets 10 yr
R gets 0 yr
C gets 5 yr
R gets 5 yr

6. Row’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
R gets 2 yr
R gets 10 yr
R gets 0 yr
R gets 5 yr
What should Row do?

7. Row’s perspective COLUMN Confess (Defect) Silence (Cooperate)
R gets 10 yr
R gets 5 yr
First, assume Column confessed. What should Row do?

8. Row’s perspective COLUMN Confess (Defect) Silence (Cooperate)
R gets 10 yr
R gets 5 yr
If Column confessed, Row clearly prefers to Confess.

9. Row’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yr ROW Confess
(Defect)
R gets 0 yr
Now, assume Column stayed silent. What should Row do?

10. Row’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) R gets 2 yr ROW Confess
(Defect)
R gets 0 yr
If Column stayed silent, Row still prefers to Confess.

11. Row’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
R gets 2 yr
R gets 10 yr
R gets 0 yr
R gets 5 yr
So, no matter what Column does, Row prefers to Confess!

12. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
C gets 10 yr
C gets 5 yr
What should Column do?

13. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 10 yr
C gets 5 yr
First, assume Row confessed. What should Column do?

14. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 10 yr
C gets 5 yr
If Row confessed, Column clearly prefers to Confess.

15. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
Now, assume Row stayed silent. What should Column do?

16. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
If Row stayed silent, Column still prefers to Confess.

17. Column’s perspective COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
C gets 10 yr
C gets 5 yr
So, no matter what Row does, Column prefers to Confess!

18. Overall game COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
R gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
R gets 10 yr
C gets 10 yr
R gets 0 yr
C gets 5 yr
R gets 5 yr
BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up both getting 5 years,

19. Overall game COLUMN Silence (Cooperate) Confess (Defect) ROW
C gets 2 yr
R gets 2 yr
C gets 0 yr
R gets 10 yr
C gets 10 yr
R gets 0 yr
C gets 5 yr
R gets 5 yr
BUT, since both Column and Row confess, they end up both getting 5 years, even though they both would prefer 2 years!

20. Nuclear arms race Soviets Don’t Build Nukes Build Nukes US Build Nukes
Sovs secure
Arms Control
US secure
Sovs super-secure
US overrun
Build
Nukes
Sovs overrun
US super-secure
Sovs insecure/poor
Arms Race
US insecure/poor
BUT, since both US and Sovs build nukes, they end up insecure AND poor even though they would prefer greater security at less cost

22. Causes of Security Dilemma
Anarchy/self-help structure of int’l system
Lack of trust
Misperception and miscommunication
Ambiguity regarding offense/defense of military forces and actions

23. Aspects of PD & Security Dilemma
Relative gains concerns
Even if only absolute gains concerns, cooperation still difficult
Role of trust
Role of iteration
Role of external sanctions
Role of number of actors
Role of information
Role of diffuse reciprocity

24. Structural realism
Structure forms wedge between intentions and outcomes – people do not get what they strive for
Structure composed of:
Ordering principle – anarchy
Relative capabilities – distribution of power
Structure dictates outcomes
Relative gains concerns dominate

25. Structure as a wedge Intentions  Outcomes
What we expect (and don’t need to explain):
Intentions  Outcomes

26. Structure as a wedge Intentions  Outcomes Intentions  Outcomes
What we expect (and don’t need to explain):
Intentions  Outcomes
What we don’t expect and must explain:
Intentions  Outcomes

27. Structure as a wedge Intentions  Outcomes Structure
What we expect (and don’t need to explain):
Intentions  Outcomes
What we don’t expect and must explain:
Structure
Intentions  Outcomes

28. Structural realism What it explains:
Continuity / consistency of conflict across race, religion, time, culture, technology, etc.
DIFFERS from a claim that war stems from human nature

29. Why relative gains matter
Country A
Country B
No trade
100M GDP
Trade pact (year 1)
120M GDP
130M GDP
Trade pact (year 2)
110M GDP tanks
110M GDP tanks
War by B on A (year 3)
Status (year 4)
0M GDP + 0 tanks
220M GDP tanks

30. Three types of interactions among states
Harmony
Independent decision-making produces GOOD outcomes
Conflict
Independent decision-making produces BAD outcomes
Cooperation
Interdependent decision-making produces GOOD outcomes (in context where independent decision-making WOULD HAVE created bad outcomes)

31. Implications of Realism for International Relations
How realists interpret and predict the world
If states are getting along, it’s harmony not cooperation
States, being concerned with relative gains, will not risk interdependent cooperation
States may form international institutions BUT
Only accept rules they would have followed anyway
States may comply BUT it’s because
Rules codify existing or expected future behavior
Hegemonic states force them to
Easy cases of “coordination” games

32. Realism Institutionalism Disenfranchised
Focus – what is being explained?
Conflict
Actors – who are considered the main actors to watch?
States are primary and act as unitary rational actors
Goals – what are the goals of the main actors?
Survival, security, and hence, power
Means – what means do actors use to achieve their goals?
Military force is usable, effective, and fungible
Organizing Principles – how is the international system organized?
Anarchy and self-help
Dynamics – what does process of international relations look like?
Acquisition and balancing of power