1. Conflict Management Regimes and the Management of Land, River, and Maritime Claims Sara McLaughlin Mitchell University of Iowa Andrew Owsiak University of Georgia

2. Motivation Fact-finding missions Innocuous form of conflict management Usage of strategy varies tremendously River claims: used repeatedly Land claims: only if river also involved Maritime claims: never used What explains this puzzling fact? Our answer focuses on conflict management regimes, which are a function of 1) state interests and issue characteristics, 2) transaction costs, and 3) distribution of power Institutionalization occurs because of disputants’ desire to reduce transaction costs and stabilize expectations

3. Terminology Regime: socially constructed institution containing a set of behavioral standards for managing interstate conflicts. Finnemore & Sikkink (1998), Keohane (1984), Ruggie (1998). Types of territorial claims (ICOW, Hensel et al 2008) Territorial claim types Land claimRiver claimMaritime claim

4. Conflict Management Strategies Binding Non-Binding Third-Party Conflict ManagementDisputants Only Greater Disputant Control Less Disputant Control Negotiation Bilateral Multilateral Good offices Fact-finding Mediation Arbitration Adjudication (All) Peaceful Conflict Management

5. Land ClaimsMaritime Claims River Claims Issue Characteristics & State Interests (CM Regime Factor #1) -High tangible & intangible salience; -High domestic audience costs for issue failure -Global resource with high tangible salience; -EEZ claims similar to land claims -High tangible salience; -Regional resource management -Interdependence Transaction Costs (CM Regime Factor #2) -High; borders are often negotiated separately -Low; UNCLOS establishes CM rules/procedures -Global IGO involvement -Medium; regional treaties/IGOs for CM, but variance -Bilateral vs. multilateral basins Key Regime Events-UN Charter recognizes sovereignty, calls for peaceful settlement -Some principles established through legal judgments (e.g. Uti Possedetis) -Traditions of the law of the sea; -Creation of UNCLOS -Strong CM regime (ITLOS, Article 287) -UN Convention on Watercourses; -Growing # of river treaties/RBOs

6. Land ClaimsMaritime Claims River Claims Hypotheses-Bilateral negotiations used frequently -Issues handled with 3PCM more frequently than land or river claims, especially adjudication -River claims more likely to involve fact finding (UN Convention). -Higher salience land claims will involve CM strategies with greater disputant control -EEZ claims will be handled more like land claims with bilateral negotiations and 3PCM that give disputants control -Regional IGOs more likely to help settle river claims than land or maritime claims. -Arbitration preferred to adjudication

7. Conflict Management Regime Factor #3: Distribution of Power In asymmetric dyads: Powerful can enforce preferences in bilateral negotiations Powerful less swayed by third-party punishments/incentives As asymmetry grows: Hypotheses Less conflict management of all kinds in asymmetric dyads Less involvement of global IGO We will not present these results, but the findings support these hypotheses.

8. Research Design ICOW, version 1.1 (1816/1900-2001): claim-dyad-year Logistic & rare events logistic regression Dependent variables: Conflict management strategies, and aggregate categories Key independent variables: Claim type: land, river, maritime (EEZ, non-EEZ) Global IGO, regional IGO (any c.m.) Control variables: Claim salience Recent MIDs, failed peaceful (any) c.m. attempts (10 year index) Joint democracy Relative capabilities (stronger/weaker) Claim duration

10. Management of claims, 1816-2001 (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6)(7) D.V.All c.m.Bil. Neg.All t.p.Non- binding BindingRegional IGO Global IGO Non EEZ -0.4486*** (0.1029) -0.6255*** (0.1222) 0.1152 (0.1584) 0.2941* (0.1643) -0.9215* (0.5282) 1.6500*** (0.3276) -0.2809 (0.5788) EEZ -0.2246** (0.1015) -0.3295*** (0.1143) 0.2417 (0.1634) 0.2524 (0.1821) 0.1574 (0.3140) 1.3594*** (0.3704) 1.0349*** (0.3822) River 0.2696** (0.1111) 0.1715 (0.1233) 0.5627*** (0.1693) 0.6410*** (0.1805) -0.0617 (0.4787) 2.1516*** (0.3404) 0.7538 (0.4881)

11. Third-party Conf. Mgmt. (1)(2)(3)(4)(5)(6) D.V.Good offices Fact- finding Mediatio n ArbitrationAdjud.Multi. Neg. Non EEZ -0.26612*** (1.0156) None-0.2778 (0.3786) None0.4232 (0.6320) 1.5406*** (0.2300) EEZ 0.5396* (0.2877) None-0.1212 (0.3148) 0.0092 (0.5503) 1.0207** (0.5055) 0.6004* (0.3424) River 0.6808** (0.3203) 2.9658*** (0.6702) 0.4685 (0.3103) None1.2937** (0.5900) 0.4067 (0.3715)

13. Conclusions Overview of our argument: State interests high, power asymmetry high, transaction costs low → states prefer conflict management strategies of greater control Control + potential for other actor involvement (function of transaction costs) → conflict management regimes Conflict management regimes have emerged historically Maritime More multilateral: EEZ: global IGO (adjudication) Non-EEZ: multilateral negotiation, no global IGO Mixed support that EEZ mirrors land claims Land: Bilateral negotiations, less third-party (except: arbitration) River: Non-binding third-party conflict management (esp. fact-finding) Limited multilateral framework (regional, not global)

14. Questions and comments

15. Appendix: Table 2, all

16. Appendix: Table 3, all