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1 Small States’ Defence Options after the Cold War Jean-Marc Rickli 6 March 2009 University of Iceland.

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Presentation on theme: "1 Small States’ Defence Options after the Cold War Jean-Marc Rickli 6 March 2009 University of Iceland."— Presentation transcript:

1 1 Small States’ Defence Options after the Cold War Jean-Marc Rickli 6 March 2009 University of Iceland

2 2 Structure of the presentation 1.Small states’ security dilemma 2.Changes in the strategic environment in Europe 3.Small states’ grand strategy options 4.Small states’ military options 5.Conclusions

3 3 1.1 Definition of a small state State that has a deficit of power due to its weak ability to mobilize ressources which could be material, relational or normative

4 4 1.2 Small states’strategic dilemma Security AutonomyInfluence Defensive Cooperative Offensive

5 5 1.3 Cold War Alliance Bandwagoning or balancing Deterrence provided by great power Lost of strategic autonomy Entrapment Neutrality Strategic sovereignty Deterrence provided by extensive territorial defence preparations Strategic abandonment

6 6 2.1 Changes in the strategic environment in Europe 1) Unipolarity 2) Shift from threats based to risks based environment 3) Institutionalisation of security

7 7 2.2 Changes in the strategic environment in Europe 1) Increased incentive for bandwagoning 2) Selectivity in the use of force 3) Standardisation of security

8 8 2.3 Obsolescence of defensive strategies Disappearence of the strategic advantage provided by territorial defence preparations Overburden of costs Maintenance of autonomy is counterproductive

9 9 2.4 Strategic orientations according to the nature of strategic challenges AutonomyInfluence Threats Linked to territorial security NeutralityAlliances Risks Linked to functional security Counterproductive Institutionalisation

10 10 2.5 Post-Cold security paradox for small states Formal strategic optionsStrategic room of manoeuvre Cold WarPost-Cold War

11 11 3.1 Small states’ grand strategic goal Carve out a niche strategy

12 12 3.2 Small states’ grand strategic goal ZOPA + + + + - - - -

13 13 3.3 Small states’ grand strategic options Technical expertise Honest broker Norms setter Institutional engineering

14 14 4.1 Change of strategic paradigm Cold WarContemporary environment National security strategy Collective or autonomous defence Prevention/Protection Doctrines Strategic level Dissuasion/ Deterrence Stabilisation/Coercion Operational level Territorial DefenceProjection Niche Theatre of operations National territoryOut of area / National territory Strategic CultureReactivePro-active

15 15 4.2 Small states’ defence options Homeland Defence Low strategic ambitions High strategic ambitions Strategic level Prevention/ Protection Stabilisation/ Reconstruction Coercion/ Enforcement Operational level Territorial protection Subsidiary assistance Police missions Intelligence Niche: Logistic Transport Medical units Communication CIMIC Niche: Special operations Counter- terrorism Framework nation Armed forces structure Conscription and professional Division of labour bw conscripts and prof Interoperability Professional Modularity Network centric

16 16 4.3 Small states’ defence options Homeland Defence Low strategic ambitions High strategic ambitions Strategic level Prevention/ Protection Stabilisation/ Reconstruction Coercion/ Enforcement Operational level Territorial protection Subsidiary assistance Police missions Intelligence Niche: Logistic Transport Medical units Communication CIMIC Niche: Special operations Counter- terrorism Framework nation Armed forces structure Conscription and professional Division of labour bw conscripts and prof Interoperability Professional Modularity Network centric

17 17 4.4 Small states’ defence options Homeland Defence Low strategic ambitions High strategic ambitions Strategic level Prevention/ Protection Stabilisation/ Reconstruction Coercion/ Enforcement Operational level Territorial protection Subsidiary assistance Police missions Intelligence Niche: Logistic Transport Medical units Communication CIMIC Niche: Special operations Counter- terrorism Framework nation Armed forces structure Conscription and professional Division of labour bw conscripts and prof Interoperability Professional Modularity Network centric

18 18 4.5 Small states’ defence options Homeland Defence Low strategic ambitions High strategic ambitions Strategic level Prevention/ Protection Stabilisation/ Reconstruction Coercion/ Enforcement Operational level Territorial protection Subsidiary assistance Police missions Intelligence Niche: Logistic Transport Medical units Communication CIMIC Niche: Special operations Counter- terrorism Framework nation Armed forces structure Conscription and professional Division of labour bw conscripts and prof Interoperability Professional Modularity Network centric

19 19 4.6 Niche strategies AdvantagesRisks Political Strategic influence Co-decision power International pressures Strategic ● Extended protection Casualties Public opinion Operational Know-how Reduction of mission creep risks Intensive use of capabilities

20 20 4.7 Framework nation strategy AdvantagesRisks Political Strategic responsibility Decision power International pressures/ responsibilities Strategic ● Extended protection ● Autonomy Casualties Public opinion reactions Operational Extended know- how Reduction of mission creep risks Intensive use of capabilities Exclusive use of ressources

21 21 5. Conclusions 1.Paradox for small states security options 2.Cooperative security policy 3.Niche strategy

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