1. Yossef Oren, Dvir Schirman, and Avishai Wool: Tel Aviv University ESORICS 2013

2.  Introduction  Contactless smartcards  Attack motivation  System design  Experimental results  Attack scenarios  Conclusions

4.  Passive tags  Communication based on inductive coupling  Transmit back data using load modulation  Nominal operation range – 5-10 cm

5.  Contactless smartcards are being used in a variety of security oriented applications:  Access control  Payment  E-voting  Smart ID card  Passports  All of them assume the tag is in proximity of the reader

6.  If a communication between the reader and the tag could be established from a longer range – the proximity assumption would be broken  Our goal – build a device (a.k.a “Ghost”) which allow a standard tag to communicate with a standard reader from a distance of more than 1m

7. Leech Ghost Relay Extended range Leech Extended range Ghost

8.  Relay attack – extending the nominal communication range between a reader and a tag using a relay channel between two custom made devices (“Ghost” & “Leech”) [KW05, Han05, FHMM11, SC13]  Extended range Leech – a device that allows to read a standard tag from a distance of 30 cm [KW06]

9.  Design principles:  Two separate antennas: ▪ A large loop antenna for downlink ▪ A mobile monopole HF antenna for uplink  Active load modulation for uplink transmission  PC based relay

10.  An open source & open hardware evaluation board for ISO14443  Can emulate a tag or a reader  Based on NXP PN532  www.openpcd.org www.openpcd.org

12.  A relay & a Leech were not part of this research, but necessary for the whole system  Relay channel between two OpenPCD2 boards was implemented inside a single PC  Using libnfc’s nfc-relay-picc – designed to overcome relay timing limitations overcome relay timing limitations  Leech was based on an unmodified OpenPCD2

13.  Part 3 (anticollision protocol) – strict timing constraint  Each of the two devices implement part 3 independently, with no relay  Part 4 (transmission protocol) – more permissive timing constraint  The tag can ask for more time by sending WTX request  WTXs are sent repeatedly by the Ghost to extend the time window allowed by the reader

14.  Receiving antenna: a 39 cm loop antenna designed for prior Leech project  Matching circuit: Based on NXP’s app note  LNA: Mini-Circuits’ ZFL-500LN

15.  Active load modulation:  Producing the spectral image created by load modulation by means of a standard AM modulator

16.  Ghost OpenPCD2 modification:  LOADMOD pin was enabled – outputs modulated subcarrier (847.5 kHz)  The above signal was connected to a detector, in order to extract coded bitstream  The bitstream was pulse modulated on a 14.4075 MHz carrier signal  The HF signal was pre-amplified (Mini- Circuits’ ZHL-32A) & power amplified (RM- Italy KL400)

17.  Transmitting antenna:  Broadband helically wound monopole antenna  We use the magnetic near field emitted from the antenna

19.  Downlink experiment:  Maximal downlink range was tested with a homemade diode detector ~ 1.5m  Using a spectrum analyzer as a detector a range of ~3.5m was measured

20.  Jamming  By transmitting a continuous signal on 14.4075 MHz the reader can be jammed  Since we couldn’t measure uplink range independently from downlink system, maximal Jamming range was measured in order to evaluate the performance of the uplink system  By transmitting a 29 dBm signal, a jamming range of 2 m was achieved

22.  The measured range was highly sensitive to the surrounding environment

23.  E-voting  Using a range extended Ghost and a relay attack, an adversary can mount several attacks on Israel’s proposed e-voting system  Allows the attacker complete control over previously cast votes  Access control  By using a range extended Ghost and a relay setup the attacker can open a secured door without being detected by a guard / security camera

24.  We offer a car mounted range extension setup for ISO 14443 RFID systems  We successfully built a prototype working from 1.15 m (more than 10 times the nominal range)

25.  Extending the nominal communication range of contactless smartcards form a severe threat on the system’s security  Combining with a relay attack the presented device can allow adversary to mount his attack without being detected

26.  I would like to thank the following people for their contributions to this work:  Mr. Ilan Kirschenbaum – For the loop antenna and other equipment built for his Leech project  Mr. Milosch Meriac – For his help with OpenPCD  Mr. Klaus Finkenzeller – For his help with understanding ISO14443