1. Sea Shield : Assured Access in the Littoral
UNCLASSIFIED
Spirit of ‘76
Sea Shield : Assured Access in the Littoral
23 October 2003
CAPT Ray Spicer, N76E
Deputy for Surface Ships
UNCLASSIFIED

2. We Must Operate Here, and Counter Asymmetric Access-Denial Threat
We are and will operate in the littoral
Force disposition prior to Iraqi Freedom - forces in the east-med waiting Turkish permission to transit
TLAM shooters in Red Sea and NAG
OEF forces off of Pakistan
What would be the effect if we faced a more potent foe?
Recent Maritime Operations Highlight the Need for Assured Access in the Littoral
We Must Operate Here, and Counter Asymmetric Access-Denial Threat 2

3. Sea Shield Mission
Assure access and sustainability throughout the battle space
Project robust defense
Provide a sea-based layer for Homeland Defense
Sea Shield goes beyond unit and task-force defense to project air defense ashore, and provide the nation with sea-based theater and strategic defense.
Sea Shield provides a protective umbrella to
assure access,
reassure allies, and
protect our homeland while deterring potential adversaries.

4. Theater Air and Missile Defense
Sea Shield Pillars
Sea Shield
Force
Protection
Surface
Warfare
Under Sea
Warfare
Theater Air and Missile Defense
Sea Shield encompasses all dimensions of the Battle Space.
Within the Sea Shield pillar, there are 4 areas of responsibility: Force Protection, Surface Warfare, Under Sea Warfare, and Theater and Missile Defense.
Once we break down Sea Shield in this way, it is clear that Sea Shield is a critical enabler to Sea Strike and Sea Basing – providing the Joint Force with the ability to project power ashore.

5. Surface Warfare Issues
Over the Horizon surface threats
Small Boat Threats
Wide Area MIO
Protection of MIW / EXW / CLF/ MPF-F Forces
Breaking down the littoral into an SUW mission, we see our requirements against the threats.
An attacking swarmed small boat threat will stress our detect to engage sequence. Helos cannot be airborne 24/7, so defeating this threat requires an organic layered defense.
A layered defense will enable our platforms to detect, assess, determine intent, warn and engage inport and underway threats. This includes using shipborne helos, the 5 inch gun, CIWS 1B and crew-served weapons.

6. Threat vs. Current Capability
BB Round (10nm)
Armed Helo
MK 45 GUN (6.5nm)
Hellfire(4nm)
.50 Cal (1nm)
Small Arms
(>1000 yds)
MK 38
(1500 yds)
CIWS IB (2nm) 5 10 NM
RPG/Small Arms (>1000yds)
An attacking swarmed small boat threat will stress our detect to engage sequence. Helos can not be airborne 24/7 so, defeating this threat requires an organic layered defense.
A layered defense will enable our platforms to detect, assess, determine intent, warn and engage inport and underway threats. This includes using shipborne helos, the 5 inch gun, CIWS 1B and crew served weapons.
The Threat
ASCM (10nm)
Wake Homing Torpedo (7nm)
Layered Defense is key

7. Future SUW Warfighting
Dispersed force of smaller networked platforms with distributed, unmanned sensors
Directed-energy weapons, to provide protection both at sea and pierside.
5 Inch Force Protection Projectile to increase range and lethality
CIWS 1B to provide inner layer defense against small boats
Stabilized 25mm Gun to provide more accuracy and range
Force Protection Projectiles
In looking for a weapon to extend our ship’s lethality, the 5 inch gun provided some options against small boats.
The 5 inch Force Protection rounds are existing CARGO rounds and filled with grain tungsten pellets.
CIWS 1B
CIWS 1B system provides an extremely effective defense against small boats. It is capable of attriting multiple boats in a swarm attack. It will not be fully fielded however until 2011.
25mm gun
To fill the gap until CIWS is on all ships, we are improving the existing Mk38 25mm chain gun by stabilizing it. The stabilized gun is far more accurate that the unstabilized gun currently in the Fleet and its effective range (and the defensive bubble) is increased by almost 1000 yards.

8. Under Sea Warfare Issues
Mine identification and neutralization
Neutralize submarine threats to operations in the littorals
Provide self-defense against sub-surface threat weapons
‘Hold at Risk’ submarine threat throughout the theater
In order to protect the force (SEA SHIELD) we have several vital requirements..
Proliferating threat in the littorals – submarines (both old Soviet Bcl exprts) and newer quieter diesels pose an increasing threat. Weapons include mines, missiles and torpedoes
So we need to defend the force against the threat, as well as seek out and attack the threat where environmentals favor the submarine
We must also develop the capability to monitor the potential threat, allowing quick engagement if/when hostilities commence.

9. Goal – Technologies and CONOPS to fundamentally change ASW
TF ASW Tasking
CNO directed N6/N7 to conduct a focused ASW study to examine technology opportunities.
Task Force ASW will provide options to the CNO for research and development, science and technology, CONOPS and training.
CONOPS
Science &
Technology
POR/
Systems
- Team A – S&T and R&D opportunities and capabilities
- Team B – CONOPS and Training
Goal – Technologies and CONOPS to
fundamentally change ASW

10. Future ASW Warfighting
Anti-Submarine Warfare Supremacy: Render an opposing submarine force incapable of interfering with mission accomplishment:
detect submarines anywhere,
engage submarines rapidly, and
neutralize submarine weapons.
Orange
Naval Base
Hold at Risk
Maritime
Shield
Clean Sweep
Protected Passage
Sea
Base
ASW CONSTRUCT
Hold at Risk
Achieve mission denial against adversary submarines and destroy enemy submarines at times and places of our choosing
Protected Passage
Assure access with safe transits in the face of submarine threats
Maritime Shield
Establish and protect Sea Bases from submarine penetration and defeat submarine attacks

11. Takeaways Sea Shield ASW SUW Concept is core to Joint Warfighting
Most critical and most challenged in the littoral environment
ASW, MIW, SUW
ASW
Move from mass force to mass effects
SUW
Early detection and a layered defense is key
Stabilized 25mm fills capability gap until CIWS 1B is fully fielded
Here are our takeways. As Sea Shield represents a projected defense umbrella – it has tremendous application to the Joint Force, projecting power ashore from the littoral.
The Navy is now using a capability-based analysis to reduce “stovepipes” and focus the warfare sponsors and the SYSCOMS on warfighting capabilities vice platforms.
The analysis leads us to Required Capabilities – focusing for this brief on ASW and SUW

12. Backups

13. Littoral Warfare Issues
Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)
Neutralize submarine threats to operations in the littorals
Provide self-defense against sub-surface threat weapons
‘Hold at Risk’ submarine threat throughout the theater
Surface Warfare (SUW)
Over the Horizon (OTH) surface threats
Swarming Small Boat Threats
Wide Area MIO
Protection of MIW / EXW / CLF/ MPF-F Forces Against Surface Threats
Mine Warfare (MIW)
Counter Mines From Deep to Shallow Water
Counter Minefields, Obstacles and Barriers from VSW to the Beach Exit Zone
Breaking down the littoral into the significant anti-access missions, we see our requirements against the threats.
These are the metrics we must measure our current and envisioned capabilities against. Where we see gaps in current or projected capability, we must fashion our investment strategy to close those Gaps, procuring those mature systems which can quickly apply to the requirements, and investing in S&T where technology is not able to help us.

14. Tomorrow – Mass Effects
TF ASW Team A Concepts
Background / Context
Today - Mass Forces
Tomorrow – Mass Effects
Team B Current CONOPS Thoughts
“We can’t do ‘effects based ASW’- must mass force and carve out an area for Battle Force
Time-constrained large area search problem
CPF: 130 false contacts per day*
*Consistent with Falklands Conflict
Very sensor, weapon and numbers of platforms limited”
Team A Technology panel tasking - identify technology innovations so that we can mass effects not forces
provide quantum improvements in ASW capabilities
seek solutions:
without reliance on force on force
maximum compression of the ASW OODA loop
highly responsive detect to engage sequence
Mid-Term Concepts
Far -Term Concepts (including systems needing further definition)
Distributed Fields, Tactical UAV,
Rapid Attack Weapon
Decoys / Countermeasures
Large-N, Large Area Non-acoustic Search, Long Range Stand-off Weapon, Tagging
Integrated Technology Concept

15. Sea Shield Capabilities
Under Sea
Warfare
Force
Protection
Surface
Warfare
Theater Air and Missile Defense
CDR Brennan
MR Smith
CDR Kadowaki
CDR Sullivan
LCDR Cegielski
Provide Self-Defense Against Subsurface Threats
Protect Against SOF and Terrorist Threats
Provide Self-Defense
Against Surface
Threats
Provide Self-Defense Against Air and Missile Threats
Mitigate Effects of CBRNE
Neutralize Submarine Threats in the Littorals
Conduct Offensive Operations against Surface Threats
Provide Maritime Air and Missile Defense
Neutralize Open Ocean Submarine Threats
Provide Overland Air and Missile Defense
These mission level capabilities were analyzed in order to identify critical Sea Shield gaps and overlaps.
I assessed the cross-warfare impact of those results in order to highlight our key POM-06 issues.
Counter Minefields from Deep to Shallow Water
Conduct Sea-Based Missile Defense
Breach Minefields, Obstacles, and Barriers from Very Shallow Water to the Beach Exit Zone
Conduct Mining Operations
14 Capabilities

16. Sea Shield POM-06 Gaps Protect the Naval Force
Platform Defense Against Undersea Threats
Platform Force Protection
Sea Based Ballistic Missile Defense
Assure Access in Contested Littorals
MIW Capacity to Clear Large Areas
ASW Cueing and Search
3. (Excess) Maritime Air Defense Capability
Project Defensive Power Over Land
MIW Assault Breaching Capability

17. Force Protection Projectiles
Requirements: 800 – 8,000 yards
Near-term enhanced SuW capability
High level interest in the program
Short turnaround
At sea test Jul 03; Oct SWARMEX
One-time procurement of 6000 rounds
Status: Completing Mk-160 & Mk-86 integration
Cargo
Projectile Body
Aluminum Spacers
WC294
Expelling Charge
MK 432 Fuze
13-Grain Tungsten Alloy
Shot Shell Pellets
(~ 9000)
HE-CVT or HE-ET
KE-ET
In looking for a weapon to extend our ship’s lethality, the 5 inch gun provided some options against small boats.
The 5 inch Force Protection rounds are existing CARGO rounds and filled with grain tungsten pellets in the case of the BB round, shown on the right, or changing the HE-CVT fuse for a HE-ET fuse and making it a HI-FRAG round, shown on the left.
Requirements:
800 yards – 8000 yards
Open craft, unprotected personnel
HE-ET twice as effective (lethal area) as current best ammo HE-CVT
KE-ET twice as effective as HE-ET
Doubles the lethal area of the HE frag pattern
Frag pattern in the range direction, where most errors

18. Force Protection Projectiles
5”/54 BB-round
At-sea Testing 30 July (CG-57)
Effective Range 500-8,000 yds
Procured 6000 BB-rounds (IOC Spring 04)
Shipboard Demo conducted 30 Jul in LAKE CHAMPLAIN (MK 86 GFCS)
Successfully engaged towed targets with HE-ET & KE-ET rounds
Targets engaged at 8,000 to 800 yards
Reliability & Lethality, as predicted
24 Oct SWARMEX in VACAPES will test the rounds against a HSMST.
Twice the Lethal Area (for topside personnel) of current HE round.

19. Phalanx Block 1B Highly effective vs Small Boat Swarm Threat
Key Capabilities
4-5 ASM Engagements without reload
8-10 Surface Engagements without reload
Integrated Radar & Infra-red Sensors
Increased Kill Range against advanced maneuvering ASM threats.
Autonomous or Integrated with CDS
Provides critical Low Elevation detection and tracking data to the ships CDS
RF SEARCH
EO TRACK
RF TRACK
Target Mix
Anti-ship Missiles:
All Altitudes
Subsonic / High Supersonic
High-G Maneuvering
Fixed-wing Aircraft
Helicopters
Surface Threats including small craft and mines.
CIWS 1B system provides an extremely effective defense against small boats. It’s capable of attriting multiple boats in a swarm attack. It will not be fully fielded however until 2011.
17 Mounts in Fleet, All Ships by 2011

20. 25mm Stabilized vs Unstabilized
Probability of hit (16'x16' billboard)
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9 1
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
Range (yds)
Stabilized with E/O sight & LRF
(Composite of STARC 25, Typhoon, Valkyrie)
Unstabilized 25mm Mount
(MK 38)
Empirical Data (Modeling) PH
To fill the gap until CIWS is on all ships, we are improving the existing Mk38 25mm chain gun. The graph shows a stabilized gun is far more accurate that the unstabilized gun currently in the Fleet.
Effective range (and the defensive bubble) is increased by almost 1000 yards.
6 mounts to Fleet by Summer 2005; ramp up to 46 ships by 2007

21. Small Arms Purchased GOTS to close the Gap
MK38 Chain Gun (Unstabilized 25mm)
POR now supports 2 guns per deployer
Mk44 GAU-17 Gatling Gun (3000 rds/min)
Delivered 90 guns
Training Commands FCTC Dam Neck & FTC San Diego
Mk 95 Twin .50 cal Machine Gun Mounts (1100 rds/min)
Delivered 255 mounts more on contract
Arriving 50/month to deployers
Mk 99 Twin M240 Machine Gun (1500 rds/min)
Increased reliability over M-60 - Delivered 10 for Fleet demo
Positive feedback - possible low-cost alternative to GAU-17
These systems made our near-term target list because:
- They were already available (GOTS for Mk44 GAU 17s and COTS for Mk95 twin .50 cals)
- They represented increased firepower from the current .50 cal mounts onboard ships.
- They were affordable now.
All deployers now have 2 MK38 Chain Guns and
either 2- GAU-17 or 2-Twin .50 cal machine guns