1. CLASS ANNOUNCEMENTS ● No class on Friday, April 23

2. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact ● Monetary union – loss of monetary policy BUT fiscal policy still remains ● National fiscal policies affect other countries ● A country has 2 macroeconomic instruments: 1. Monetary policy – lost in a monetary union 2. Fiscal policy – retained even in a monetary union

3. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● In the Euro area fiscal policy therefore becomes very important! ● In case of asymmetric shocks fiscal policy is the only available macroeconomic instrument ● But fiscal policy is more difficult to activate and less reliable than monetary policy

4. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Fiscal policy – changes in spending and/or taxes ● Fiscal policy is also very slow to implement ● Ex. In monetary policy – central bank can change interest rates very quickly;

5. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● In fiscal policy – establishing the budget is a very long process  Government must agree on budget  Ministers will negotiate  Parliament must approve budget  Spending must be enacted by bureaucracy  Taxes take time to increase ● Sometimes during this process the situation fiscal policy is trying to solve dissapears

6. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Another way of looking at fiscal policy: government borrows and pays back on behalf of its citizens ● During a slowdown – government budget deficit financed by public borrowing ● During an upswing – government budget surplus – government pays back its debt

7. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Individual firms and citizens could lead to the same effect, in principle, by borrowing in bad years and paying back in good years ● The government simply acts as a bank vis-a-vis its citizens ● This makes sense because when the economy slows down lending becomes generally riskier and banks become cautious

8. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Many citizens and firms cannot borrow in bad times ● When governments are considered a good risk (as is the case in Europe) they can borrow at a relatively low cost

9. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Europe also fares poorly in inter-country transfer (remember OCA theory!) ● This is the equivalent of a transfer ● When a country faces a negative asymmetric shock its government can borrow from countries that are not affected by the shock

10. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Instead of receiving a loan or grant from other EMU governments the affected country can borrow on international private markets ● This way fiscal policy makes up for the absence of a “federal” transfer in a monetary union

11. Fiscal Policy and the Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Basically – if government borrows to reduce taxes now it will raise taxes later to pay back its debt ● In an asymmetric shock the country facing the negative demand shift can borrow from countries not affected by the shock – equivalent of a transfer

12. Fiscal Policy Externalities ● Spillovers and Co-ordination  Fiscal policy actions in one country may spillover to other countries through different channels ● İncome and spending ● Inflation ● Borrowing costs

13. Fiscal Policy Externalities (cont.)  Such spillovers are called externalities ● They can help or hurt other countries ● Countries need to consider other countries when implementing fiscal policy and the effect other countries policies will have ● Countries should coordinate their policies  Will the EMU countries want to give up more of their sovereignty to coordinate fiscal policy after loss of monetary policy?

14. Fiscal Policy Externalities (cont.) ● Formally, fiscal policy remains a national prerogative ● However, deepening economic integration among EMU countries may call for some coordination ● Fiscal policy coordination that requires binding agreements would limit each country’s sovereignty at a time when fiscal policy becomes an important tool ● The question to ask:  Does sharing the same currency increase spillovers to the point where some new limits on sovereignty are warranted and justified?

15. Fiscal Policy Externalities (cont.) ● Cyclical Income Spillovers:  Business cycles – transmitted through exports and imports  Ex. Germany enters an expansion phase ● Germany gets more imports ● Partner countries have more exports and more incomes ● (GRAPH) ● Spillover is stronger the more countries trade with one another and the larger the coutnry taking action  This is why Germany is so important

16. Fiscal Policy Externalities (cont.) ● What does this mean for fiscal policy?  Ex. 2 monetary union member countries undergoing synchronized cycles suffering from a recession  Each country will want to adopt an expansionary fiscal policy but ignoring the other country’s actions may mean the combined action may be too strong  If each government relies on the other to do the work – too little may be done  If the cycles are asynchronized – expansionary fiscal policy in one country may boost spending in the booming country; a contradictory fiscal policy move in the booming country may deepen the recession of the other country

17. Fiscal Policy Externalities (cont.) ● Borrowing Cost Spillovers:  Fiscal expansion – increases public borrowing OR reduces public saving  The Government is the country’s biggest borrower – large budget deficits – push interest rates up  However, EMU countries share the same interest rate ● One country’s deficits (especially if the country is large and the deficits sizeable) may impose higher interest rates throughout the Euro area  High interest rates – deter investment and affect long term growth

18. Eurozone Government Bond Spread

19. Excessive Deficits and the No- Bailout Clause

22. Excessive Deficits and the No- Bailout Clause (cont.) ● Debt build-up – partly related to the oil shocks of 1970s and 1980s ● What happens when a public debt becomes unsustainable?  Financially hard-pressed governments may ask the central bank to finance their deficits – this would lead to inflation  If the Eurosystem did this – inflation in Euroland would increase ● The Maastricht Treaty forbids the Eurosystem (ECB and NCBs) from providing direct support to governments

23. Excessive Deficits and the No- Bailout Clause (cont.) ● Spillover 1:  If 1 country had heavy borrowing – could trouble international financial markets  If markets believe debt is unsustainable ● The whole Euro area comes under suspicion ● Capital outflow from Euro area would occur

25. Excessive Deficits and the No- Bailout Clause (cont.) ● Spillover 2:  If a government cannot pay its debt – this would lead to a default which would mean: ● Massive capital outflow ● Collapse of the exchange rate and the stock markets ● Deep recession ● Rising unemployment  In a monetary union this may affect all member countries

26. Excessive Deficits and the No- Bailout Clause (cont.) ● The Maastricht Treaty has a no-bailout clause  No official credit can be extended to a distressed member government ● In spite of the no-bailout clause in case of an emergency some arrangement could be found to bail out a bankrupt government  Ex. The ECB could “informally” relax its monetary policy to make general credit more abundant at a lower cost ● It should be remembered that defaults do not occur out of the blue – it takes years to accumulate large debts  Preventative measures could be taken during this time

27. Collective Discipline ● Why do governments accumulate such high deficits?  To win elections (paying money back takes a long time – usually the spenders are out of office by then)  Public spending favors narrow interest groups (civil servants, military, public road contractors, etc.) while debt service is diffused and borne by the majority (Theory of Collective Action) ● Collective Discipline could be used as a substitute to refuse spending for these purposes

28. Public Debts in Europe in 2009 (%GDP) Austria63,3 Belgium90,1 Bulgaria13 Cyprus52,6 Czech Rep. 28 Denmark21,6 Estonia4,2 Finland32,8 France75,9 Germany69,5 Greece102,1 Hungary76,7 Ireland32,9 Italy118,9 Latvia12,8 Lithuania19 Luxembourg8,6 Malta68,7 Netherlands44,1 Poland49,7 Portugal74 Romania17,4 Slovakia31,6 Slovenia25,7 Spain39,3 Sweden37,2 UK60,2 EU2766,9 Eurozone73,3

29. Fiscal Policy ● Existence of spillovers – 1 argument for sharing policy ● Broader question: At which level of government (regional, national, supranational) should policies be conducted?  Theory of fiscal federalism  Principle of subsidiarity

30. Theory of Fiscal Federalism ● Theory asks how in one country fiscal responsibilities should be assigned between the various levels (national, regional, municipal) ● Asks the question of which responsibilities should stay in national hands and which responsibilities should be transferred to Brussels

31. Theory of Fiscal Federalism (cont.) ● 2 arguments for sharing responsibility: 1. Spillovers lead to inefficient outcomes when each country is free to act as it wishes 2. Some policies are more efficient when carried out on a large scale ● Ex. Use of money, defence

32. Theory of Fiscal Federalism (cont.) ● One solution is coordination which preserves sovereignty but needs repeated negotiations ● Another solution is giving up sovereignty to a supranational institution ● In Europe the European Commission (internal market and trade negotiations) and the ECB (monetary policy) have already taken on some important tasks

33. Excessive Deficits and the No- Bailout Clause (cont.) ● 2 arguments for keeping sovereignty: 1. Preferences are heterogenous and a supranational institution will create dissatisfaction  Ex: common law concerning family life – preferences in these types of areas differ across countries 2. Information asymmetries – policies need to be understood at the local level  Ex: decisions regarding where to build roads, etc. – requires knowledge of that particular geographic area – information asymmetries may occur (more knowledge regarding such issues is available more so at the local level than the global level)

34. The Principle of Subsidiarity ● Principle embraced in the Maastricht Treaty ● Basically means that decisions should be made as close to the people as possible and that the EU should not take action unless doing so is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level ● The broad definition of subsidiarity is that decisions should be taken at the lowest level possible

35. The Principle of Subsidiarity (cont.) ● European Commission’s definition:  “The subsidiarity principle is intended to ensure that decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen and that constant checks are made as to whether action at the Community level is justified in the light of the possibilities available at national, regional or local level.”  The problem is that the dividing lines between the EU and the national level are unclear and ever changing. This makes the subsidiarity principle an ambigious principle.

36. Micro vs Macroeconomic Aspects of Fiscal Policy ● It is very important to separate two aspects of fiscal policy: 1. Structural aspect (or microeconomic aspect)  Concerns the size of the budget, what public money is spent on, how taxes are raised, etc. 2. Macroeconomic aspect  The income stabilization role of fiscal policy  We are focusing on the macroeconomic aspect of fiscal policy

37. Implications for Fiscal Policy ● The Case for Collective Restraint:  Spillovers such as income flows, borrowing costs, and the risk of debt default can have serious effects across the Euro area  Some countries may lack the political institutions necessary for fiscal discipline necessitating the use of an external agent such as Brussels for restraint ● The limits of collective restraint can range from coordination and peer pressure to mandatory limits on deficits and debts

38. Implications for Fiscal Policy (cont.) ● The Case Against Collective Restraint:  Important heterogeneities and information asymmetries exist between nations  This can lead to asymmetric shocks  A common fiscal policy in addition to a common monetary policy would leave nations without any counter-cyclical macroeconomic tool

39. Implications for Fiscal Policy (cont.) ● It is far from clear that the macroeconomic component of fiscal policy should be subject to external limits ● A common fiscal policy is ruled out but some degree of coordination may be considered ● This is an ongoing debate in the EU

40. Implications for Fiscal Policy (cont.) ● The subsidiarity principle implies that as long as the case is not strong fiscal policy should remain a national issue ● On the other hand the spillover that could result from excessive deficits is important – this forms the basis for the Stability and Growth Pact

41. Stability and Growth Pact

43. The Stability and Growth Pact ● Admission to the monetary union:  Budget deficit of less than 3% of GDP  Public debt of less than 60% of GDP ● There was some worry that after a country joined the EMU that a breach of either of these criteria could happen

44. The Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Maastricht Treaty’s Article 104:  “Member states shall avoid excessive government deficits” ● The practical details of the procedure are fulfilled by the Stability and Growth Pact ● The initiative was taken by Germany in 1995

45. The Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Germany was worried that fiscal indiscipline could lead to inflation and insisted on a clear and automatic procedure ● Germany made full use of the Maastricht Treaty to achieve its aims ● The other countries were less enthusiastic but agreed because of Germany’s importance for EMU

46. The Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● The SGP consists of 4 elements:  A definition of what constitutes an ‘excessive deficit’  A preventive arm, designed to encourage governments to avoid excessive deficits  A corrective arm, which prescribes how governments should react to a breach of the deficit limit  Sanctions  The SGP applies to all EU member countries but only the Eurozone countries are subject to the corrective arm

47. The Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● The Pact:  Deficits are excessive when they are above 3% of GDP  Recognizes that serious recessions beyond government control can lead to deepening deficits ● Trying to close down deficits during a recession may lead to contradictory policies which may deepen recession  Exceptional circumstances when the provisions are automatically suspended: ● If the country’s GDP declines by at least 2% in the year in question ● When output declines by less than 0.75%

48. The Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● When a country is found exceeding the limit – commission issues a report and decides whether the country is in excessive deficit  Commission issues a report and decides whether the country is in excessive deficit  If it finds against the country – recommendations and deadline (may or may not be made public) ● A country may run deficits in excess of 3% GDP for 2 successive years without incurring sanctions

49. The Stability and Growth Pact (cont.) ● Due to the EU experiences of 2001-2003:  Shallower but longer-lasting slowdowns can gradually deepend the deficit  With its revised version the SGP introduces two elements of flexibility: ● It admits taht a negative growth rate or an accumulated loss of output during a protracted period of very low growth may be considered as exceptional ● It suggests taking into account of ‘all other relevant factors’  In contrast with the 3% limits and the -2 and -0,75% definitional of exceptional circumstances, these new elements are vaguealy specified.

50. Sanctions ● If a country fails to bring down the deficit below 3% by the deadline – it is sanctioned Size of deficit (%GDP) Amount of fine (% GDP) 3%0,2% 4%0,3% 5%0,4% 6% +0,5% ● Deposits are imposed each year until the deficit is corrected ● If there is no correction within 2 years – deposits become a fine – otherwise they are returned

51. Several Aspects of the Pact 1. Does not remove fiscal policy sovereignty ● Governments are in full control – but they bear the consequences of their actions 2. Intent is pre-emptive due to the time between the deficit deemed excessive and the time a deposit is imposed and another 2 years before the deposit becomes a fine 3. The declaration of the country in violation is meant to elicit prompt corrective action 4. All decisions are in the hands of the Council ( a political body that can exploit the “ifs” in the pact)

52. Stability Programmes ● Part of wider peer-monitoring arrangement – calls for every country to submit its budgetary positions for the following 3 years to the Council and the Commission annually ● Objective is not just deficits below 3% but a budget balance or surplus – leaving room for policy action in case of a modern slowdown ● The Commission and the Council examine national budget plans and draws conclusions

53. Stability Programmes (cont.) ● A warning could be issued and made public ● Warnings however are peer pressure and only violations of the Pact can carry fines ● Even though the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines, such as the Stability and Growth Pact, concern all EMU members regardless of their membership to the EMU, only monetary union members can be sanctioned

54. Problems with the SGP ● Early experience with the SGP has revealed some problems ● Questions arise as to whether or not SGP leaves enough room for counter-cyclical fiscal policies

55. Early experiences of the SGP ● Over the first 10 years of the monetary union, the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP) has been triggered 15 times:  İncluding 7 cases concerning Eurozone members which are subject to sanctions  Yet sanctions have never been imposed

58. Problems With SGP (cont.) ● Ireland:  1st country to be formally “warned” under the SGP rule  Odd case with an odd official statement:  “In 2000, due to a strongly growing economy the surplus is estimated to hae been 4.5% for GDP, …the period of 2001-2003 projects high surpluses of 4.2% GDP on average and a further decline in debt ratio… the public finances are sound…the Council considered budgetary plans for 2001 inappropriately expansionary and issued a recommendation to Ireland to end this inconsistency” – Council Recommendation, 15 June 2001  The Irish economy was actually booming in 2000-2001 and the Irish government and citizens were not happy with “Brussels” invading their national sovereignty

59. Problems With SGP (cont.) ● France and Germany:  2002-2003 have not been good for most European countries  The economy slowed down significantly  The EMU’s 2 biggest countries, France and Germany, have faced deficits in excess of 3%  Since budgets did not improve enough during the earlier years there was not enough room to use fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool  Both countries were issued warnings in 2002 and recommendations in 2003  They were not fined however

61. SGP Fines

62. Problems With SGP (cont.) ● The sanctions and recommendations of the Pact are openly questioned: ● Former President of the Commission, Romano Prodi, referred to the pact as “stupid” and the Economist adopted the nickname of the “Stupidity Pact”

63. SGP Reforms ● Pact reformed in 2005 after widespread criticism over weak treatment of France and Germany ● More emphasis on:  Nation-specific situations  Advice on addressing problems  More time permitted to address problems  Allowance for evolving situations (ex. Recommendations may not be met because situation further deteriorated)  In summary: move toward peer support and peer pressure

64. Limits of the Pact ● SGP serves 2 main purposes: 1. It counteracts the deficit bias 2. It greatly reduces the odds of a debt default within the monetary union which could result in painful spillover effects ● The imposition of fiscal discipline from the outside has the advantage of protecting governments from interest groups however using “Brussels” as a scapegoat too often can undermine the general support for European integration

65. Limits of the Pact (cont.) ● The imposition of fines could especially have the effect of undermining support for European integration ● The 3% limit is artificial – if there are economic difficulties it is difficult to justify this number ● For example: why not 3.5% ● As long as Europe remains less than an OCA leaving member countries without the fiscal policy instrument is not desirable

66. Possible Reforms ● Various proposals to compensate for these limits have been proposed ● One solution is to set limits for the cyclically adjusted budget not the actual budget ● This raises other problems – calculating the adjusted budget is more art than science ● It would also be difficult to impose sanctions on the basis of adjusted numbers

67. Possible Reforms ● Another solution is to target the public debt over the medium term – not the budget balance year after year ● Tis leaves governments free to use fiscal policy as they see fit in the short term ● The difficulty of this solution is that governments can promise to be virtous in the future – but could they really achieve this ● Any asymmetric shocks that hit close to the deadline could also cause difficulties

68. Accession Countries

69. Greek Debt Crisis