1. JULY, 1942 – FEBRUARY, 1943

2.  EASTERN (RUSSIAN)FRONT SITUATION - SUMMER, 1942  AXIS (GERMAN) ARMIES CONTROL MOST OF EUROPEAN RUSSIA (USSR)  RED ARMY & USSR HAVE TAKEN MASSIVE CASUALTIES  MOST SOVIET INDUSTIRES / FACTORIES HAVE BEEN EVACUATED EAST OF URAL MTS.  MOST OBJECTIVES HAVE BEEN TAKEN OR … ARE EXPECTED TO BE TAKEN  EXAMPLES:  Army Group North – sieging Leningrad  Army Group Center – close to Moscow  Army Group South – Kiev captured, moving towards Central Asia & Oil fields RESULT? -GERMANS FEEL INVINCIBLE -GERMANS HAVE MOMENTUM -SOVIETS HAVE RESORTED TO SCORCHED-EARTH POLICY -SOVIETS HAVE CALLED ALL RESERVES INTO MILITARY - SOVIETS ARE “PLAYING FOR TIME” (DEFINE)

5.  “IF I DO NOT GET THE OIL OF MAIKOP AND GROZNY, THEN I MUST END THIS WAR.”  ADOLF HITLER, 1942

6. GGERMAN ADVANTAGES: AARMOR ADVANTAGE RRUSSIANS STILL HAD NOT PRODUCED ENOUGH T-34 TANKS TO EFFECTIVELY CHALLENGE GERMAN ARMOR AAIR POWER: LUFTWAFFE IS… MMORE EXPERIENCED HHAS BETTER AIRCRAFT HHAS PERFECTED G ROUND SUPPORT TACTICS MMORALE: GERMANS ARE CONFIDENT MMOMENTUM: GERMANS ARE ACTIVELY PURSUING / LOOKING TO DESTROY RED ARMY

7.  GERMAN DISADVANTAGES  BIGGEST PROBLEM: SUPPLY LINES ARE DANGEROUSLY OVEREXTENDED  EFFECT? EXTENSION OF SUPPLY LINES =  INCREASES CHANCE OF SUPPLIES BEING CUT OFF  REINFORCEMENTS TAKE LONGER TO GET TO STALINGRAD  MORE TROOPS NEEDED TO PROTECT SUPPLY LINES  FEWER TROOPS AVAILABLE FOR FORWARD OPERATIONS  GERMAN BLITZKRIEG TACTICS ARE DESIGNED FOR…  SPEED  SURPRISE  OPEN TERRAIN / GEOGRAPHY  LONG DISTANCES  RESULT?  KEY ELEMENTS OF BLITZKRIEG CAN’T BE EFFECTIVELY USED IN A CITY  EXAMPLE? ARMOR / TANK MOVEMENT IS LIMITED

12.  DEFINE: THE GERMAN CAMPAIGN TO SEIZE SOUTHERN RUSSIA, THE CAUCASUS REGION, AND OIL FIELDS  WHEN?  OPERATION BEGINS = LATE JUNE, 1942  OPERATION ENDS W/DEFEAT AT STALINGRAD  WHO/WHAT?  GERMAN ARMY GROUP SOUTH  GROUP IS DIVIDED INTO TWO SUB-GROUPS  ARMY GROUP “A”  ARMY GROUP “B”  BOTH GROUPS ARE ASSIGNED DIFFERENT TASKS & OBJECTIVES  THE PLAN:  ARMY GROUP A – SEIZE THE CAUCASUS REGION, AND ALL VITAL CITIES & RESOURCES THERE  ARMY GROUP B –  MOVE EASTWARD TOWARDS THE DON AND VOLGA RIVERS  SEIZE CITY OF STALINGRAD

15.  STALINGRAD WAS NOT THE PRIMARY OBJECTIVE OF OPERATION BLUE  PRIMARY OBJECTIVE(S) WAS / WERE…  OIL  AGRICULTURE /FOOD  REDUCE RUSSIA’s INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY  WHY STALINGRAD?  LOCATED ON THE VOLGA RIVER  VOLGA IS ONE OF RUSSIA’s MAJOR TRANSPORTATION ROUTES  INDUSTRIAL CITY  CONTROL OF STALINGRAD WOULD PROTECT ARMY GROUP SOUTH’s FLANK (define)  LESSER REASON: CITY WAS NAMED AFETR STALIN, SO IT HAD SYMBOLIC VALUE  SEIZING STALINGRAD: ASSIGNED TO…  GERMAN 6 th ARMY  GERMAN 4 th PANZER ARMY

16.  GERMAN 6 th IN PUTTING INCREASING #s OF TROOPS INTO STALINGRAD  EVENTUALLY CONTROL 90% OF CITY, BUT…  CANNOT GAIN TOTAL CONTROL  SOVIET 62 ND ARMY IS HOLDING OUT IN CITY  RUSSIANS ARE BRINGING MORE RESERVES…  TO THE STALINGRAD AREA  ACROSS VOLGA RIVER INTO CITY  ***RED ARMY ALSO BRINGS LARGE # OF SNIPERS TO CITY (SO WHAT?)  ARMY GROUP A (INVADING THE CAUCASUS REGION) IS TOO FAR TO SUPPORT ARMY GROUP B, ESPECIALLY THE 6 TH ARMY  LATE OCT./EARLY NOV.:  DANGER OF 6 TH ARMY BEING CUT OFF INCREASES  RUSSIANS ARE BUILDING UP RESERVES / ARMOR ON FLANKS OF CITY  RUSSIANS IN CITY ARE FOLLOWING STALIN’s ORDERS: “NOT A STEP BACKWARD”

17.  RUSSIAN 62 ND ARMY:  COMMANDED BY VASILY CHUIKOV  OVERALL COMMANDER OF STALINGRAD AREA IS GEORGI ZHUKOV  62 ND ARMY’s ORDERS ARE SIMPLE =DEFEND THE CITY TO THE LAST MAN, LAST BULLET, etc.  SOVIET BATTLE PLAN IS SIMPLE:  62 nd ARMY WILL / MUST DENY GERMANS TOTAL CONTROL OF THE CITY  THIS WILL FORCE GERMANS TO COMMIT MORE TROOPS INTO CITY  RED ARMY WILL USE CITY TO HOLD GERMAN 6 TH ARMY IN STATIC POSITION  RED ARMY WILL THEN LAUNCH SIMULTANEOUS ATTACKS ON GERMAN FLANKS  FLANKS WILL LINK UP WEST OF CITY  6 TH ARMY WILL BE CUT OFF FROM REMAINDER OF GERMAN ARMY  BUT…FLANKING ASSAULT MUST BE LAUNCHED BEFORE…  GERMANS CAN TRANSFER FORCES FROM ARMY GROUP A TO RELIEVE 6 TH ARMY  SO…RED ARMY MUST QUICKLY BUILD UP ARMOR / ARTILLERY / INFANTRY RESERVES ON FLANKS  SO…TIMING IS CRITICAL (for both sides)

18.  WHAT WERE THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BATTLE OF STALINGRAD?  VERY LITTLE ARMOR USED  MOSTLY HOUSE-to-HOUSE FIGHTING  BRUTAL HAND-TO-HAND FIGHTING  BUILDINGS COULD BE / WERE OFTEN OCCUPIED BY BOTH SIDES  BUILDINGS USUALLY CONVERTED INTO SMALL FORTRESSES  EXAMPLE?  FACTORIES  OFFICE BUILDINGS  SEWERS / BASEMENTS WERE OFTEN FOUGHT OVER or USED FOR SHELTER  EXTENSIVE USE OF SNIPERS BY BOTH SIDES  “RATTENKRIEG” : THE RAT WAR – GERMAN NAME FOR THE BATTLE  RESULT?  NORMAL OPEN-COUNTRY BATTLE LINES DON’T REALLY EXIST

19.  GERMAN WERMACHT :  ARMY GROUP B :  GERMAN 6 TH ARMY (GEN. Von PAULUS)  GERMAN 4 TH PANZER ARMY (GEN. HOTH)  ROMANIAN 3 rd ARMY  ROMANIAN 4 th ARMY  HUNGARIAN 2 ND ARMY  ITALIAN 8 TH ARMY  INITIAL STRENGTH:  270,000 MEN  3000 ARTILLEY PIECES  500 TANKS  600 AIRCRAFT

20.  SOVIET UNION:  SOVIET 62 ND ARMY (inside city, led by Gen. Chuikov)  DON FRONT ARMY  SOUTHWESTERN FRONT ARMY  STALINGRAD FRONT ARMY  INITIAL STRENGTH:  187,000 MEN  2000 ARTILLERY PIECES  400 TANKS  300 AIRCRAFT

21.  BY THE TIME OF THE GERMAN SURRENDER, MASSIVE RESERVES AND EQUIPMENT HAD BEEN SENT BY BOTH ARMIES TO STALINGRAD:  EXAMPLE:  TROOP STRENGTH BY TIME OF OPERATION URANUS (SOVIET COUNTEROFFENSIVE), NOV. 1942 :  SOVIETS :  1,100,000 MEN  15,000 ARTILLERY PIECES  1400 TANKS  1100 AIRCRAFT  GERMANS :  1,000,000 MEN  10,000 ARTILLERY PIECES  675 TANKS  702 AIRCRAFT

26. “WE WILL DEFEND THE CITY OR DIE IN THE ATTEMPT.”  GENERAL VASILY CHUIKOV, SOVIET 62 nd ARMY, STALINGRAD

71.  HITLER’s OBSESSION W/ CAPTURING STALINGRAD LED TO…  TOO MUCH ATTENTION PAID TO FIGHTING IN THE CITY  GERMAN FLANKS WERE NOT WELL PROTECTED  REQUESTS FROM 6 TH ARMY TO MOVE TROOPS TO FLANKS WERE DENIED  GERMAN FLANKS WERE MANNED BY WEAKER ALLIES:  ROMANIAN ARMY  HUNGARIAN ARMY  ITALIAN ARMY  RESULT?  SOVIETSA RECOGNIZE THE WEAKNESS  BEGIN MASSING FORCES ON FLANKS NOTH & SOUTH OF CITY  WHY?  THEY ARE PLANNING A MASSIVE ASSAULT  PURPOSE WILL BE TO CUT OFF / ENCIRCLE 6 TH ARMY

79.  OPERATION URANUS HAD COMPLETELY CUT OFF 6 TH ARMY FROM ANY LAND SUPPORT  DEC., ‘42: OPERATION WINTER STORM  GERMAN 4 TH PANZER ARMY ATTEMPT TO BREAK THROUGH TO STALINGRAD  FAILURE  ONLY OPTION LEFT = AERIAL RESUPPLY BY LUFTWAFFE  DEC.,’42: SOVIETS LAUNCH OPERATION LITTLE SATURN  PURPOSE = CUT OFF ALL GERMANS IN SOUTHERN RUSSIA  ATTEMPT TO RELIEVE 6 TH ARMY IS ABANDONED BY 4 TH PANZER ARMY  6 TH ARMY WOULD NEED 800 TONS OF DAILY SUPPLIES TO SURVIVE  LUFTWAFFE CLAIMS IT CAN ONLY BRING 117 TONS PER DAY  REALITY: ONLY PROVIDE 95 TONS PER DAY  RESULT?  6 TH ARMY BEGINS TO STARVE, SUPPLIES DISAPPEAR  LUFTWAFFE LOSSES ARE HEAVY  BY JAN. 30 TH, 6 TH ARMY IS UNABLE TO RESIST  Feb. 2 nd, 1943: GEN. Von PAULUS SURRENDERS 6 TH ARMY TO SOVIETS

91.  CASUALTIES :  GERMAN:  750,000 KIA, WIA, MIA  91,000 POWs***  900 AIRCRAFT  SOVIETS :  480,000 KIA/MIA  650,000 WIA  40,000 CIVILIAN KIA  4000 TANKS  16,000 ARTILLERY PIECES  2800 AIRCRAFT  ***OF THE 91,000 GERMAN P.O.W.s TAKEN CAPTIVE, ONLY 5000 EVER RETURN TO GERMANY ALIVE

92.  GERMAN ADVANCE INTO RUSSIA IS STOPPED  GERMANS NEVER PENETRATE FURTHER EASTWARD  RUSSIAN OIL RESOURCES ARE SAVED  SOVIETS BEGIN SLOW WESTWARD ADVANCE TOWARD GERMANY  STALINGRAD IS THE TURNING POINT IN THE EUROPEAN THEATRE OF WORLD WAR II  FROM THAT POINT ON, GERMANS ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE

98. BATTLEYEARWAR LOCATIONOPPONENTSCASUALTIES VERDUN1916WWIFRANCEFrance v. Germany 975,000 THE SOMME 1916WWIFRANCE UK/FR v GERMANY 1,200,000 SPRING OFFENSIVE 1918WWI FRANCO- GERMAN BORDER FR/UK/USA v GERMANY 900,000 MOSCOW1941WWIIRUSSIA GERMANY v USSR 1,000,000 LENINGRAD 1941-44WWIIRUSSIA GERMANY v USSR 1.2 MIL – 4.5 MIL. STALINGRAD 1942-43WWIIRUSSIA GERMANY v USSR 1.2MIL. – 1.8 MIL. O PERATION BAGRATION 1944WWIIRUSSIA – POLAND GERMANY v USSR 1.4 MIL. BERLIN1945WWII GERMANYGERMANY v RUSSIA 1.3 MIL.