1. Philip Morris’s Project Sunrise: Weakening tobacco control by working with it Ruth E. Malone, RN, PhD Patricia McDaniel, PhD Elizabeth A. Smith, PhD University of California, San Francisco Department of Social & Behavioral Sciences Funding: NCI CA095989, American Legacy Foundation Fellowship, CA Tobacco-Related Disease Research Program 13KT-0081

2. 1990s: U.S. tobacco industry faced challenges FDA attempts to regulate cigarettes/nicotine Multiple state lawsuits Smokefree laws Tobacco control activism Critical media coverage

3. If status quo were maintained… Source: PM 2044341638/1676

6. But…with a “proactive agenda”… Source: PM 2044341638/1676

7. Source: PM 2078018689/8800

8. Source: PM 2070437692/7704

9. “Fair Play” included: Source: PM 2063393720/3726

10. Research—important because… “Antis activities are… a principal reason for…negative sentiment against the tobacco industry. Anything we can do to research and counteract their activities is at the same level as our research on ETS or nicotine (albeit not as high profile…” Source: PM 2046901461

11. Relationships—important because…

12. Exacerbating conflicts

13. Source: PM 2063393720/3726

14. Source: PM 2062367623/7628

15. Weaken credibility “Publicize financial motives of Voluntary Health Organizations: How do these organizations raise funds and what do they do with them?... “Work with other social stakeholders to question priorities of foundations involved in tobacco advocacy—e.g. raise questions about why RWJ foundation support is not going to other causes.” Source: PM 2063393720/3726

16. Diminish funding “Establish a coalition of watchdog groups, conservative media and non-traditional allies to publicize evidence of abuses of federal and state statutes… Divert funds to either “benign” tobacco- related programs, or to programs that affect other social policy stakeholders…An example might be to divert ASSIST or IMPACT funding into programs designed to enforce tobacco minimum age laws.” Source: PM 2063393720/3726

17. Source: PM 2063393705/3719

18. Evidence of implementation Research: Created “Common Ground” database on tobacco control organizations: biographical information funding sources political contributions advertising meetings budgets policy priorities/plans communications

20. Evidence of implementation Relationships: –Attempted “dialogue” with AHA, ACS, ALA re: youth smoking, access –Attempted dialogue with RWJ; rebuffed –National 4-H youth smoking initiative (1998) –Overtures to TC leaders re: harm/risk reduction –Corporate philanthropy

21. Evidence of implementation Diminish funding: –May have urged IRS to investigate AHA, ALA political activity –National Smokers’ Alliance sued Roswell Park Cancer Institute –PM report on ‘waste, fraud and abuse’ in California TC expenditures –Attacking ASSIST –Marked ↓ in TC funding

22. Evidence of implementation Weaken credibility: –Message testing –Use of third-party allies, e.g. taxpayer, smokers’ rights, pro-choice/tolerance groups accuse TC groups of “extremism”

23. Source: PM 2078018689/8800

24. Improved attitudes toward PM 1993: PM’s opinion research showed: Highly negative view of company 2000: 39% view favorably 18-34 age group rating grew by 26 percentage points December 2000: More young adults view PM favorably (45%) than unfavorably (34%)

25. Conclusions PM’s makeover is not just PR: It is calculated to undermine the tobacco control movement by creating conflict and thwarting industry delegitimization as a TC strategy “Partnerships” with TC may serve PM’s aims of disempowering TC movement and enhancing its own social acceptability

26. “One last point… “This is a long-term project….It will take a series of interdependent actions, plans and initiatives. A reweaving of the fabric of social acceptability.” Source: PM 2078018668/8672