1. Global Politics: Classical theories
Klaus Segbers
MGIMO/ FUB
March 29, 2005

2. The Game of Theories Positivism/ Ratchoice
Reflectivism/ Constructivism
World
systems
Insti-
tutions
Cognitive
(Neo)
Realism
Liberalism/
domestic
IR/ GP Theories
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A World of States!
For a long time, international politics was defined and understood as politics between states.
Accordingly, IP/ IR require the existence and interaction of and between states.
Also, reflections on the state are quite old: theories of state, state-based law, etc.
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A World of States?
At the same time, clear definitions of “the” state always were problematic.
Today, it is more problematic than ever to maintain that states are the only,. Or even the main players on the globe.
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State: Evolution
There were social entities w/o a state. The modern state is a rather new phenomenon.
It very well may be that the state is, after all, a transitory phenomenon.
The Westphalian system ( ) was preceded (and may be replaced) by world orders which do not require the modern nation state as the core unit.
Various forms of states characterized political history starting from the ancient Greek polis.
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States: Attributes
Administration (not bargaining)
Territoriality (not nomadism)
Internal sovereignty, esp. power monopoly
Social homogenization (not patchworks etc.)
External sovereignty (no interference in domestic affairs)
Citizenship/ Statsbürgerschaft (not multiple identities)
National identity (not regional or other)
Borders, indicating domestic/ foreign spheres
Symbols
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What is this about?
Explaining cooperation between actors and coordination of actions
Explaining In/Stability
Explaining In/Security
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Realism: Core ideas (1)
The context is anarchic
Actors are unitary (state) actors
States (container-states) must survive; they live in a competitive, even dangerous context
Therefore they engaged in self-help
This makes cooperation less likely (and reasonable)
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Realism: core ideas (2)
Human nature is power oriented
What matters, therefore, is power maximization
Military power is the decisive currency of power
Gains are relative gains
Balancing and coalition building is possible, but its effects are always temporary
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10. Core thinkers and ideas (1)
Classical realisms is characterized by some names and writings (s. req. reading):
Thucydides („adapt the natural reality of unequal power“ – Melos dialogue)
Machiavelli („Maxims of realist statecraft“, the world is dangerous; civic virtue aspect)
Hobbes (state of nature >>> permanent ‘state of war‘)
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11. Core thinkers and ideas (2)
20th century approaches:
Morgenthau, neoclassical realism („men and women are political animals, born to pursue power“)
Schelling, strategic realism (foreign policy decision making, game theories, neutral toward values)
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Neo-Realism (1)
A move toward more scientific credentials
Waltz: (only) structure matters
Structure is anarchic
States are units, being shaped by this structure
States act in this macro-configuration
The result is the international outcome
Nothing else matters, incl. human nature
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Neo-Realism (2)
Mearsheimer: bipolar systems are inherently more stable than multi-polar systens of IR
In general: rather pessimist prospects for peace and stability
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14. Realism: questions and critique
Are states unitary actors?
Is territoriality a given?
How many classical states are around these days?
What about the validity of sovereignty?
The pursue of (individual) survival and the resulting security dilemma
Borders or cleavages, stable or fluid?
Domestic/ foreign dichotomy- still valid?
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2 Institutionalism
There is some confusion re. how to label this approach.
Suggestions are: institutionalism, functionalism, idealism…
Also, this is close to regime theories.
Others talk about „neoliberal institutionalism“.
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16. Definition of institutions
Institutions are …
rules of the game
formal or informal (examples?)
legal or illegal
effective or not
constraints – and opportunities – for actors
not organizations
rules - instructions for interaction
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17. Definitions of institutions (2)
Institutions are formal and informal rules that constrain individual behavior and shape human interaction.
(Douglass North)
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Basic assumptions (1)
Institutionalists have a similar understanding of the international system (anarchic) and the state (unitary) as realists (next week).
Yet, they are saying that the state can be embedded in rules and act in such a way that its inherent behavior – utility maximizing leading to permanent instability – can be overcome by utility maximizing – leading to increasing interdependence b/w states, thereby producing stability and cooperation.
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Basic assumptions (2)
Institutionalists realize that modern societies are characterized by complex schemes of division of labor. This makes them vulnerable for dysfunctions, for example by attacks.
So governments may develop an interest to intertwine and integrate some of their functional spheres with other societies – resulting in networks, and in increasing mutual vulnerability.
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Basic assumptions (3)
Regimes and institutions can be useful, so their proponents, because they do not rest on appeals and values, or altruism, but because they serve mutual interests.
Therefore, they can be integrated into interests, or even preferences, of state (or other wp) actors – who expect utilities from regimes.
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Sources
Disciplinary source: economics
Meta-theoretical source:
(not only) ratchoice
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22. Neoinstituional Concepts: Transaction costs (TACs)
TACs are investments for initiating, measuring, proceeding, monitoring, control and correction of (originally: economic) exchanges.
This can be translated into wp/ ir language: costs of interaction and non/cooperation.
I.e. all kinds of investments for preparing treaties/ contracts, and also for informal rules, and for evaluating contract fulfillment.
Institutions are designed, and maintained, to reduce TACs.
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23. Neoinstitutional Concepts: Principal Agent
AGENTS
AGENTS
PRINCIPALS
AGENTS
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Formally:
Top – down: Tasks, resources
Bottom – up: Fulfillment, deliveries
Informally:
Hidden action, information, resources
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25. Neoinstitutional concepts: Institutional Change (1)
... is initiated by actors
... generated by context modifications (like relative prices >>> changing preferences)
... aims at better utility maximization (profit – rents – security – survival)
... proceeds mostly evolutionary/ gradually
... but sometimes also as a rupture (revolution, war)
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26. Institutional Change (2)
Actors’ moves always are limited/ constrained by institutions.
At the same time, institutions are modified by recalculations of actors’ preferences or interests.
Working and stable institutions provide security and stability.
Institutional change is unevitable. There are probably no eternal institutions.
Institutional change starts directed and intentional, but the outcome may be different.
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27. Institutional change (3): Path dependency
This is an important concept that explains the limits of change.
Generally speaking, there are multiple options for changing institutions – in theory.
But only those of them have some opportunity to be realized who correspond to former institutional legacies.
Ex’l: EE
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Regimes
Regimes are inter- or transnational institutions.
Functionally, there are hardly any differences.
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Regimes: Definition
Regimes are „sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision making procedures around which actors‘ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.
(Stephen Krasner)
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30. Institutionalism: questions and critique
When institutionalism is such a great concept, why do institutions not work better? Why do they fail?
What about actors‘ time horizons?
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31. 3 Liberalism/ pluralism
The dependent variables are, still, aspects of international or world politics.
But the domestic context (structures) will be brought in as an independent variable.
This is different from explaining domestic events/ processes by international factors (like globalization).
This is different, too, from explaining state behavior by system-level qualities (anarchy; distribution of capabilities/ information)
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32. Core assumptions of Liberalism (1)
In an IR context, liberalism means that democratic states don‘t fight each other – this is the theory of democratic peace.
But note: democracies do fight non-democracies.
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33. Core assumptions of liberalism (2)
The basic tenet of liberal approaches in IR is that „state-society relations - the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded - have a fundamental impact on state behavior in world politics“.
Andrew Moravcsik 1997, p 513
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34. Core assumptionsof liberalism (3)
This kind of approach is not compatible with
-- states as „black boxes“
-- states as “containers”
-- states as unitary actors
-- states as rational decision makers (though it may be compatible with ratchoice!)
-- states as effective resource mobilizers
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35. Core assumptions of liberalism (4)
Rather, societies and social actors are the level/ object of analysis.
There is a primacy of societal actors: individuals & social groups.
They act and interact, they build coalitions, they lobby, they put pressure on bureaucracies, they act – collectively or individually.
Political actors are dependent on election cycles (and, in general, on time…).
This is what being „liberal“ or „plural“ means in this ir-context.
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36. Core assumption of Moravcsik
“… states do not automatically maximize fixed, homogeneous conceptions of security, sovereignty, or wealth per se, as realists and institutionalists assume.“
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37. Variant: ideational liberalism
Societal preferences concerning the scope and content of the „nation“
Commitment of individuals and social groups to particular political institutions (regime types)
Nature of legitimate socioeconomic regulation and redistribution
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38. Variant: commercial liberalism
Patterns of market incentives facing domestic and transnational economic actors
Important: Not only free trade
In general: The greater economic benefits for private actors, the greater their incentive to press governments to facilitate such transactions.
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39. Variant: republican liberalism
... means the mode of domestic political representation which determines whose social preferences are institutionally privileged.
Rent seeking is an important mode of action.
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40. Variant: two-level games (R. Putnam)
In int‘l negotiations, people actually sit at 2 tables at the same time: int‘l, and domestic.
All possible int‘s outcomes need domestic ratification.
The sum of all possible outcomes to be ratified is a win set.
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41. Variant: transnationalism
Here social actors are perceived as transnational (non-state) actors and players on the world politics arena.
Their prospects to intrude other societies depend on those societies‘ („domestic“) structures.
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42. Liberalism: questions and problems
This school requires research strategies which are
complex
related to contexts;
may require case studies;
are necessarily comparative.
You never succeed in identifying a domestic structure/ coalition once and for ever – they are permanently shifting.
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