1. DEPLOYABLE JOINT FORCE HEADQUARTERS
JOINT MILITARY APPRECIATION
PROCESS
(JMAP)
DJFHQ Adaptation and Implementation

2. Why Bother I don’t work at this level.
I’m in a Service or Unit that doesn’t use this process for very good reasons.
It’s just more bloody theory anyway - only ever used at Training Institutions.

3. Why Bother
Well it isn’t just theory any more. We are in the busiest operational planning period of my career.
Similar processes are used by Defence Forces around the world.
You must certainly modify it to suit your purposes but directions you are likely to receive have been formulated using this process so it best to get to grips with it.

4. I promise: As little doctrine as possible.
Personal views based on either operations or major exercises.
A joint perspective.

5. A lecture is the process by which the notes of the lecturer become the notes of the students, without passing through the minds of either.
R.K. Rathburn 6

6. An expert is one who knows so much about so little that he can neither be contradicted, nor is worth contradicting
Henry Ward 14

7. JIPB JMAP Preliminary Scoping STEP 1: MISSION ANALYSIS STEP 2:
Course of Action
DEVELOPMENT
STEP 3:
Comd’s Guidance
STEP 4:
DECISION &
EXECUTION
Modified COA’s
The process is a cyclic one with analysis of the environment, threat, and stakeholders (JIPB) being revisited at each step.
Additionally, information from the steps contributes to drive and focus information requirements. Hence the double direction arrows.

8. Deficiencies/Requirements
Situational Awareness across the staff
Linkages between Components, BOS and staff functions
Utility of current products - Inputs/Outputs
Gap between Mission Analysis and COA Development
Time Management
Unclear whether the products being produced during the planning process were appropriate for fighting the battle or were just informing the process. In particular some of the IPB products but also the utility of JPTLs, AGMs.

9. Its about Russia. Woody Allen
I took a speed reading course and read War and Peace in twenty minutes.
Its about Russia.
Woody Allen 4

10. Planning Groups Commander’s Planning Group Joint Planning Group
Joint Admin Planning Group
Joint Intelligence Planning Group
Joint Surveillance and Targeting Planning Group and Targeting Board

11. JIPB JMAP Preliminary Scoping STEP 1: MISSION ANALYSIS STEP 2:
Course of Action
DEVELOPMENT
STEP 3:
Comd’s Guidance
STEP 4:
DECISION &
EXECUTION
Modified COA’s
The process is a cyclic one with analysis of the environment, threat, and stakeholders (JIPB) being revisited at each step.
Additionally, information from the steps contributes to drive and focus information requirements. Hence the double direction arrows.

12. PRELIMINARY SCOPING
Situation update/Forces Available - a need for the reintroduction of relative strengths.
Strategic/Higher direction - clarity and focus are the essential requirements.
Commander’s initial guidance
Planning timeline
Division of responsibilities
Situation Update:
Inputs from higher include: WNGO, Int update, Country Studies, CSPs, Imagery, Maps.
Friendly Forces availabliity including indicative Force Assignment and their NTM
Outputs are similar and consider:
Operational environment analysis. (Focus on POEs, Infrastructure)
Identification of stakeholders
Initial COG Construct
Imagery, Maps, CSPs
Operations Update (NTMs, assets available, current locations)
Initial Logistical capability/shortfalls
Strategic/Higher Direction - Superior Comd’s Intent
Comd’s Initial Guidance - by Battlespoace Operating System (BOS)
Planning Timeline
Allocation to subordinates, COMDs input, briefing times
Division of Staff responsibilities - priority of staff effort/support - to the J2 for IPB, J9 for targeting
Requirements to conduct prelim moves or heighten readiness are identified early.

13. Preliminary Scoping The initial CPG Meeting
Incorporating the components
Set the focus for IPB
Determine the initial staff effort
Establish the time management
CPG Meeting held to:
analyse the Higher Intent fully
inform the whole HQ
draw on the corporate experience
Problem of engaging the components remains
consider secure comms with likely componemt staff
RANLO & DALO in the first instance with links
Assignment of staff effort from across the HQ to primarily J2 - IPB and J9 - RSI and Targeting
Time Management
Application of the 1/3 - 2/3 rule - rigid
Better meeting management processes to avoid time wasting
A time management tool - in need of testing.

14. Time Management

15. Time Management MISSION ANALYSIS 20% MISSION ANALYSIS 50%
COG / DE CONSTRUCT 10% MISSION ANALYSIS BRIEF 30% COMD GUIDANCE 10%
COA DEV 30%
BROAD COA DEV 20% SCHEME OF MANOUEVRE 50% COA DEV BRIEF 20% COMD GUIDANCE 10%
COA ANALYSIS 30%
PREP FOR WARGAMING 20% WARGAMING 60% PROD OF SYNCH / DSM 10% COMD GUIDANCE 10%
DECISION / EXECUTION 10%
COA COMPARISON 10%
DECISION BRIEF 70%
COMD GUIDANCE 20%
ORDERS PRODUCTION 10%
WRITE ORDER 60%
EDIT BY J5 / J3 15%
EDIT BY COFS 10%
EDIT BY COMD 5%
REPRODUCTION / DISTR 10%

16. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace
Getting the composition of the JIPG right.
For example - the need for joint logisticians
The utility of higher level product. Country studies vs the need for an analysis of strategic and operational level COG.
The ability to analyse and articulate the intangible.

17. Mission Analysis COG Construct considered earlier than COA Dev
Proposed Decisive Events and Draft Comd’s Intent (Method Statement)
Improved Situational Awareness
Preparation for COA Development
Decisive Event linkages
MA Brief is more detailed with the COG construct and Decisive Events derivation. Draft suggestion of some of the Comd’s Guidance information.
Have combined the Comd’s worksheet (elements of his own estimate) and MA Brief format to align and make access available across the staff
COG construct has been brought forward from the initial stage of COA Dev because of the implications for RFIs, RSI planning and others.
Our analysis of the TCVs and tasks leads us to propose Decisive Events as the basis for COA Dev. Method statement (old defeat mechanism)
Use MA brief as the basis for all staff getting to a level of SA.
A clear understanding promotes preparation and understanding as we launch into COA Dev.

18. And a chance for the staff to think on their feet under pressure
Did they pass the Charles De Gaulle test?

19. Charles De Gaulle looked like a female llama surprised in her bath
Charles De Gaulle looked like a female llama surprised in her bath. Winston Churchill

20. CRITICAL VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS
The enemy COG is his ability to generate combat power. I intend to negate this COG through disruption of the enemy’s ability to observe and direct fire by the denial of key terrain suitable for OPs. I will dislocate the enemy combined arms team by a combination of tactical obstacles and the siting of positions to maximise the constraining effects of the ground and the range advantage of my anti-armour weapons. Finally, I will disrupt his ability to fight dismounted by encouraging an attack at night over terrain suitable for concentrated direct and indirect fire.

21. Example CJTF Operational COG
Force Projection
ASSESSED OPERATIONAL
COG
(From GCB until Lodgement)
PHASES
Transit Focal Area Lodgement Forced Passage
CVBG/
ARG
Int
Assets
ARG
CVBG
TACTICAL COG
Morale Ability to sustain ops
WLS Essex
Ability to detect deception
Ltd number strike acft
Casualties
MCM
CAS/CAP
Weather
Fire spt
AOR
SLOC
Attack helo
CRITICAL
VULNERABILITIES
This is a summary of the COG construct. A detailed COG construct is aval separately. The TCVs are highlighted in red.

22. COG construct Threat Targetable Critical Vulnerabilities
Targeting, Collection Plan, RSI
IO planning
Templated - matrix approach early in process
Can be qualified by
BOS to deliver effect
Time or Phase
Close, Deep, Rear
Utility across the whole staff. Basis of the common understanding of the en and the effect we want to have on him

23. COG construct Friendly forces Vulnerabilities - Force Protection tasks
EEFI - OPSEC, CI, and IO planning
Force ratio comparison in key capabilities, strengths vs weaknesses.
The importance of our own COG construct analysis is:
Identify own weaknesses and scarce resources (critical capabilities) and areas for force protection tasks.
EEFI implications for OPSEC.
Identify own strengths and ability to target en critical vulnerabilities.
Idea of developing force ratios in key capabilities for use at certain decisive points (events).

24. Decisive Event Planning
What events must I successfully achieve to target the enemy’s critical vulnerabilities and achieve my superior commanders intent ?

25. Decisive Event Planning
Two key elements combined to ensure success (Defeat en and meet Comd’s Intent)
Target en weaknesses to get to his COG
Complete tasks to meet superior Comd’s Intent
Determine which of the CVs we are able to Target and have an effect on
Review of the Essential Tasks

26. COA Development Focus shifted to targeting as a “driver”
Decisive Events and effects on TCVs
Key input from BOS planners - effect
Decisive Events used as the basis for the Scheme of Manoeuvre and Line of Operation.

27. COA Development
Lines of operation through Decisive Event combinations

28. COA Development Time compressed planning - modification
COA Dev ends with Hasty Wargame and brief of results
Detailed preparation and synchronisation of one COA
Decisive Events used as the basis for the Scheme of Manoeuvre and Line of Operation.

29. Targeting at DJFHQ
Targeting at DJFHQ incorporates lethal and non-lethal targeting.
Aims to integrate the RS&I effort with the exploitation effort and BDA, which in turn informs the continuing targeting effort in support of the overall plan.

30. The Targeting Working Group (TWG)
The TWG, headed by the J9, integrates the targeting plan with the JMAP and is one of the HQ key working groups
The TWG comprises core targeting and TA staff with augmentation from SMEs, and LOs for the full gambit of RS&I assets, and lethal and non-lethal exploitation assets.
The inputs and outputs between the TWG and the JPG during the JMAP are shown in the following slides.

31. TWG Inputs and Outputs to the JMAP

32. TWG Inputs and Outputs to the JMAP Contd...

33. JIPB REVIEW Preliminary Scoping STEP 1: STEP 2: Course of Action
Comd’s Guidance
Course of Action
DEVELOPMENT
MISSION
ANALYSIS
STEP X:
JIPB
Course of Action
ANALYSIS
(Deliberate)
STEP 3:
Course of Action
ANALYSIS
(Hasty)
Whilst the basic steps of the MAP have been adopted in the JMAP the level of consideration has been raised to serve the operational level planner. Importantly the warfighting concepts have been incorporated into the process to assist the commander and his staff produce plans that meet the ways the ADF is trained and equipped to fight.
I will now outline how these concepts have impacted on each step of the process and highlight how it facilitates operational level planning.
STEP 4:
DECISION &
EXECUTION
Modified COA’s 9

34. Course of Action Analysis
War gaming to endstate
Throughout the battlespace
Identifies adv and disadv of COA
Identifies Risk
Identifies Comd’s Decisions
Synchronises capabilities
Identifies NAI and TAI
Establishes the key logistic requirements
COA Analysis is the tool we use to synchronise the COA and determine its adv and disadv for subsequent comparison and decision.

35. Course of Action Analysis
Dry synch and preparations are essential
Synchronisation and Decision Support Matrix
Production of Operational timeline - Battle Management
COA Analysis is the tool we use to synchronise the COA and determine its adv and disadv for subsequent comparison and decision.
Have approached DIO for information and analysis that will allow us a greater understanding of the following in preparation of the en COAs for wargaming.
En wider aims and courses
En higher guidance and military strategic endstate
Level of Command and operational level relations with strategic level
En Comd’s Intent
En Most Likely COA
En Most Dangerous COA

36. Decision and Execution
Review of Products
Less cumbersome OPORD
Proposed changes to:
Task Organisation Matrix
Synchronisation Matrix
OPORD body
Better use of Graphics

37. Everyone needs an editor. Tim Foote
Hitler’s original title for Mein Kampf was Four and a half Years of Struggle against Lies, Stupidity and Cowardice.
Everyone needs an editor.
Tim Foote 12

38. Conclusion DJFHQ has embraced the JMAP and Decisive Event Planning
Improving Situational Awareness through using TCVs and Decisive Events is the basis for the common understanding of Comd’s Intent
Linkages between planning groups, Components, BOS and advisors remains the area for focus
Decisive Event Planning brought forward into the Mission Analysis and further refined throughout the process.

39. And for all that there will be times when your views about the JMAP will be similar to Mr Thomas’s views about Welsh Nationalism

40. When asked his opinion of Welsh nationalism, Mr Thomas replied in three words, two of which were “Welsh nationalism”.
Dylan Thomas

41. Conclusion: 45 46